QAZI FAEZ ISA, J. Both these petitions assail the common judgment of the Multan Bench of the Lahore High Court rendered in an Intra-Court Appeal, which was filed by the Cantonment Executive Officer, Multan, the Director Military Lands, Multan and the Director-General, Military Lands and Cantonment (hereinafter respectively referred to as "the CEO". "the Director" and "the Director General"). The impugned judgment upheld the order of the learned Single Judge of the said High Court (in Writ Petition No. 13415 of 2013) but modified it to the extent that the appellants therein were entitled to charge fifty per cent premium from Lt. Col. (Retired) Shahid Ahmed Khan ("Mr. Khan") from the date that the requisite sanction, to change of purpose of the property from residential to commercial, was granted to him, that is from September 24, 2013.
2. Mr. Khan is the leasehold rights' owner of residential house No. 75/C, Qasim Road, Multan Cantonment (hereinafter referred to as ("the property") and wanted to use the property for commercial purposes therefore he had submitted an application dated April, 13, 2007, which was allowed subject to payment of premium of 100 per cent rather than at the rate of 50 per cent because, it was alleged, that Mr. Khan was already using the property for commercial purposes. Mr. Khan disputed that he was using the property commercially and insisted that he be charged the, normal premium rate of 50 percent. The dispute with regard to the applicable rate could not be resolved. Mr. Khan moved another application on February 17, 2012 to change the designated use of the property from residential to commercial but wanted to pay premium at 50 (sic) of the revenue rate as applicable in the years 2007-2008, but this application was rejected on November 29, 2012.
Mr. Khan therefore filed a writ petition before the High Court, which was allowed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court vide judgment dated May 14, 2014, against which decision an Intra-Court appeal was filed, which was partially allowed as mentioned above Feeling aggrieved by the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in the Intra-Court appeal both sides have filed civil petitions for leave to appeal in this Court.
3. The applicable rules and the policy are the Cantonment Land Administration Rules, .1937-and the Revised Policy of Conversion of Properties incorporated in the Ministry of Defence, Government of the Pakistan's letter dated December 21, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as "the Rules" and "the Policy").
The CEO and the Director want to charge 100 percent premium on the applicable "Revenue Rule' alleging that the premium at 50 percent of the Revenue Rate(commercial) (as stipulated in clause 2(b) of the Policy) is not applicable because Mr. Khan had put the property to commercial use before having been granted permission to do so. On the other hand, Mr. Khan wants to be charged premium at the rate that was applicable when he had submitted his application in the year, 2007.
4. The record reveals that the CEO had himself visited the property on January 13, 2009 and through his letter dated January 23. 2009 observed and confirmed that, there is no unauthorized construction and change of purpose, which was also referred to in the Director's letter dated December 21, 2012. The CEO's said letter also enclosed photographs of the property taken by him.
Once the factual position was ascertained by the CEO himself it is not understandable how he can challenge his own determination. The learned Single Judge had referred to the factual determination by the CEO and decided the writ petition on the basis thereof. The learned Division Bench of the High Court upheld such determination but, had allowed the CEO/the Director/the Director-General to charge 50 per cent premium at the applicable rate from September 24, 2013, which was the date of the grant of sanction .to change the .purpose of the property from residential to commercial. 1p any event the learned counsel representing the CEO and the Director have not shown any material that would establish that Mr. Khan had commenced using the property for commercial purposes before such use was permitted. Therefore, the factual determination by the CEO. which was accepted both by the learned Single Judge and by the learned Judges of the Division Bench of the High Court, cannot be set aside at this juncture, and all the more so when there is nothing on record to support a contrary view.
5. We now attend to the petition filed by Mr. Khan, who wants to be charged at the rate applicable in the years 2007-2008. The learned counsel representing Mr. Khan stated that Mr. Khan submitted the application to convert the property to commercial use in the year 2007 therefore the rates than applicable should be charged, he however, did not refer to any clause of the Policy or any provision of the Rules to support his contention. The learned Judges of the Division Bench of the High Court held that Mr. Khan should be charged the rate as was applicable on the date that the requisite sanction was granted which appears to us to be logical and one which we have no reason to disagree with therefore, no exception can be taken to the impugned judgment in this regard.
6. For the reasons mentioned leave to appeal the impugned judgment is declined and both these petitions are dismissed.