Dr. Khurshid Iqbal, J.-
1. In the year 2020, the petitioners filed writ petitions (WPs) # 1276, 1277, 1279, 1281, 1282, 1283, 1284 and 1285-M against the present respondents Department (Secretary Public Health Engineering, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and 06 others). On the basis of their treatment with similarly placed employees, they prayed for the grant of benefits of regularization of their services from the date of their initial appointments along with pensionary benefits, etc. By orders dated 06/08/1995, 31.07.1993, 31.07.1995, 14.09.1995, 12.05.1994, 12.06.1995, 15.01.1995 and 14.07.1996, they were appointed by the respondents-Department as Operator in BPS-4 on contract basis. They developed and pleaded their case on earlier judgments of this Court rendered in similar cases in writ petitioners instituted by other employees whose services were regularized with effect from their initial appointment along with back benefits. They presented their case to the respondents-Department for similar treatment. The respondents-Department refused to concede their request which prompted the petitioners to file the writ petitions.
2. After hearing, their WPs were allowed by Judgment dated 03/11/2021 while relying _ on the Judgment rendered in WP # 767-P/2016. The operative part of the Judgment dated 03/11/2021 is contained in paragraph 12, which reads as under: "12. We, in the circumstances, are not inclined to treat the petitioners differentially and the writ petitions in hand are therefore allowed with directions to the concerned department to regularize services of the petitioners with effect from their initial date of appointments and count their services accordingly. They shall not however claim arrears of salaries or other back benefits for the service they had rendered on contract basis before regularization."
3. The petitioners initially filed Miscellaneous Petitions in their respective WPs, under sections 151, 152 and 153 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC), stating their grievance with words underlined in the above quoted last paragraph of the Judgment. The key ground set up in the petitions concisely is that the above referred words are the result of accidental slip or omission, and liable to correction as they are obtruding on their fundamental rights, particularly equal treatment of the petitioners with similarly placed other employees, as held in the Judgment passed in WP # 767. As the petitions came up for hearing on 08/02/2022, this Court directed that the petitions be converted to review petitions. The petitioners prayed for deletion of the underlined words from the last paragraph.
4. The respondent # 01, 02 (Secretary Public Health Engineering and Secretary Finance Department), and # 6 and 7 (Pay Fixation Branch of the Accountant General Office, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the District Accounts Officer, Timergara) filed their para-wise replies which we shall refer later in this Judgment at appropriate places. We have heard argument of Mr. Asad Nabi, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Sohail Sultan, Assistant Advocate General, for the respondents in light of the material available on the record.
5. At the very outset, we would observe that certain other petitioners filed a WP # 3674-P/2019, which was decided by Judgment passed on 08/09/2020. While relying on the Judgment in WP ft 767, the prayer of other petitioners (# 2, 4 to 8 and 12) was allowed while that of the petitioners # 1, 11 and 13, was held that it could not be decided on available record and their status declared as misjoinder with other petitioners. They were found to have been appointed on fixed pay basis. A reason that made their case intelligibly different from petitioner # 2, 4 to 8 and 12 whose appointment was against sanctioned and permanent posts. The Court observed that it was not clear whether they were subsequently offered contract appointment or not. It was, however, let open for the petitioners to file fresh WP which was to be decided on the strength of its own merits.
Availing their choice, the petitioners filed the instant WPs which were allowed though with the underlined words with which the petitioners are aggrieved.
6. The respondents # 1 and 2 in their reply, while controverting the petitioners' contention, referred to annexed copies of a notification dated 22/05/2019 and a letter dated 29/01/2008, which are reproduced as under: Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Finance Department (Regulation Wing)
Dated Peshawar the 22.05.2019 NOTIFICATION No. FD(SOSR-11)4-36/2017. In pursuance of the judgment of Peshawar High Court Abbottabad Bench in Writ Petition No. 627zA/ 2018 dated: 18.12.2018 and judgments of various Lower Courts as well as supersession of Finance Department policy letter No. BO-I/ 1-22/2007-08/FD dated 29.01.2008, the Competent Authority has been pleased to accord sanction of regularization of Fixed Pay Class-IV employees appointed on the basis of policies issued vide Finance Department notifications No.B-1/2-1/92-93/I dated 04.11.1992 and No.B-I/ 1-22/94-951FD Vol-II dated 24.07.1999 by extending them the status of civil servant as per Civil Servants Act, 1973 from the date of their first appointments instead of the date of their regularization w.e.f. 01.07.2008 in their respective entities in the best of public interest. ---sd--- Secretary to Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Finance Department
7. Another crucial aspect of the case is that the Judgment in WP # 767 was impugned in Civil Appeals # 239, 274 and 283 of 2020 before the apex Court. By its Judgment passed on 25/11/2020, while allowing the appeals, Judgment in WP 767, was set aside. Thus, the very foundation on which the instant WPs were allowed no longer exists. Moreover, the reply submitted by the respondents # 01 and 02 shows that the Judgment of this Court in WP 3674-P/2020 has also been assailed before the august Apex Court in a CPLA vide CP # 358-P/2021.
8. Corning to the applicable law, section 114, C.P.C., envisages review jurisdiction. Order XLVII [47], C.P.C., enunciates the requirements an application for review shall meet. It is essential to reproduce Rule 1, below:
1. Application for review of judgment. ---
(1) Any person considering himself aggrieved- a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from no appeal has been preferred, b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order.
(2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court the case on which he applies for the review. (Underlining is ours).
The following three grounds could be pithily deduced: i. discovery of new facts/materials/ evidence; ii. mistake or error on the face of record, or iii. for any other sufficient cause.
9. The power of review is expressly conferred by a statute. Its exercise is subject to only those grounds which a statute provides. It is exercised in exceptional cases only. A judicial pronouncement is a serious enterprise. It need not be done away with glibly. Perhaps, it may be heartening to refer to the famous case of Somasundaram in which Lord Justice Atkinson remarked: "Review jurisdiction has always been considered to be exercisable in exceptional case. Legal judgments, it has been said "cannot be treated as mere counters in the game of litigation. They are serious pronouncements, for the most part by the judicial officers of the State, touching the rights or disputes of subjects, bringing home to those subjects what the rule of justice required and are enforceable, if need be, by the force of the State. Moreover, once pronounced, they cannot be lightly set aside." (Somasundaram Chetty v. Chetty, AIR 1926 PC 136).
In Muhammad Tufail, our Supreme Court observed: "It cannot be over-stressed that a decision, come to properly and after hearing the parties, carries sanctity, and both on public and administrative considerations, should not be lightly interfered with." (Muhammad Tufail v. Abdul Ghafaor, PLD 1958 SC (Pak) 201). [Reference: Justice (R) Fazal Karim, Access to Justice in Pakistan, Pakistan Law House, First Edition 2003, page 6441.
10. The Hon'ble Apex Court while discussing the scope of review from the perspective of the 1980 Supreme Court Rules, has observed: "4. it has been noticed by us that a tendency has developed nowadays to presume review jurisdiction to be taken to an appellate jurisdiction. It is, therefore, that the review petitions are being filed with these considerations, although this is not in actuality the case and scope of review jurisdiction. The review jurisdiction has to be invoked in consonance with the requirements of Order XXVI, Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules 1980, which envisages the applicability of the grounds similar to that of Order XLVII, rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. According to that rule 1 of Order XLVII of the, C.P.C., the following preconditions are essential, for beseeching the exercise of review jurisdiction. -- i. When new and important matter or evidence has been discovered after the passing of impugned judgment, decree or order, which after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him at the time of making of judgment, decree or order; ii. There was some mistake or error apparent on the face of record, which was found in the impugned judgment or order; Or for any other sufficient reason, it was necessary to obtain review of the impugned judgment.
[Anwar Ahmed v/s Mst. Nafeesa Bono through legal heirs, PLD 2009 Supreme Court 493 (Supreme Court of Pakistan)].
11. In A.R Bhuiyan's case, the significance of expression "who from the discovery of new and important matter of evidence, which after the exercise of the diligence, was within his knowledge" used in Order 47 rule 1, C.P.C, was explained as under: "It is true that on the discovery of 'new and important matter or evidence' a review application can be presented but we cannot lose sight of the fact that a new and important matter can be brought before a Court by a review application but that new and important matter must be such, which could not be discovered by the petitioner after exercise of due diligence." [Messrs A.R. Bhuivan & Co. Limited Ws Messers Centrotex Foreign Trading' Corporation", PLD 1968 Dacca 779]."
12. It is also worth noting that an aggrieved person could not be allowed to raise those grounds which were available to him at the time of hearing of the main petition but he did not press it at that point of time. A review petition could not be equated or treated as hearing of the main appeal or revision, as the case may be. It has to be restricted to the newly discovered facts or any illegality or mistake or error which is floating on the face of record. We rely on the case of Syed Wajihul Hassan Zaidi v. Government of the Punjab and others, reported as PLD 2004 SC 901 [Supreme Court of Pakistan], wherein it has been held that: "[...] if the Court has taken a conscious and deliberate decision on a point of fact or law, a review petition will not be competent. The circumstance that the view canvassed in the review petition is more reasonable than the view already accepted by the Court in the impugned order of which review is sought would not be sufficient to maintain a review petition. Likewise, factum that a material irregularity was committed by the Court would not be adequate enough to warrant a review of the judgment unless the material irregularity be of a nature so as to convert the process of acting in aid of justice to a process of gross injustice. In such eventuality a review petition would be competent. Similarly, fact that the conclusion drawn in a judgment is wrong would not warrant review of the same but if the conclusion is wrong because something manifest has been ignored by the Court or the Court has not considered an important aspect of the matter, a review petition would lie [...]."
13. The upshot of the above discussion is that no ground for review was made out. Hence, these review petitions stand dismissed.