' SAEEDUZZAMAN SIDDIQUI, J.-This petition is directed against the order of respondent 1 dated 14th January, 1982 passed under M. L.
0.
33. When this petition came up for Katcha Peshi on 1st March, 1982 the Court after hearing the counsel for the petitioner and the learned Advocate-General framed the following question for determination and in view of its importance requested Mr. All Ahmed Fazil, Mr. Khalid M. Ishaque and the Deputy Attorney-General to appear as amicus curiae in the case :- "Whether the jurisdiction of the High Court is completely barred in examining any order passed by any authority in pursuance of a Martial Law Order, or, whether this Court can enter into the question of finding out, whether the order would be termed to have been passed in exercise of power under a Martial Law Order, despite the order, prima facie, not fulfilling the requisites of exercise of power under the said Martial Law Order."
' We are thankful to learned amicus who appeared today in the case and addressed us on the above question. We however, feel after hearing their arguments that it is not necessary to decide the above question in this case which in our opinion should be left open to be decided in some other appropriate case, as the present case can be disposed of conveniently on its own facts. The petitioners are the lessee of Government land bearing Survey Nos. 179 and 489 of Deh Gujro measuring 15.21 Acres which was last renewed for a period of 30 years by the Government of Sind in their favour vide letters No, 31/76/60/-6'K/111, dated 24th January, 1976 and 4811/76/1864-6 (K)/111, dated 15th September 1976 from 9th December, 1968 to 9th December, 1968. The petitioner, it appears, that at some later stage intended to utilize a portion of the leased land for construction of residential quarters and for that purpose they approached the Government for necessary permission. It further appears that respondent 1 who dealt with the case and is invested with the power under M. L.
0. 33 instead of granting the permission sought by the petitioner passed the following order in respect of unutilized land measuring 8 acres :- "Under the powers conferred upon me by Government Notification No, KB-1/37/77/2953, dated 10th October, 1977 read with M.L.O. 33 I, cancel the lease in respect of Survey No, 489 of Deh Gujro measuring 8 Acres and further direct that the possession of the cancelled land may be taken over after lapse of appeal period or decision of appeal, in case appeal is decided in favour of the Government."
' In the comments, dated 31st March, 1982 which were called for in the case the Deputy Secretary (Land Utilization I, Board of Revenue) has mentioned in paragraph 7 that against the order passed by respondent 1 under M.L.O. 33 a review petition was filed by the petitioner before the M.L.A. Zone "C" which has since been disposed of on 8th December, 1981 and the order passed by M.L.A. Zone `C" has been since given effect to. We reproduce here paragraph 7 of the comments which is as follows:- "7. The Review Petition was processed through the Review Committee appointed by the Martial Law Administrator to examine cases under M.L.O. 33 and a Summary processed through the Chief Secretary was put up to the Governor/Martial Law Administrator Zone "C" by his Order, dated 8th December, 1981 rejected the Review Petition under para. 5 of M.L.O. 33 and passed the following orders:--- "Unutilized 8 acres to be resumed."
(Sd.) M. L. A. Zone "C"
8-12-1981.
' This order of Martial Law Administrator Zone "C" was given effect to by the Government of Sind in Land Utilization Department vide Order, dated 16th December, 1981, communicated to the petitioner vide letter dated 16th December, 1981."
Mr. A. A. Zari the learned counsel for the petitioner contends before us that the orders passed by respondents 1 and 2 are not passed in conformity with M.L.O. 33 and are, therefore, liable to be quashed. We are afraid on such ground the petition against the order of Martial Law A Authorities cannot be entertained by this Court in view of the provisions of Article 15 (5) of the P. C.
0. Of 1981. The power of the Court to examine such orders came up for consideration in the case of Muhammad Haroon v. District Food Controller and others and we can do no better than to reproduce here the following observation of the Supreme Court, appearing at page 556 of the report in that case :- "Rana Abdul Majid, learned counsel for the petitioners appearing in support of the remaining petitions submitted that he was neither challenging the validity of Martial Law Instruction No, 22 nor questioning the view that if action was taken thereunder it would be immune from challenge after the promulgation of the Provisional Constitution Order, 1981. His plea was that the provisions of Martial Law Instruction No, 22 had not been observed, while cancelling the depot of the petitioners, whom he was representing. In this connection, he submitted that in the case of Qazi Muhammad Ishaq (petitioner in C. P. S. L. A. No, 184/82) for instance the said petitioner's authorisation was cancelled without hearing him, although para. 8 of Martial Law Order itself provides that the cancellation of the authorisation would be ordered only after giving a show cause notice to the persons effected.
' The question whether a person was issued a show-cause notice before cancelling his authorisation or not is a question of fact ; and in so far as action purports to have been taken under the said Martial Law Instruction No, 22 and shall be presumed that its provisions have been1 complied with. Moreso its validity is to be judged according to the tenor of the order and if it purports to be passed in pursuance of the said Martial Law Instruction it is immune from challenge.
However, if the petitioners felt aggrieved by the said order on the ground now urged before us they should have filed an appeal to the authority superior to one, who bad passed the said order as provided for under para. 9 of the Instruction, in the course of which the objection being taken before us could have been scrutinised and investigated."
In the light of the above observation of the Supreme Court we are of the view that in the facts and the circumstances of the present case this 'B petition is not maintainable and we accordingly dismiss the same summarily. 1982 SCMR 551