JAWAD HASSAN, J.---Through this Writ Petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (the "Constitution"), the Petitioner impugns the order dated 05.09.2022, whereby the Respondent rejected his Application for renewal of the License for manufacturing, possessing and selling gunpowder and fireworks under certain terms and conditions constituted under the Provisions of the Explosive Act, 1884 and the Rules made thereunder.
2. It is contended by learned counsel for the Petitioner that initially on 30.12.2015, he had been issued the License to manufacture, possess and sell fireworks and gunpowder, that had been renewed from time to time and lastly expired on 31.12.2021, for renewal of which he submitted Application before the Respondent well in time but he rejected the same with the observation that the Petitioner had committed negligence and violated the terms and conditions of the License and that certain FIRs had been registered against him. While passing the impugned order, the Respondent ignored the fact that he along with some others had already been acquitted of the charge levelled against him in case FIR No.676/2011, vide judgment dated 16.01.2012, passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Faisalabad; that though FIRs Nos. 348/2018 and 589/2012 have also been registered against the Petitioner, yet the same are still pending adjudication, therefore, mere on the basis of nomination of the Petitioner in the FIRs, he cannot prove to be guilty of the charges causing snatching of his bread and butter which is linked with renewal of the License; that fireworks Licenses of some other dealers of this business standing on the similar footings, as that of the Petitioner, had been renewed discriminately, which is sheer violation of Articles 25 and 27 of the Constitution. Placing reliance on Asghar Ali alias Kaloo v. The State (PLD 2008 Lahore 184) seeks suspension of the impugned order dated 05.09.2022, which allegedly has been passed by the Respondent being biased against him.
On the other hand, the learned Law Officer submits that there is no denial that the Petitioner had succeeded in having issuance of a direction to the Respondent from this Court for decision of his Application claimed to be lying pending adjudication with him/the Respondent, which the latter complied with. As for as, Petitioner's allegation of biasness of the Respondent towards him regarding non-renewal of his fireworks License is concerned, he refers to Annexure-F, placed on case-file of this Petition, which is the Police Character Verification report of the Petitioner, which not only shows involvement of the Petitioner in certain cognizable criminal cases but also reveals his conviction and sentence in case FIRS Nos.348/18 and 589/21 under Sections 285 and 286, P.P.C. The language of both the Section ibid is somewhat similar, however, for the ready reference, he quotes Section 285, P.P.C. which reads as under:- "285. Negligent conduct with respect to fire or combustible matter: Whoever does, with tire or any combustible matter, any act so rashly or negligently as to endanger human life, or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person, or knowingly or negligently omits to take such order with any fire or any combustible matter in his possession as is sufficient to guard against any probable danger to human life from such fire or combustible matter, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extent to six months, or with fine which may extent to thousand rupees or with both."
Adds that in this scenario, the Respondent has very rightly rejected the renewal of the fireworks License sought for by the Petitioner and prays for dismissal of this Petition.
4. Heard Record perused.
5. Grievance of the Petitioner agitated through this Petition is that on 31st of December 2016, he had been issued the Fireworks License which later on had been renewed from time to time. Now he has deposited requisite fee for this purpose and that the police report is also in his favour, yet the Respondent is obstinate to renew his License while some others standing on the same footings have been granted the same relief by discriminating him that is not only violation of the law and rules on the subject but also against the norms settled under Articles 25 and 27 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (the "Constitution").
6. Admittedly, the Petitioner has been involved in case FIRs under sections 285 and 286, P.P.C. and as per Police Character Verification, dated 18.08.2022, issued by the City Police Officer, Faisalabad, therein the Petitioner has been convicted and sentenced, which makes him disentitled for renewal of the Fireworks License, in view of Clause 6A(a)(ii) of the Explosive Act, 1884 (IV of 1884) [the "Act"), which reads as under: "any person- who has been sentenced on conviction of any offence involving violence or moral turpitude for a term of not less than six months any time during a period of five year's after the expiration of the sentence; or ......................................
(i) manufacture, sell, transport, import or export any explosive:...
7. So far as, Petitioner's contention that he has been discriminated while renewing the Licenses of his some other co-businessm en. To better understand meaning and object of the word 'discrimination' especially in view of Article 25 of the Constitution, on which the Petitioner has relied upon, I would like to seek guideline from the case reported as "Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary and others v. Syed Sadiq Shah and others" (2021 SCMR 747) wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan has dilated upon the issue of discrimination by holding that Article 25 of the Constitution, guarantees to every person the right to equality before the law and the equal protection of the laws. The expression "equal before law" is a declaration of equality of all persons irrespective of gender, race, religion, colour, caste, creed, status and language etc, implying thereby the absence of any privilege in favour of any individual. The guiding principle of Article 25 is that all persons and things similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike both in respect of privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. Equality before law means that amongst equals should be equal and equally administered and that like should be treated alike.
Hence what it forbids is discrimination between persons who are substantially in similar circumstances or conditions. However, Article 25 does not forbid different treatment of un-equals.
The rule is rather that alike should be treated equally and that unlike should be treated differently.
As a matter of fact all persons are not alike or equal in all respects. Application of the same laws or yardstick uniformly to all of them will, therefore, be inconsistent with the principle of equality. To avoid that situation laws must distinguish between those who are equals and to whom they must apply and those who are different and to whom they should not apply. In fact identical treatment in unequal circumstances would amount to inequality. So a reasonable classification or sub- classification is only not permitted but is necessary if society is to progress. It must always rest upon some real and substantial distinction bearing a just and reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the authority. Persons may be classified or further sub-classified into entities and such entities may be treated differently if there is a reasonable basis for such difference. Article 25 forbids class legislation but it does not forbid classification or differentiation which rests upon reasonable grounds of distinction. The classification however must not be arbitrary, artificial or evasive but must be based on some real and substantial bearing, a just and reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the legislation.
Principle of equality does not mean that every law, policy matter, notification, administrative or executive order etc. must have universal application to all the persons who by nature, attainment or circumstances are not in the same position.
8. On summing up the above discussion, it becomes crystal clear that Petitioner's case neither comes within the ambit of the Explosive Act, 1884 (IV of 1884) [the "Act"] nor under the guidelines laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan, mentioned above. So, there is no illegality or infirmity in the impugned order passed by the Respondent calling for interference by this Court in its Constitutional jurisdiction. This Petition is, therefore, hereby dismissed.