1. On 13th June, 1982 I enlarged the two respondents namely Bashir son of Alahditta and Dhani Bux son of Ghulam Muhammad, on bail in the sum of Rs, 10,000 each with one surety and P. R. In the like amount to the satisfaction of Sessions Judge, Hyderabad. For the sake of convenience I would reproduce the order granting bail to these persons which proceeded on the short ground that the medical report shows that the injuries suffered by -the two persons named in the F. I. R. Were simple in nature and were not on the vital part of the body. The order is as follows :- "13th June, 1982.
2. Mr. Abdul Wahid Shaikh, Advocate.
3. Mr. A. A. Muhammadally, A. A.-G.
4. The applicants are accused of offence under sections 307, 326 and 324 read with section 34, P.P.C.
5. The learned A.A.-G. Admits that accord--ing to the Medical Report the injuries caused to the injured are simple in nature and are not on any vital part. He accordingly does not oppose the grant of bail to the applicants who are enlarged on bail in the sum of Rs. 10,000 each with one surety and P. R. In the like amount to the satisfaction of Sessions Judge, Hyderabad."
6. It-appears that at the time the above bail application was argued before me the learned counsel appearing for the State did not oppose the grant of bail to the respondents on the ground that the injuries suffered by the persons mentioned in the F. I. R. Were firstly simple and secondly they were not on any vital part of the body. Dur Muhammad who is one of the persons who has suffered injuries has now come up for cancellation of the bail on the ground that out of four injuries suffered by him two were grievous in nature while two were simple. Similarly it is stated that out of four injuries suffered by the other person Muhammad Budhal, three were declared to be grievous in nature. The learned A. A. G. Appearing for the State supported the application for cancellation of bail on the ground that the medical certificate granted by the Medical Officer immediately after grant. Of bail to respondent had declared the injuries suffered by the persons mentioned in the F. I.
7. R.. As grievous. Under section 497, Cr. P. C. Bail could not be granted to an accused person if there were reasonable grounds for believing that he was guilty of- offence which was punishable with death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for ten years. However, bail could be granted under this section- if the case is covered by any of the exceptions mentioned in the section. It is not disputed by the learned counsel for the respondents that none of the exceptions mentioned in section 497, Cr. P. C. Are applicable to the cases of respondents. 1n fact the order of bail passed by me on 13th June, 1982 shows that bail was granted on merits and not on the ground that it fell under any of the exceptions mentioned under section 497, Cr. P. C. Can the face of the medical evidence now produced before me, I am of the view that the bail granted on 13th June, 1982 could not have been granted if this evidence was placed before me then as admittedly the offence which is disclosed in the F. I. R. Falls prima facie under section 326 of the P. P. C. In view of the medical evidence, which is punishable with imprisonment of either description which may extend to life imprisonment or ten years. Mr. Muhammad Ali Shaikh, the learned counsel for respondents I and 2 has raised two-fold objection before me. It is firstly contended by the learned counsel that the injured Dur Muhammad has no right to move for cancella--tion of bail under section 497, Cr.
8. P.C. As no private person could move for cancellation of bail under this section. Such a right according to learned counsel can be exercised either by the State or by the complainant at the most. The learned counsel in support of his contention referred to the case of Nazar Muhammad v.
9. The State and another (1977 P Cr. L J 277). In that case a learn--ed Single Judge of this Court (as he then was) while accepting the revision application filed by the accused whose bail was cancelled by the Additional District Judge at the instance of the injured in that case observed that the provision regarding cancellation of bail cannot be made available to private parties to satisfy their grudges or to use it as a means of wreaking their vengeance. This observation of the learned Judge in the circumstances of that case did not amount to laying down as a rule of law that an injured person to a case could not move for cancellation of bail granted to an accused in a case even if could be shown to the Court that the bail was wrongly granted to the accused-persons. In my humble opinion the learned Single Judge while making the above observation did not intend to lay down as a result of law that such a right could not be exercised by the private person or by a party who is vitally interested in the case: Both the learned counsel for the applicant and the State jointly referred to the case of Nazir Ahmad v. Latif Hussain and 3 others (PLD 1976 Lah. 76) to contend that such a right could be exercised by a person who was either a complainant in the case or was vitally interested. I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed in the above case and hold that a person who was allegedly injured by an accused-person, though he may not be a complainant in the case, is a person vitally interested in the case and is, therefore, entitled to move for cancellation of bail to the accused under section 497 (5), Cr. P. C. In the A case before me the bail application is filed by one of injured persons who it is alleged in the F. I. R. Was injured by the two respondents. 1n these circumstances I am of the view that the bail application filed by the applicant is competent in law. The next argument of the learned counsel for the respondents is that the bail was granted on 13th June, 1982 while the certificate issued by the Doctor is dated 26th June, 1982. It is, therefore, contended that since on the date of passing of the order for bail there was no evidence before the Court to come to the conclusion that the injuries suffered by the two persons named in the F. I. R. Was grievous in nature, it could not be said that the order was not properly passed. I regret to say that the learned counsel appearing for the State who supported grant of bail to respondents then, did not draw my attention to the statement in F. I. R. Which clearly showed that as a result of the injuries allegedly caused to applicant by respondents 1 and 2 the applicant's left hand was severed. This fact alone was sufficient to show that B the injuries suffered by the applicant were grievous in nature, However, now, that the two medical certificates produced in the case clearly indicate that the nature of injuries suffered by the two persons named in the F. I.
10. R. Were grievous in nature and as already pointed out earlier, the case before me did not fall in any of the exceptions mentioned in section 497, Cr. P. C. I am inclined to cancel the bail granted to the respondents. Mr. Muhammad Ali Shaikh, the learned counsel for the respondents lastly urged that taking in view the fact that the respondents are already en bail for the last about ten months and they have not abused the concession of bail granted to them it may be ordered that the trial Court may consider the cancellation of bail of respondents after recording of the medical evidence in the case. I am not inclined to follow the course suggested by the learned counsel Since the bail was granted to the respondents by this Court it is only appropriate that the cancellation of bail is also considered by this Court and should not be left to be decided by the trial Court who may find it difficult to take a contrary view in view of the order of a superior Court. However, the respondents will not be debarred from moving fresh bail application on new grounds-which may be available to them after recording of medical evidence or other evidence in the case, if they are so advised.
11. With these observations the bail granted to the two accused persons respondents are hereby cancelled as also their bail bonds. They may be taken into custody forthwith.