SHAHID KARIM , J. This order will also decide connected petition W.P No.7766 of 2019. Both the constitutional petitions challenge the notification dated 6.3.2018 issued by the District Council Khanewal levying taxes and fees of various nature. This has been done under the Punjab Local Government Act 2013 and in particular under Sections 115 and 116 of the Act, 2013 which empower a local government to levy any tax, fee, rate, toll or surcharge specified in the third schedule. Part II of third schedule of the Act, 2013 deals with taxes and other levies by District Councils and reliance has been placed on the Entry relating to fees for licenses, sanctions and permits granted by District Council.
2. The learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon various judgments as also the Entry in the fourth schedule to the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 to contend that taxes on corporation can only be levied by the Federal Government. However, it is not necessary to go into that question. Suffice to say that District Council is empowered to levy taxes and fees to be notified by District Council. In the notification the license fee has been levied on the petitioners which arc textile mills. However, the Entry on which reliance has been placed for levy of license fee specifically states that the fee shall be in respect of a license granted by the District Council. There is no material on record which would show that the District Council Khanewal has indeed granted any license to the petitioners for carrying out any profession and for which the fee is sought to be levied by the impugned notification. It would not suffice to state merely that since there is a power in the District Council to levy taxes and fees, the District Council is at liberty to levy any fee or tax irrespective of whether that comes within the ambit of the relevant Entry or not. Also prior to that the onus lies on the District Council to establish that the person in respect of whom a levy has been imposed is carrying on a profession which requires a license to be taken out. Unless this is established no fee can be imposed on that person on the pretext of license fee. To reiterate, in order for a person to be liable for payment of license fee, it must be established as a pre-condition that that person carries on a business or a profession which in fact requires a license in the first place. Without such a pre-condition having been fulfilled the mere levy of license fee on the petitioners is ultra vires and without lawful authority.
3. In view of the above, these petitions are allowed. The notification to the extent of the petitioners is held to be void and is struck down.