Through instant application, the applicant seeks condonation of delay in filing main appeal, which is barred by fourty eight (48) days.
2. Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that though main appeal is barred by time but delay in filing the same is neither intentional nor wilful. It is contended that due to lack of knowledge about passing of impugned judgment, the applicant cannot approach the Court in time, which resulted into delay in filing appeal. Learned counsel emphasized that law favours the adjudication on merits instead of knocking out the parties on the basis of technicalities. Argued that no limitation run against an illegal order.
3. Heard. Record perused.
4. Record reveals that the applicant instituted a suit under Section 9 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 for recovery of Rs.19,40,660 along with cost of funds, cost of suit and markup till final realization in accordance with law against respondent No.1 (hereinafter to be referred as "respondent"). The "respondent" moved an application seeking leave to defend the suit, which was not pressed by him and finally suit of the applicant was decreed vide impugned judgment dated 27th April, 2017 in the following manner:-- "2. The application for leave to appear and defend the suit is dismissed having been not pressed by the defendant and the suit of the plaintiff is decreed to the extent of principal outstanding amount Rs.525,042/- along with costs of funds and cost of suit from date of default till realization of the whole amount. The rates with regard to the cost of funds will be the same as circulated by the State Bank of Pakistan under the law. Decree sheet be prepared."
5. We have noticed that main appeal was though admitted for regular hearing vide order dated 18th January, 2018 but as the appeal was barred by time, so notice was issued to "respondent" subject to final outcome of this application. There remains thus no need to advert to the other merits of the case. Condonation of delay is solicited on the basis of reasons embodied in Paras.
Nos. 2 and 4 of application, which are reproduced below for convenience:-- "2. That the previous lawyer had delivered the certified copies of the order with an immense delay, to the petitioner.
3. ........
4. That under the law, limitation does not run against an illegal order, hence this application/petition."
After going through the contents of the application, it can safely be inferred that reasons assigned are neither justifiable nor sufficient enough to persuade this Court to condone the delay in filing the main appeal. No concrete material is even available to substantiate the ground agitated by the applicant. Mere bald assertions are not sufficient to soften the implication of law of limitation.
Apparently, there was no such disability in the way of the applicant to approach the Court within time and mere filing of an application is not sufficient to persuade the Court to condone the delay in filing the main appeal.
6. It is though the stance of the applicant that delay occasioned due to negligence of learned counsel for the applicant but when learned counsel for the applicant is confronted with query as to whether any action has been taken against said learned counsel on account of such default, he conceded that no action whatsoever has been taken in this regard. Needless to observe that the applicant is obliged to explain delay of each and every day. It is incumbent upon the applicant to establish sufficient cause for the same. Though the word "sufficient cause" is nowhere defined in the Limitation Act, 1908 but guidance in this respect can be sought from the latest judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Rai Muhammad Riaz Decd through L. Rs. and others v. Ejaz Ahmed and others (PLD 2021 Supreme Court 761) wherein it is held as under :- "11 ...........Although the term sufficient cause has not been defined in. the Code of Civil Procedure nor can a specific yardstick be put in place for determining what constitutes sufficient cause and what does not, it always depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case and it has to be left to the judicial conscience of the Court to make an informed assessment as to whether the cause disclosed by the petitioners was a reason good enough to satisfy the Court that it was beyond the reasonable control of the party concerned to appear before the Court on the date fixed for hearing.
12. In the case of Ata Ullah Malik v. Custodian Evacuee Property (PLD 1964 SC 236) this Court examined, discussed and elaborated the term, "sufficient cause" which effectively explained the meaning and scope of the said term in the context of Order IX, Rule 9, C.P.C. as follows: "Under section 5 of the Limitation Act there has to be a finding of sufficient cause. In pre-Partition India sufficient cause had been defined as circumstances beyond the control of the party and I do not know of any case wherein this definition of sufficient case had been rejected. However, at least in determining sufficient cause while dealing with the same expression in Order IX, Rule 8, C.P.C. and Order IX, Rule 3, C.P.C. the Courts had been lenient and had been condoning some negligence i.e. negligence to the extent to which it is regarded as human though they never condoned gross negligence. At the same time the Courts had always been strict in demanding proof of sufficient cause for every day which had expired after the ordinary period of limitation."
Many years later in the case of Khadija Begum v. Yasmeen (PLD 2001 SC 355) this Court again reiterated the same principle which by now is accepted settled law."
The same view was reiterated by the Hon'ble apex Court in the case of Abdul Majid and others v.
Mst. Zubeda Begum and others (2007 SCMR 866).
7. It is noteworthy to mention here that justice, equity and good conscience did not override the law of limitation. Object of law of limitation was to prevent stale demands and it ought to be construed strictly. The hurdles of limitation could not be crossed under the guise of any hardships or imagined inherent discretionary jurisdiction of the court. Ignorance, negligence, mistake or hardship did not save limitation, nor does poverty of the parties. Guidance in this respect can be sought from Khushi Muhammad through L.Rs. and others v. Mst. Fazal Bibi (PLD 2016 Supreme Court 872).
8. So far contention of learned counsel for the applicant that no limitation run against an illegal order, suffice to observe that hurdle of limitation cannot be softened merely on the ground that order under challenge in appeal is illegal, or unlawful. Even if order under challenge is void the person challenging such order has to explain the delay in filing the proceedings. The said view is fully backed up by the august apex Court from the pronouncements reported as Abid Hussain v.
Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Government of Pakistan through Chief of Air Staff Islamabad (2021 SCMR 645), Haji Wajdad v. Provincial Government through Secretary Board of Revenue Government of Balochistan, Quetta and others (2020 SCMR 2046) and Messrs Blue Star Spinning Mills Ltd. v: Collector of Sales Tax and others (2013 SCMR 587).
9. Needless to observe that the question of limitation cannot be termed as mere technicality. It has paramount importance, as with the afflux of time certain rights do accrue in favour of the adversary, which cannot be taken away in a slipshod manner. The object for framing the law for the purpose of regulating the limitation was to push the parties to file their respective claims within stipulated period. The time period provided for filing the proceedings in terms of suit, appeal, review or revision petition cannot be lightly ignored or brushed aside. The question of limitation is as important as jurisdiction of the Court. After having gone through the reason assigned for the delay it can safely be inferred that no plausible reason is shown for condonation of delay.
10. The procedural requirements are not meant to alter the same on the whims of the parties. It is now high time to curb the tendency of prolonging the matter on false pretext. Every litigant is expected to prosecute his cause with all diligence and hilt and if somebody opts to thwart the process of law, he is liable to face the penal consequences provided therein. The courts cannot sit as silent spectator in, such circumstances and shut their eyes on the flagrant violation of law.
11. For the foregoing reasons, the instant application being devoid of any merits is dismissed.
Main Appeal
12. In view of order of even date, recorded in C.M. No.03-C of 2017 the instant appeal is dismissed being barred by time with no order as to costs.