MUHAMMAD IJAZ KHAN, J. Through the instant revision petition, petitioner has challenged the judgment/decree of the learned trial Court dated 15.06.2021, whereby his suit has been dismissed and that of the learned appellate Court dated 26.02.2022, whereby his appeal filed there-under has also been dismissed.
2. Petitioner/plaintiff filed a suit for a declaration to the effect that he is owner-in -possession of the suit path measuring 06 Marlas in Khata No. 781/1 situated in Khasra No. 1490 being his ancestral ownership, which path was made by his predecessor-in-interest namely Akram Khan for access towards his other property measuring 42 Kanal 07 Marlas situated in Khasra No. 1485 and to Kota ghojal measuring 01 Kanal 10 Marlas situated in Khasra No. 1489 on which predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner/plaintiff has also planted trees, which the petitioner/plaintiff has used to cut the same but at the time of preparation of the revenue record, the suit path was illegally entered in the name of District Council/Provincial Government, which entries in the revenue record are factually incorrect and are thus ineffective upon the rights of the petitioner/plaintiff.
3. The respondents/defendants were summoned out of them, defendants No. 1 to 3 and 5 to 7 through their representative, defendant No. 4 and defendants No. 8 to 13 put their appearance and submitted their respective written statements, where they denied the claim of petitioner/plaintiff.
The learned trial Court in view of divergent pleadings of the parties framed as many as 06 issues and the parties were required to produce their respective evidence. In support of his suit, petitioner/plaintiff produced 04 witnesses out of which Sarbali Khan, Patwari Halqa Moza Elai appeared as PW-1, who produced ford jamabandi of the year 1977-78 as well as ford jamabandi zer-e-kar of the year 2013-14 which were exhibited as Ex PW 1/1 and Ex PW 1/2 respectively. He also produced a site plan of the spot, which was exhibited as Ex PW 1/3. Petitioner/plaintiff himself appeared as PW-2, Bakht Zada as PW-3 and Behram Khan as PW-4. In rebuttal, the official defendants produced Musa Khan, Supervisor Local Government Tehsil Daggar, District Buner as DW-1, Ghani Rahman, Assistant at the office of Deputy Commissioner Daggar, District Buner as DW- 2, defendant No. 8 himself and as an attorney for defendants No. 9 to 13 appeared as DW-3, who produced deed No. 284 dated 04.07.1952 which was exhibited as Ex DW 3/3 and deed dated 07.02.1972 which was exhibited as Ex DW 3/4 and Ahmad Raza appeared as DW-4. Thereafter, the learned trial Court dismissed the suit of petitioner/plaintiff vide one of the impugned judgment and decree dated 15.06.2021. Petitioner being aggrieved of the aforesaid judgment and decree preferred an appeal to the Court of learned District Judge/Zilla Qazi, Buner at Daggar, however the same was also dismissed vide the impugned judgment and decree dated 26.02.2022. Petitioner has now challenged the aforesaid two judgments and decree before this Court through the instant revision petition.
4. Arguments of learned counsel for the petitioner were heard in detail and the record perused with his able assistance.
5. Petitioner being plaintiff was required to prove his suit/case through his own evidence. It is the case of petitioner/plaintiff that the suit path is his ancestral property, however, during the course of his evidence he could not prove his this stance. Petitioner/plaintiff himself appeared in the Court as PW-2 and during the course of his cross-examination, he has categorically admitted that he has no information that his father namely Akram Khan has ever submitted any application to the revenue authorities for correction of the revenue record. Similarly, he has not brought on record any documentary or oral evidence to substantiate his plea that the suit path was his ancestral ownership and that the same has wrongly been entered in the revenue record in the name of Provincial Government, therefore he could not discharge his burden of proof qua the facts agitated by him in his plaint. Under Article 117 of The Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, it was for the petitioner/plaintiff to establish all the stances/facts taken in his plaint. The aforesaid Article being relevant is reproduced below:- "117. M. Burden of Proof-- (1) Whoever desires any Court to give judgment as to any legal right of liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist.
(2) When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person."
The aforesaid Article of The Qanun-e -Shahadat Order, 1984 declares that any person who desires a Court to issue a judgment in his favour has to prove all those facts which he has pleaded in his plaint, however, the record would reveal that petitioner/plaintiff could not prove the existence of all those facts on which he has based his plaint. Needless to mention here that the plaintiff has to prove his case on the basis of his own evidence and he cannot be allowed to draw any benefit from the weakness or lapses of the defendant's evidence. In the case of Qahaim Khan and 4 others vs. Amar Khan and 2 others reported as 2022 CLC 335, it was held that admittedly it is responsibility and duty of claimant to prove his case on his own strength. Under Article 117 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 (Order, 1984), the burden of proof lies on person who desire the court to give decision in his/their favour. It is bounden duty of a party to prove the claim through cogent and confidence inspiring evidence. The plaintiff must prove his case on the strength of his own evidence. He cannot take benefit from the weaknesses of the defendant's case. Similarly, in the case of Muhammad Latif vs. Bashir Ahmed and 7 others reported as 2004 CLC 1010, the Lahore High Court has also held that it is settled proposition of law that a party has to succeed on the basis of his own evidence and not on account of lapses in the case of his adversary. This Court in the case of Abdul Waheed vs. Muhammad Bilal reported as PLD 2005 Peshawar 19, has also held that needless to emphasize that burden of proof always lies upon the plaintiff and plaintiff cannot be benefited from short comings of defendant's case, where the case of plaintiff was doubtful and the entire evidence of plaintiff was self contradictory and highly discrepant.
6. As against this, the stance of the official respondents/defendants is that the suit path was rightly entered in their names in the revenue record. It may noted that the first ever settlement in District Buner has completed in the year 1977-78 and as such the Misl-e-Haqiyat of the year 1977-78 shows that the same was entered in the first ever settlement in the name of Provincial Government and those entries are continuously being reflecting in the revenue record as fard jamabandi zer-e- Kar which was exhibited as Ex PW 1/2 shows the same. It may be noted that entries at the time of preparation of the revenue record are made after an exhaustive and comprehensive inquiry conducted by the revenue officials on the spot in presence of the claimants as against the periodical entries, which are made by the Patwari Halqa in his office on the basis of different mutations took place during the intervening period. Such exhaustive exercise is carried out in the respective Mozas and every person who is owner of the property is remained onboard, therefore under the law strong presumption of correctness and authenticity is attached to the entries made during the course of first ever settlement. In the case of Haji Allah Bakhsh vs. Abdullah Kahn etc. reported as NLR 2002 Revenue 113(Supreme Court), the Hon'ble Apex Court has declared that presumption of truth of the highest degree is attached to the entries of the first ever Settlement Record of a revenue estate. In order to dislodge such entry, extraordinary strong evidence is required which, in the instant case, is not at all available on the record. Similar view was also reiterated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Nawab Khan and others vs. Said Karim Khan and others reported as 1997 SCMR 1840, where it was observed that the presumption of truth is attached to the record of rights generally but to the first ever settlement record in particular. Very strong evidence is required to rebut the presumption of correctness attached to the first settlement record of an area. Similarly, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case titled Faqir Muhammad Khurshid and others vs. Chief Administrator of Auqaf reported as PLD 1987 Supreme Court 60, has also held that as regards the entries of the Revenue record and the presumption attaching to it under section 44, mention has already been made of the decision of the Privy Council in Mst.
Wallan's case and the procedure for preparation of the record. In the case of Makhdum Hasan Baksh v. Ilahi Bakhsh and others ((1913) 48 PR 27) the Privy Council held that the entries of the Settlement Record showing "Ghair Mumkin Qabristan" in the possession of Mohammadans and owned by Makhdum Hasan Bakbsh must be presumed to be true under section 44 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act.
7. It also merits to mention here that entries in the revenue record in the name of the Provincial Government were made in the year 1977-78 and the same remained continued till date but the petitioner/plaintiff has filed the instant suit for a declaration challenging the aforesaid entries on 09.01.2019. The limitation period for filing of a declaratory suit under Article 120 of The Limitation Act, 1908 is 06 years and as such the suit of the petitioner/plaintiff is hopelessly time barred. It is by now settled law that it is the duty of the Court to adhere to the question of limitation as Section 3 of The Act of 1908 do require from a Court of law to address the question of limitation even if the same has not been taken as a defence by a party. Recently a larger Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case titled Khushi Muhammad through L.Rs. and others vs. Mst. Fazal Bibi and others reported as PLD 2016 Supreme Court 872 has held that the purpose of the laws of limitation is to establish certainty in the affairs of men, to bring repose and to bring an end to litigation after a certain time period has expired from accrual of an actionable right. It was also held that before considering the propositions above, it is expedient to mention certain salient features which have been settled over a period of time by the superior Courts for the purposes of interpretation of the law of limitation. These are:- i. The law of limitation is a statute of repose, designed to quieten title and to bar stale and water- logged disputes and is to be strictly complied with. Statutes of limitation by their very nature are strict and inflexible. The Act does not confer a right; it only regulates the rights of the parties.
Such a regulatory enactment cannot be allowed to extinguish vested rights or curtail remedies, unless all the conditions for extinguishment of rights and curtailment of remedies are fully complied with in letter and spirit. There is no scope in limitation law for any equitable or ethical construction to get over them. Justice, equity and good conscience do not override the law of limitation. Their object is to prevent stale demands and so they ought to be construed strictly; ii. The hurdles of limitation cannot be crossed under the guise of any hardships or imagined inherent discretionary jurisdiction of the Court. Ignorance, negligence, mistake or hardship does not save limitation, nor does poverty of the parties; iii. It is salutary to construe exceptions or exemptions to a provision in a statute of limitation rather liberally while a strict construction is enjoined as regards the main provision. For when such a provision is set up as a defence to an action, it has to be clearly seen if the case comes strictly within the ambit of the provision; iv. There is absolutely no room for the exercise of any imagined judicial discretion vis--vis interpretation of a provision, whatever hardship may result from following strictly the statutory provision. There is no scope for any equity. The Court cannot claim any special inherent equity jurisdiction; v. A statute of limitation instead of being viewed in an unfavourable light, as an unjust and discreditable defence, should have received such support from Courts of justice as would have made it what it was intended emphatically to be, a statute of repose. It can be rightly stated that the plea of limitation cannot be deemed as an unjust or discreditable defence. There is nothing morally wrong and there is no disparagement to the party pleading it. It is not a mere technical plea as it is based on sound public policy and no one should be deprived of the right he has gained by the law. It is indeed often a righteous defence. The Court has to only see if the defence is good in law and not if it is moral or conscientious; vi. The intention of the Law of Limitation is not to give a right where there is not one, but to interpose a bar after a certain period to a suit to enforce an existing right; vii. The Law of Limitation is an artificial mode conceived to terminate justiciable disputes. It has therefore to be construed strictly with a leaning to benefit the suitor; viii. Construing the Preamble and Section 5 of the Act it will be seen that the fundamental principle is to induce the claimants to be prompt in claiming rights. Unexplained delay or laches on the part of those who are expected to be aware and conscious of the legal position and who have facilities for proper legal assistance can hardly be encouraged or countenanced.
8. In this case, the two Courts below have concurrently recorded their findings of facts and law, which this Court found them as perfectly in accordance with the available evidence of the parties and thus the same neither suffer from any misreading or non-reading of evidence nor the same suffer from any illegalities or material irregularities, so as to warrant the interference of this Court in a revisional jurisdiction under section 115 CPC. The scope, extent and domain of revisional jurisdiction of this Court has elaborately been dilated upon by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its recent judgment titled Mst. Zarsheda vs. Nobat Khan reported as PLD 2022 Supreme Court 21, where in Para-10 it was held that in the case of Shahbaz Gul and others v. Muhammad Younas Khan and others (2020 SCMR 867), this Court held that where two different interpretations were possible of the evidence brought on record, then appraisal of facts of lower Courts should not be overturned by the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction under section 115 C.P.C. Between two possible interpretations, the one adopted by the trial and appellate Courts should have been maintained, keeping in mind the limited scope of revisional jurisdiction. Whereas in the case of Ahmad Nawaz Khan v. Muhammad Jaffar Khan and others (2010 SCMR 984), the Hon'ble Apex Court expressed that the High Court has very limited jurisdiction to interfere in the concurrent conclusions arrived at by the Courts below while exercising power under section 115, C.P.C. In the case of Cantonment Board through Executive Officer, Cantt. Board, Rawalpindi v. Ikhlaq Ahmed and others (2014 SCMR 161), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the provisions of section 115 C.P.C under which a High Court exercises its revisional jurisdiction, confer an exceptional and necessary power intended to secure effective exercise of its superintendence and visitorial powers of correction unhindered by technicalities. The revisional jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked against conclusion of law or fact, which do not, in any way, affect the jurisdiction of the Court. In the case of Atiq-ur- Rehman v. Muhammad Amin (PLD 2006 SC 309), it was held that the scope of revisional jurisdiction is confined to the extent of misreading or non-reading of evidence, jurisdictional error or an illegality of the nature in the judgment which may have material effect on the result of the case or the conclusion drawn therein is perverse or contrary to the law but the interference for the mere fact that the appraisal of evidence may suggest another view of the matter, is not possible in revisional jurisdiction. There is a difference between the misreading, non-reading and mis- appreciation of the evidence therefore, the scope of the appellate and revisional jurisdiction must not be confused and care must be taken for interference in revisional jurisdiction only in the cases in which the order passed or a judgment rendered by a subordinate Court is found perverse or suffering from a jurisdictional error or the defect of misreading or non-reading of evidence and the conclusion drawn is contrary to law. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sultan Muhammad and another v. Muhammad Qasim and others (2010 SCMR 1630) has held that the concurrent findings of three Courts below on a question of fact, if not based on misreading or non-reading of evidence and not suffering from any illegality or material irregularity effecting the merits of the case are not open to question at the revisional stage. Similar view was also reiterated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case titled Muhammad Sarwar and others vs. Hashmal Khan and others reported as PLD 2022 Supreme Court 13, where in para-6 it was held that it is well settled exposition of law, deducible from plethora of dictums laid down by superior Courts that section 115, C.P.C. empowers and meted out the High Court to satisfy and reassure itself that the order of the subordinate court is within its jurisdiction; the case is one in which the Court ought to exercise jurisdiction and in exercising jurisdiction, the Court has not acted illegally or in breach of some provision of law or with material irregularity or by committing some error of procedure in the course of the trial which affected the ultimate decision. If the High Court is satisfied that aforesaid principles have not been unheeded or disregarded by the Courts below, it has no power to interfere in the conclusion of the subordinate Court upon questions of fact or law.
9. For what has been discussed above, the judgments and decree of both the Courts below respectively dated 15.06.2021 and 26.02.2022 are maintained and upheld and consequently the instant revision petition being bereft of any merit is hereby dismissed in limine.