IJAZ UL AHSAN, J. This appeal by leave of the Court arises out of a judgment of the High Court of Balochistan at Quetta dated 19.07.2021. Through the impugned judgment, a constitutional petition filed by Respondent No.1 (Saeed Ahmed Khoso) was allowed, letter dated 10.06.2021 through which his services had been terminated was set aside and the Appellant was directed to reinstate him in service from the date when the order of his termination was passed and with a further direction to regularize the services of the Respondent.
2. Leave to appeal was granted by this Court vide order dated 03.11.2021 in the following terms: "The learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the High Court of Balochistan, Quetta (the High Court) was not justified in non-suiting the petitioners and directing the regularization of service of respondent No.1 (the respondent) and also entertaining the very writ petition and, in this regard relies upon the cases of Sui Southern Gas Company Limited Karachi v. Imdad Ali Pathan and others (2020 SCMR 1259) and Raja Iviz Mehmood and another v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Information Technology and Telecommunication and others (2018 SCMR 162).
2. The contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners require consideration. Leave to appeal is granted to consider, inter alia, the same. The appeal stage paper books be prepared from the available record with liberty to the parties to file additional documents, if any, within a period of one month. As the matter relates to service, the office is directed to fix the appeal expeditiously, preferably after three months."
3. The learned counsel for the Appellant submits that the learned High Court erred in law in entertaining the constitutional petition filed by the Respondent and granting him relief despite the fact that the employment Rules of the Appellant are non-statutory in nature and there are number of judgments of this Court holding that where employment rules are non-statutory, the relationship between the employer and the employee is governed by the principle of master and servant. He further submits that the learned High Court ignored the fact that services of the Respondent were terminated in simpliciter on the basis of his appointment letter which in terms of item 8 clearly and categorically provided that services of the Respondent could be terminated by giving him three months' notice. He finally maintains that the case of the Respondent was not that of regularization nor was the said question before the learned High Court and the controversy between the parties related only to the question whether or not his services were lawfully terminated and in accordance with law.
4. The learned counsel for Respondent No.1 on other hand has vehemently argued that the Respondent was discriminated against. Further, the Appellant acted against the dicta of this Court as well as the policy of the Federal Government that the services of an employee could not have been terminated without due process without assigning reasons. He further maintains that the Appellant-Company is wholly owned by the Government of Pakistan in consequence of which different principles of law are applicable to it and its rules are to be treated as statutory rules. He finally argues that even on the constitutional plain, the fundamental rights of the Respondent by way of due process and treatment in accordance with law have been violated.
5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record. The only question requiring determination by this Court is whether or not the High Court correctly exercised its jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. It is settled law by this Court that where employment rules are non-statutory in nature, the relationship of employer and employee is governed by the principle of master and servant. The learned ASC for the Respondent does not contest, neither that the rules governing terms and conditions of employment of the Respondent are non-statutory nor that ordinarily the principle of master and servant would apply in governing the relationship -between the employer and the employee.
However, he has attempted to draw a distinction between the Companies owned by the Federal Government and the Companies registered under the Companies Ordinance, 1984/Act, 2017 which have private shareholders to argue that where the State has a stake in the Company then it has to be treated on a different footing and its rules are to be treated as statutory in nature. In this context, he has relied upon the judgments of this Court reported as Muhammad Ashraf Tiwana v.
Pakistan (2013 SCMR 1159), Muhammad Rafi v. Federation of Pakistan (2016 SCMR 2146) and Pakistan Defence Officers Housing Authority v. Itrat Sajjad Awan (2017 SCMR 2010).
6. Having gone through the aforenoted judgments, we find that the said judgments relate to the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, the Civil Aviation Authority and the Defence Housing Authority. There is a clear distinction in the treatment of statutory Bodies and the Corporations as opposed to the limited companies. Consequently, we are not impressed by the argument of learned counsel for the Respondent that a Company in which the Government has a shareholding is to be treated at par with statutory Corporations and Authorities.
7. We further note that the regularization letter of the Respondent which was issued pursuant to an order of this Court clearly and categorically contained a term to the following effect: "8. Your services may be terminated, except in the cases of misconduct and/or indiscipline, by three months notice in writing, on either side and will be subject to the provision of the Company's Service Rules, as in force from time to time."
The effect of the aforenoted term which was never challenged or disputed by the Respondent is that his services could be terminated by giving him three months' notice in writing. This condition appears to have been fulfilled. We therefore find no illegality in the action of the Appellant which had exercised powers available to it on the basis of the appointment letter lawfully issued by it and accepted by the Respondent. At best even if three month's notice as mentioned above was not given, the appropriate remedy for the Respondent was to approach a competent forum for recovery of salary/dues for the said period or if a case for such claim was made out for violation of any contractual term remaining within the context of the relationship of master and servant.
8. Further, the learned High Court has unfortunately not noticed three judgments of this Court noted in paragraph 5 above which directly relate to the questions in hand and has instead relied on general principles of law relating to statutory corporations and authorities which were clearly not attracted to the facts and circumstances of the case. The argument of the learned counsel that the Respondent was entitled to due process where his civil rights were to be determined may have substance. However, in the instant case, only question before us is which forum was available to him in the facts and circumstances of the case before which the rights claimed by the Respondent be asserted. The instant case, we are in no manner of doubt that such forum was not the High Court in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution.
9. For the aforenoted reasons, we find that the impugned judgment of the High Court dated 19.07.2021 is unsustainable. It is accordingly set aside. Consequently, the listed appeal is allowed in the aforenoted terms.
10. The Respondent may however avail such other remedies that may be available to him under the law.