M. S. H. QURAISHI, J.-The petitioner is aggrieved by the order of the Lahore High Court dated 26th October, 1982 refusing to review its order dated 12th October, 1982, whereby it had dismissed the petitioner's F. A. O.
No. 42 of 1982 against the order dated 25th September, 1982 of the Civil Court making the disputed award rule of the Court.
2. The facts are that a dispute having arisen between the parties regarding partnership of Shalimar Cinema, Multan, the matter had been referred to arbitration in terms of their agreement dated 8th August, 1979 and an award had been given on 17th October, 1979. As the respondents felt that the petitioner was avoiding the imple- -mentation of the award, they moved an application before the Civil Court on 13th January, 1980 under sections 14, 17 and 20 of the Arbitration Act. The award was filed in Court on 31st March, 1981 in the presence of the petitioner's counsel and the matter was adjourned to 5th May, 1981 for filing objections to the award. On the latter date--- the petitioner moved an application seeking production by the respondents of the agreement dated 8th August, 1979. The respondents, thereafter, made an application on 15th June, 1981 praying that as no objection had been filed, the award be made the rule of the Court. After hearing the parties, the Civil Court passed such order holding that no objection had been filed to the award within the prescribed period of thirty days. The High Court also came to the same view.
3. Learned counsel contends that there was no written agreement between the parties for referring the dispute to arbitration and that, even in the absence of an objection it was the duty of the Court to l have satisfied itself as to the existence of such agreement. For this, reference was made to Board of Governors Aitchison College v.
Karam Din Muhammad Ramzan (PLD 1973 Note 158 at p. 238). We find that the award does speak of both the parties having sought the arbitration on the basis of a written agreement dated 8th August, 1979. In any case, this was a point which could have been raised by way of an objection within time, Learned counsel contends that such objection had been taken on 5th May, 1981 which was a date given for the purpose by the Court. It appears from the order of the trial Court that on this date the petitioner had moved only an application for production of the agreement and had not filed any formal objections. The time for filing objection is prescribed by law and, therefore, it had to be done within the period so prescribed. The petitioner had appeared before the Civil Court on three preceding dates, namely, 5th January, 1981, 18 February, 1981 and 13th March, 1981. He had, therefore, ample oppor--tunity to have asked for the production of the agreement and to have filed his objections within time.
4. In the circumstance we find no merit in this petition which is accordingly dismissed and leave to appeal refused.