RAJA MUHAMMAD KHURSH1D KHAN, C. J.-The appellant, Fida Muhammad Rathore, to this appeal by leave was compulsorily retired when he was holding a post of selection grade Section Officer on 18-7-1978. He sought the vacation of this order by way of a review petition moved before the Government on 25-7-1978. The review petition was filed under the provisions of rule 16 of Chapter 4 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir. Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1977.
2. The review petition, vide order dated 25-3-1979, was partially accepted by the Government and recalling the order of retirement the appellant was taken back in the service but was de-graded from National Pay Scale No. 18 which he was earlier enjoying before his retirement to National Pay Scale No. 17.
3. The appellant called in question this later Government order through a second review petition.
The Government found the second review petition as incompetent and disallowed the same on 6- 1-1980. Under the provisions of section 4 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Service Tribunal Act, 1975 (hereinafter to be referred as Service Act) the appellant, for discharging the second order of the Government, appealed before the Service Tribunal which appeal was disallowed on 5-4-1980, inter alia, on the grounds :-
(a) that the appeal having been filed beyond the statutory period of thirty days from the date of the decision of first review petition is incompetent. It was found that time consumed in prosecuting the second incompetent review petition cannot be deducted from the limitation period ;
(b) that no sufficient ground exists for consideration of the delay.
4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. The only point which requires determination is as to whether the appeal filed before the Service Tribunal beyond the period of 30 days, stipulated under section 4 of the Service Act, can be considered to be a valid appeal. On the point Sh. Abdul Aziz, the (earned counsel, contended that the order passed on the second review petition might he considered to be a final order passed by the appellate authority and that being so the time against appellant would start running from 6-1-1980 when the second review petition was refused. We regret we cannot agree with him.
5. The enacting part of section 4 of the Service Act, which lays down :- "Any civil servant aggrieved by any final order, whether original or appellate made by a departmental authority in respect of any of the terms and conditions of his service including disciplinary matter may, within thirty days of the communication of such order to him or wihtin six months of the establishment of the appropriate Tribunal, whichever is later, prefer an appeal to the Tribunal." it would appear, provides a period of 30 days for filing an appeal to be counted from the time of intimation of the final order ; whether original or appellate and this proposition admits of no ambiguity or doubt. The plain meaning of the language employed yields no two meanings and this provision apparently creates no difficulty in so far as appeals against appellate orders are concerned for apparently the proviso is not attracted in such cases. To our mind the word `final' used in respect of both original as well as appellate orders only means orders which dispose of the con--troversy.
6. In the instant case the point which would clinch the matter is as to whether the second review petition was competent ? For convenience sake we may reproduce rule 16 of Chapter 4 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1977, which reads :- "Where the original order has been passed by the Government, no appeal shall lie, and instead, a review petition, shall lie to the Government and the Government may, in its discretion, exercise any of the powers conferred on the appellate authority."
It would appear that no application to review an order made on an application for a review of an order, made under review petition `can legally be entertained and, therefore, after the disposal of the first review petition of the appellant the second application could not have been entertained at all by the Government which was rightly disallowed.-
7. There is, however, some authority in the view that a second application for review of the original order is admissible when some fresh ground (the present case is Rot covered by it) is advanced in support of such an application which the appellant was not in a position to adduce in a former application. In such a case it might be said that the second application is permissible. But in the present case, as said elsewhere, the second application does not disclose a fresh ground which was not available to the appellant at the time he made the first application for review. Therefore in our view the second review petition was incompetent.
8. It is settled principle of law that a review is not an appeal. It is not a means of putting right a mistake however heinous apart from the clerical error or mistake of calculation and reluctant all Courts must be to admit an application for review on an alien ground not known to such petitions.
They must be doubly reluctant to admit a second application on the same grounds which were already agitated, for to do so would teantomount to reconsidering the correctness of the matter already decided on the same materials.
9. In view of the above the appellant negligently slept over his legal right to assail the first order passed on the review petition under the provisions of section 4 of the Service Act and only chose to approach the Tribunal when his appeal was hopelessly barred by limitation.
10. Before parting with the case we may dispose of the application submitted by the appellant for condonation of time in filing appeal before the Service Tribunal. He seeks condonation on the ground that he, in good faith, believed that second review petition was competent and, therefore, time spent in prosecuting the second review petition may be extended. The second review petition was not permissible and the appellant, in his own wisdom, chose to file the same before the Government, thereby wasting practically nine months in pursuing the same. Due diligence and care could make him alive of his wrong action and thus save him to follow the wrong cause. The time thus spent in pursuing a wrong remedy, therefore, cannot be excused. The appellant's act obviously a smacks with gross carelssaness. It is significant that the petitioner has not even filed any application for condonation of delay before the Service Tribunal and even here the application is not supported by any affidavit showing the appellant's bona fides. Even otherwise condonation of delay is exclusively within the province of the Service Tribunal and refusal to exercise the discretion in favour of the appellant in this case does not suffer from any legal infirmity calling for our interference.
For the view we have taken in the matter the appeal stands dismissed. In the circumstances of the case no order as to costs.