DECISION This appeal under section 30, `Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, is directed against the order of the learned Commissioner appointed under the said Act, announced on 31st May, 1982. By the said order, the learned Commissioner has awarded to the dependants of Mst. Aisha. Mst. Fatima and Mst. Hanifa who are said to have died in consequence of injuries sustained by them while they were working in a Grain Godown, belonging to the appellants, a total amount of Rs. 45,000 i.e. An amount of Rs. 15,000 per deceased woman.
2. An appeal under section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act is required to be filed within the period of sixty days. However, the appeal has been filed after a period of three months in that the order of the learned Commissioner was announced on 31st May, 1982 the appeal was filed on 31st August, 1982. It may be pointed out that as per the endorsement on the certified copy of the impugned order, the appellants had applied for a certified copy on 6th June, 1982 and the copy was supplied to them on the following day i. e. On 7th June, 1982 though the copy was typed on 31st May, 1982 presumably alongwith the original order.
3. In view of the fact that the appeal was admittedly not filed within the prescribed period of sixty days. Mr. Syed Ahmed Farooqui, the learned counsel for the appellants, has submitted an application for condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act, the provisions whereof are applicable to the Workmen's Compensation Act. A perusal for the affidavit in support of the application for condonation indicates that delay was due to the dilatory departmental procedure in obtaining the necessary sanction for the filing of the appeal. It was strongly urged by Mr. Syed Ahmed Farooqui that this delay was unavoidable and should be considered a sufficient cause for condoning the delay in filing the appeal. I regret that I find no force in this contention. The law of limitation operate equally for or against a private individual as against Government and hence delay in Government Offices can be no justifica--tion for invoking the power of the Court under section 5 of the Limitation Act. A similar plea was raised before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Province of East Pakistan v. Abdul Hamid Darji and others (1970 SC M R 558).
Repelling this contention, Hamoodur Rabman, C. J., observed as follows :- "As to the legal aspect of the question, namely ; as to what is or is not sufficient cause for the purposes of an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, it is manifest that no hard and fast rule can be laid down nor is it desirable that this should be done. Each case has to be sufficient in one case may well not be sufficient in another case, but this much is certain that where by lapse of time a valuable right has accrued to the other side, it should not be lightly taken away.
This Court has furthermore repeatedly pointed out that in an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act it is the duty of the party seeking condonation to explain each day's delay and unless this is done, the delay should not be condoned particularly where valuable rights have accrued to the other sides.
This Court has also in several cases had occasion to point out that so far as limitation is concerned the Government cannot claim to be treated in any manner differently from an ordinary litigant, because of the fact that the Government enjoys unusual facilities for the preparation and conduct of their cases and its resources are much larger. If in spite of these facilities the Government cannot comply with the requirements of the law of limitation, then it is for it to take steps to have that law changed and not to ask the Courts to give a different interpretation to its provisions. In this view of the matter the High Court's decision in these two petitions is unexceptionable."
Respectfully following the interpretation, of law as expounded by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the above case I find no valid ground made out for condoning the delay in the instant case and 1 would,' accordingly, dismiss the application made by the appellants under section 5 of the Limitation Act. In consequence the appeal is not maintainable on the ground of limitation.
4: Before parting with this judgment I would like to refer to the submission of Mr. Syed Ahmed Farooqui as to the reasons for the delay in filing the present appeal. The learned counsel contended that the main delay was on account of the fact that it took considerable time to obtain the amount of Rs. 45,000 from the department the deposit whereof with the learned Commissioner is a pre-condition under the law for filing of they appeal under section 30. This, however, again is not a sufficient ground for condanation of the delay because the delay, if any, was due to the failure on the part of the Departmental Officer to take prompt action in' the matter.