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1983 PLC (C. S.) 1170

FAZAL KHAN vs SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, SADAR DIVISION, LAHORE AND 2 OTHERS

Citation1983 PLC (C. S.) 1170
CourtPunjab Service Tribunal
Judge(s)Malik Zawwar Hussain, Sardar Abdul Jabbar Khan, Abdul Hameed
ResultOrder accordingly

MALIK ZAWWAR HUSSAIN (MEMBER).-Fazal Khan Sub-Inspector has filed this appeal under section 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974 in which he has impleaded the Superintendent of Police, Sadar Division, Lahore, the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Lahore Range, Lahore and the Inspector-General of Police, Punjab, Lahore as respon--dents. By virtue of this appeal he has prayed that orders dated 11-5-1981, 11-7-1981 and 5-6-1982, passed by the respondents No. 1, 2 and 3 res--pectively be set aside.

2. Brief facts of the case are that while the appellant was posted as S. H. O. At Police Station, Raiwind City, he was served with show-cause notice under rule 6 (3) of the Punjab Police (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1975 which are reproduced hereunder for the sake of convenience :- "You Sub-Inspector Fazal Khan L/81 while posted as S. H. O., P. S. Raiwind City, committed misconduct defined in rule 3(b) of the Punjab Police (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1975 by failing to perform your official duty in appropriate manner in that detention order in respect of Mr Shah Muhammad Mohsan, ex-M. P. A. Of defunct P. P. P. Son of Umer Daraz Khan, resident of 5-A, Race Course Road, Lahore and a landlord of village Samlani Khui, P. S: Chung, was issued by the Martial Law Authorities vide their No. 0101/G/L & C/ML, dated 25-2-1981. All the S.H.Os. And S.D.P.Os. Were apprised of the order by the undersigned and directed to arrest him wherever he was found available., S.D.P.O. Sadar-II was specially deputed in this connec--tion who in turn directed all the S.H.Os. Of his circle to carry out the search of aforesaid Shah Muhammad Mohsan and apprehend him as early as possible. On 20-3-1981 Shah Muhammad Mohsan was found moving about in Raiwind City in Car No. 3100/IH, alongwith his companions. You instead of arresting him, submitted a special diary No. 191-5 ARW, dated 24-3-1981 just mentioning his visit and movements in Raiwind City on 23-3-1981, SDPO-Sadar II forwarded your Special Diary with the remarks that you failed to perform your duty by not arresting Shah Muhammad Mohsan which was tanta--mount to harbouring hip. It is evident that you deliberately failed to carry out arrest of Shah Muhammad Mohsan for some ulterior motive." .

3. By virtue of this show-cause notice, he was called upon to show--cause as to why one or more of the major penalties as defined in rule 4 be not imposed upon him. The appellant submitted reply and was also heard in person by the Superintendent of Police. The Superintendent of Police. Was not satisfied with the defence of the appellant and he also held ' guilty of the charge and was imposed a major punishment of reduction in his pay from Rs. 433 p. m. To Rs. 405 p. m. Were. f. 5-5- 1981. The appellant submitted an appeal to the Deputy Inspector-General of Police which was rejected vide order dated 11-7-1981. He again filed a revision petition before the Inspector-General of Police, Punjab, Lahore which was also rejected hence this appeal.

4. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant as well as the learned District Attorney on behalf of the respondents. It has been argued on behalf of the appellant that the Superintendent of Police has clearly mentioned in the show-cause notice as well as in the impugned orders that he himself bad appraised all the S. H. Os. And the S.D:F Os. Regarding the order of detention and directed them to arrest Shah Muhammad Mohsan, ex-M. P. A. Wherever he was found available. He has submitted that the Superintendent of Police himself being vital witness could not sit in judgment against the appellant, and the impugned order is of no legal effect. Reliance has been placed on a case of this Tribunal reported as Malik Mukhtar Ahn;ad v. S. P., Attock (1982 PLC (C. S.)

238). It has further been argued on behalf of the appellant that the appellant never knew about the issuance of any detention order by the M. L. A. Against Shah Muhammad Mohsan and even otherwise he could not arrest him because he was not entrusted with any such order. It has further been explained that this matter required a regular enquiry in view of the denial of the appellant ; as such the procedure adopted under rule 6(3) is illegal. On the other hand the learned District Attorney has argued that the competent authority has acted strictly in accordance with the Rules and the Superintendent of Police was fully competent to pass the impugned orders. It has further been argued that perusal of the appeal filed by the appellant before the Deputy Inspector-General of Police would reveal that the appellant fully knew about the detention order and that he has failed to effect the arrest of ex-M. P. A. Deliberately.

5. We have given our anxious thoughts to the arguments of the parties and have perused the record. The crucial issue in this case is whether the appellant was ever informed about the issuance of detention order against ex-M. P. A. And whether, he had committed misconduct by not apprehend--ing him. To resolve this issue we have persued the record in this case very carefully. In paras. 4 to 6 of his appeal filed before the Deputy Inspector- General of Police, the appellant had clearly mentioned that as a matter of fact, the detention orders were to be served upon the person concerned by the local S. H. O. And not any one else and that it was bare fact that Raiwind town was such a place where the only conveyance available was a tonga which has no matching with a car. He has also mentioned in his appeal that Raiwind Police was without any mechanized transport and it was not only difficult rather well nigh impossible to chase a car either on foot or bicycle or in a tonga. He has also submitted that he did not conceal the visit of ex-M. P. A. To Raiwind and immediately submitted a Diary to the authorities concerned. From the examination of the record and his own admissions stated above it is clearly revealed that the appellant was fully in the knowledge of the detention order and that he did not take any step to arrest ex-M. P. A. We are fortified in our view when we find that the appellant has even submitted a Diary to the higher authorities regarding the visit of the ex-M. P. A. To Raiwind, if the appellant had not known about the existence of any warrant of detention, there was no occasion for him to send any such report to the higher authorities. Thus, we do not see any force in the contention of the appellant that he was unaware about the existence of any warrant of detention against the ex-M. P. A. And the plea so raised before us is as afterthought and a bogus one. Regarding the arguments that the S. P. Should not have passed the impugned orders himself, we may observe her that the facts and the circumstances of the case of Malik Mukhtar Ahmad are entirely distinguishable from the facts of the present case particularly when we find that the appellant while submitting appeal to the Deputy Inspector-General of Police had not denied the knowledge about the existence of warrant of detention. Thus, we hold that the Superintendent of Police is fully justified in passing the impugned order. Since the action taken against the appellant is based on documentary evidence, so these circumstances did not require any regular enquiry and the procedure adopted by the Superintendent of Police under rule 6(3) of the Punjab Police (Efficiency and .Discipline) Rules, 1975 was fully justified in accordance with the rules.

6. In view of the above analysis we hold that there are no merits in this appeal which is liable to be dismissed. However, we find that the punishment awarded to the appellant is harsh, is unduly severe and does not commensurate with the gravity of the allegations proved against him. In the circumstances of the case we feel that the punishment of stoppage of increment for a period of one year without cumulative effect would be sufficient to meet the ends of justice. So we uphold the findings but reduce the penalty from reduction of pay to that of stoppage of increment for one year without cumulative effect. The appeal is accepted to the extent as indicated above. There will be no order as to costs.

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