RAHEEL KAMRAN, J.----Through this writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the judgment and decree dated 09.09.2021 passed by the learned Additio nal District Judge, Sohawa whereby the appeal preferred by the petitioner against the judgement and decree dated 05.03.2021 passed by the learned Judge family Court, Sohawa partially decreeing the suit for dissolution of marriage, recovery of maintenance allowan ce, iddat period allowance and dowry articles etc. was dismissed.
2. It is pertinent to mention here that through the impugned judgments and decrees, suit of respondent No.1 was partially decreed in the following terms:
(i) prayer for the decree of dissolution of marriage on the basis of khula was allowed on 12.02.2020 with direction to respondent No.1 to surrender 25% of her prompt dower and 50% of deferred dower , if any;
(ii) claim of recovery of the past maintena nce was allowed at the rate of Rs. 5000/- per month since October 2018 till dissolution of marriage in February 2020;
(iii) claim of recovery of maintenance for iddat period was allowed at the rate of Rs.7000/- per month for three months (i.e. Rs.21,000/- in total);
(iv) respondent No.1 was held entitled to receive dowry articles in the list (Ex.P .2) except gents' articles and gold ornaments or in the alternative price thereof specified in the said list after 10% depreciation.
3. It is also noteworthy that an amount of Rs.42,000/- has been specified to be the amount of dower in column No.13 of the Nikahnama annexed with the titled writ petition, which has been totally paid at the time of marriage, as mentioned in column No. 15 of the Nikahnama.
4. The petitioner has made the following prayer in the titled W rit Petition: "It is therefore, respectfully prayed that the Writ Petition of the Petitioner may kindly be accepted and impugned order dated 09.09.2021 passed by the Appellate Court/ADJ Sohawa District Jehlum be set aside and it may be modified to the extent of maintenance for iddat period only which too may be decre ased and respondent No.1 may be directed to return 100% of dower amount to the petitioner under section 10(4) of West Pakistan Family Court Act, 1964 and oblige.
Any other order which this Honourable Court deem fit and proper may also be passed."
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the impugned judgment and decree is unwarranted by law inasmuch as respondent No.1 who obtained khula herself is not entitled for the payment of partial dower and that she was required to surrender whole of the dower which she has received at the time of her marriage with the petitioner . He adds that order of payment of past maintenance at the rate of Rs.5000/- per month to respondent No.1 is also unlawful inasmuch as it was respondent No.1 who herself left the house of the petitioner and was not entitled to claim or receive any past maintenance. He finally contends that the amount of maintenance allowance for iddat period is unduly harsh and excessive.
6. Arguments heard. Record perused.
7. Through the Punjab Family Courts (Amendment) Act, 2015 (XI of 2015), inter alia, subsection (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act, 1964 [herein after referred to as the Act] was substituted and new subsections (5) and (6) in Section 10 were inserted, which read as follows:- "(4) Subject to subsection (5), if compromise is not possible between the parties, the Family Court may, if necessary , frame precise points of controversy and record evidence of the parties.
(5) In a suit for dissolution of marriage, if reconciliation fails, the Family Court shall immediately pass a decree for dissolution of marriage and, in case of dissolution of marriage through khula; may direct the wife to surrender up to fifty percent of her deferred dower or up to twenty-five percent of her admitted prompt dower to the husband.
(6) Subject to subsection (5), in the decree for dissolution of marriage, the Family Court shall direct the husband to pay whole or part of the outstanding deferred dower to the wife."
8. It is manifest that since substitution of subsection (4) of Section 10 ibid through the Punjab Family Courts (Amendment) Act, 2015 (XI of 2015), there is no legal requirement, to the extent of province of the Punjab, in a suit for dissolution of marriage to restore the husband the Haq Mehr received by the wife in consideration of marriage at the time of Nikah. This was postulated under proviso to the substituted Section 10(4) of the Act. The said requirement has now been substituted with the newly inserted subsection (5) in Section 10 of the Act.
9. In terms the Section 10(5) of the Act, the surrender of dower by wife in a case of dissolution of marriage through khula is no more mandatory or as a matter of course rather it is discretionary . Such surrender is not automatic but depends upon direction of the Family Court. The surrender by the wife under Section 10(5) of the Act is only a part of the dower and not the whole of it. The scope of discretion of the Family Court in this regard covers not only whether or not to direct surrender of the dower by the wife but also how much or what part of the prompt or deferred dower . Such direction for surrend er has to be within the ceiling prescribed by the legislature in either case i.e. up to fifty percent of the deferred dower or up to twenty five percent of the admi tted prompt dower . Any direction by the Family Court to the wife for the surrender of dower has to be part of either of the two namely deferred dower or admitted prompt dower and not both. In the decree for dissolution of marriage, in case whole or part of the deferred dower is outstanding, subject to Section 10(5) ibid, it is mandatory for the Family Court under . Section 10(6) of the Act to direct the husband to pay the same to the wife.
10. In this case, the petitioner has prayed for the return of entire prompt dower mentioned in the Nikahnama which has no legal basis in view of the amendments introduced through the Family Cour ts (Amendment) Act, 2015 (XI of 2015), in particular Section 10(5) of the Act. A direction for the surrender of prompt dower to the maximum limit of 25% has already been decreed against respondent No.1, as Safeer Ahmad v. Gulshan Bibi visualized under Section 10(5) of the Act, therefore, any additional claim of the petitioner is unwarranted by law .
11. As regards decree for maintenance allowance, Rs.5000/- per month is concerned, the same has been considered by the legislature to be too meager even to allow an appeal under Secti on 14(2)(c) of the Act, therefore, entertaining of the titled writ petition would be tantamount to defeat the legislative intent and purpose of restricting the challenge to such decrees. Reliance in this regard is placed on the case of Sarfraz v. Additional District Judge and 5 others (2017 YLR 1684 ), Abdul Hameed v. Additional District Judge, Dera Ghazi Khan and 3 others ( 2014 CLC 1 1) and Mst. T abassum v . Waqar Hussain and another ( 2011 MLD 351 ).
12. Even otherwise, respondent No.1 has levelled allegations of bad conduct and disrespectful behaviour of the petitioner towards her. She deposed in her evidence that on account of torture inflicted by the petitioner upon asking for maintenance, she left the house of the petitioner and to that extent her testimony has not been discredited in cross-examination by the petitioner . Respondent No.1 has left the house of the petitioner under compelling circumstances to reside with her parents and he could not prove any attempt on his part to reconcile with her. In his cross-examination, DWs have admitted the date of desertion to be 20.09.2018 as well as the fact that the petitioner has not paid any amount of maintenance from the said date till dissolution of the marriage. In these circumstances, the decree for maintenance has been rightly passed in favour of the respondent No.1 against the petitioner .
13. As regards contention of the petitioner that the amount of maintenance allowance for iddat period is unduly harsh and excessive, suffice it to say that said amount is barely enough to meet basic needs of respondent No.1 in these times of high inflation. Therefore, by any stretch of imagination the allowance of Rs.7000/- per month for iddat period cannot be termed as harsh and excessive.
14. Learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to point out any illegality or jurisdictional defect warranting interference by this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 199 of the constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 in the impugned judgments and decrees. Accordingly , this writ petition is dismissed in limine being devoid of any merit.