Shujaat Ali Khan, J. Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts, forming factual canvass of this petition, are that Nestle Pakistan (hereinafter to be referred as "the petitioner-company") acquired area measuring 79,000 sq. ft., situated at Packages Mall, Walton Road, Lahore, from Packages Real Estate (Pvt.) Ltd. (hereinafter to be referred as "the lessor"), on lease, for a period of ten years. For the purpose of registration of the Lease Deed, stamps papers worth Rs.37,64,463/- were got issued by the petitioner-company, on 22.03.2022. On presentation of the Lease Deed, the Registry Moharrar raised objection that the stamp duty was deficient to the tune of Rs.50,44,378/- which was paid by the petitioner-company, on 24.06.2022. Again, the petitioner-company presented Lease Deed for registration before the Sub-Registrar, Nishtar Town, Lahore (respondent No.1) who impounded the same on account of deficiency of stamp duty and informed the Additional Deputy Commissioner (General), Lahore (respondent No.2), through order, dated 29.06.2022. Being aggrieved of impounding of the Lease Deed, the petitioner- company approached respondent No.2 by filing a representation but without any success as the same was rejected vide order, dated 05.09.2022. Being dissatisfied with orders, dated 29.06.2022 and 05.09.2022, passed by respondents No.1 & 2, respectively, the petitioner-company has filed this petition.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner-company submits that since the petitioner-company deposited the deficient amount, pointed out by the Registry Moharrar, respondent No.1 had no authority to impound the said document; that according to Section 23 of the Registration Act, 1908 ("the Act, 1908") a document can be presented for registration within 120 days of its execution and a beneficiary of such document can remove any deficiency during the period in question; that as per Section 33 of the Stamp Act, 1899 ("the Act, 1899"), head of a department or a forum before which a document is presented for the purpose of evidence can impound the same on account of deficiency in payment of requisite fee but the Local Commission having not been figuring under any of the said categories could not impound the Lease Deed presented by the petitioner- company; that findings of the fora below that stamp duty was also required to be fixed against the amount to be charged by the lessor on account of provision of services, being erroneous, cannot sustain; that when a term or phrase has been defined in the relevant Statute itself, no reference can be made by the departmental authorities to the other Statute to the disinterest of a party whereas in the case in hand, the respondents, out of some extraneous consideration, relied upon irrelevant enactments to decide case against the petitioner-company; that as the petitioner- company deposited the deficient stamp duty on pinpointing by the office of respondent No.1, there was no necessity to seek prior permission of the Collector as it was only necessary when the petitioner-company approached the Collector raising objection against evaluation by respondent No.1 and that though the amount paid by the petitioner-company even against the fixture was not leviable but the petitioner-company, as a matter of abundant caution, deposited the same confining its grievance to the extent of claim of the respondents for payment of stamp duty against the amount in lieu of services to be charged by the lessor.
3. Learned Law Officer, while opposing the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner- company submits that since remedy of revision is available to the petitioner-company before the Chief Inspector of Stamps in terms of Section 56 of the Act, 1899, instant petition is not maintainable; that since factual controversy regarding liability of the petitioner-company to pay stamp duty is involved, said question cannot be adjudicated upon in these proceedings; that respondent No.1, being Office Incharge of the registration office, was fully empowered to impound the document as the same was not properly stamped; that since reference was sent by respondent No.1 to the Collector in terms of Section 38 of the Act, 1899, provisions of Section 40 of the Act, 1899 were fully attracted; that reliance of the petitioner-company on Section 41 of the Act, 1899 does not come to its rescue for the reason that it only comes into play when deficiency in stamp duty was to some inadvertence whereas in the matter in hand till date the petitioner- company is raising objection against chargeability of the stamp duty on the Lease Deed; that it is cardinal principle of interpretation of a Statute that provisions of an enactment should be read as a whole and no provision can be considered in isolation just to benefit a party and conjunctive hearing of the provision referred in the impugned order brings it to limelight that the petitioner- company is liable to pay stamp duty according to recitals of the Lease Deed, hence, no illegality has been committed by the fora below while passing the impugned orders and that inconsistent attitude of the petitioner-company is evident from the fact that on the one hand it had deposited the amount of stamp duty against fixture but on the other has raised objection against its chargeability. Relies on Province of the Punjab through Collector, Sheikhupura and others v. Syed Ghazanfar Ali Shah and others (2017 SCMR 172).
4. While exercising his right of rebuttal, learned counsel for the petitioner-company submits that reliance of respondents on Section 41 of the Act, 1899 is of no help to them as it was not applicable in the matter of the petitioner-company.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at considerable length and have also gone through the documents, annexed with this petition, as well as the case-law cited at the bar.
6. Before delving into merits of the case, it is to be clarified here that though the petitioner- company raised objection against levy of stamp duty qua the amount to be charged by lessor on account of fixture, subject matter of the Lease Deed, but has not impugned the chargeability of the stamp duty against said head in this petition, thus, at this moment no finding can be given in that regard rather the same is left to the parties to raise their claim at appropriate time before relevant forum, if so advised.
7. Now reverting to merits of the case, it is noted that the controversy involved in this petition revolves around chargeability of stamp duty on the Lease Deed executed by the lessor in favour of the petitioner-company. A perusal of the Lease Deed shows that firstly it was presented before the Ahl-e-Commission, on 11.06.2022 and secondly the same was presented on 15.06.2022 whereupon it was pointed out that the said document was deficient in respect of stamp duty to the tune of Rs.50,44,378/- whereupon the petitioner-company deposited the same in the relevant head in Bank of Punjab, Main Boulevard Branch, Gulberg, Lahore on 24.06.2022, however, respondent No.1, through letter, dated 29.06.2022, informed respondent No.2 regarding impounding of Lease Deed on account of deficiency of Rs.50,44,378/- in respect of stamp duty. In this backdrop, the moot question which evolves for determination by this Court is as to whether even after deposit of Rs.50,44,378/- by the petitioner-company, on account of deficiency in respect of stamp duty, prior to impounding of the Lease Deed, could still be treated as deficiency towards stamp duty.
Indisputably, when any deficiency is pointed out by the relevant authority, the same can be made good by the party concerned, prior to impounding the said document and same can be presented again for registration and if no deficiency is noted, the registering authority is bound to register the document. A perusal of the impugned order passed by respondent No.2 shows that in support of his finding, he has relied upon Section 41 of the Act, 1899, which for convenience of reference is reproduced herein below:- "41. Instruments unduly stamped by accident.- If any instrument chargeable with duty and not duly stamped, not being an instrument chargeable with a duty of not exceeding fifty rupees only or a bill of exchange or promissory note, is produced by any person of his own motion before the Collector within one year from the date of its execution or first execution, and such person brings to the notice of the Collector the fact that such instrument is not duly stamped and offers to pay to the Collector the amount of the proper duty, or the amount required to make up the same, and the Collector is satisfied that the omission to duly stamp such instrument has been occasioned by accident, mistake or urgent necessity, he may, instead of proceeding under section 33 and 40, receive such amount and proceed as next hereinafter prescribed."
A perusal of the afore-quoted provision shows that the same is only applicable if a party in whose favour an instrument has been executed brings the matter before the Collector pointing out any deficiency in respect of stamp duty and shows readiness to make up the same. Insofar as the case in hand is concerned, admittedly after completion of proceedings, the Local Commission presented the Lease Deed before respondent No.1 for registration, on 15.06.2022, but the same was not impounded rather the Registry Moharrar pointed out deficiency in respect of stamp duty to the tune of Rs.50,44,378/-. The petitioner-company deposited the same in the Bank of Punjab, on 24.06.2022, which fact has not been denied by the respondents rather their stance is that since no prior permission was obtained from the Collector, prior to depositing of the same, the said fact was inconsequential. It is very strange to note that when Section 41 ibid only comes into play when a party approaches the Collector to make up any deficiency in respect of stamp duty on an instrument as to how the respondents could be allowed to stretch the same to the petitioner- company which deposited the deficient amount, identified by the Registry Moharrar prior to impounding of the document by respondent No.1.
8. It is to be noted here that the responsibility of respondent No.1 is to ensure payment of requisite duties, including stamp duty, on an instrument or a document presented before it for registration.
Moreover, the provisions of the Act, 1899, are meant to ensure payment of dues on the documents/instruments for registration and to save the national exchequer. In this case in hand, conduct of the respondents speaks loud about the fact that instead of caring for their statutory duties towards national exchequer, they were interested to impede the registration of Lease Deed of the petitioner-company, on whimsical grounds, which otherwise enjoy good reputation at international level, coupled with the fact that it was ever ready to make up for any deficiency in respect of stamp duty, payable on Lease Deed.
9. Considering from another angle, since it was brought into notice of respondent No.1 that the deficient stamp duty was paid by the petitioner-company on 24.06.2022, respondent No.1 was bound to acknowledge the said fact and highlight the same while putting up reference before respondent No.2. Had he done so, perhaps, the result might have been entirely different.
A perusal of the order passed by respondent No.2 as well as Reference put up by respondent No.1 renders it crystal clear that the respondents, instead of performing their duties according to the relevant provisions of the Act, 1899, were all out to penalize the petitioner-company despite the fact that it was ever ready to pay the requisite dues.
10. Now taking up the question as to whether the petitioner-company is liable to pay stamp duty against the amount in lieu of services mentioned in the Lease Deed, I am of the view that before dilating upon the issue under discussion it would be expedient to have a glance upon the definition of the term "lease" contained in the Act, 1899. The said term has been defined under Section 2(16) of the Act, 1899, which, for convenience of reference, is reproduced herein below:- "(16) "lease" means a lease of immovable property, and includes also-
(a) patta;
(b) a kabuliyat or other undertaking in writing, not being a counter-part of a lease, to cultivate, occupy or pay or deliver rent for, immovable property;
(c) any instrument by which tolls of any description are let;
(d) any writing on an application for a lease intended to signify that the application is granted."
According to afore-quoted definition clause, read with Article 35 of Schedule-I (Punjab) of Act, 1899, lease relates to Patta, Kabuliyat or Undertaking relating to cultivate, occupy or deliver running of immoveable property or instrument relating to tolls. If the Lease Deed executed in favour of the petitioner-company is considered in the light of the afore-quoted definition, in my humble opinion, the charges to be paid by the petitioner-company to the lessor on account of provision of services is not covered under the said definition inasmuch as it does not convey any right to the petitioner- company to cultivate, occupy, possession of immovable property rather the said amount is to be paid by the petitioner-company to the lessor in lieu of the services to be provided to it. In this scenario, stamp duty is only payable in respect of land/area being leased out to the petitioner- company.
11. It is ironical that respondent No.2, while deciding the matter, instead of relying upon the definition of lease contained in the Act, 1899, relied upon definition of the same contained in Transfer of Property Act, 1882. A Full Bench of Allahabad High Court, in the case of Burmah Shell Oil Storage and distributing Co. Ltd. of India (A.I.R. 1933 Allahabad 735) while dealing with definition of word "lease" with specific reference to the Act, 1899 inter-alia concluded as under: - "Lease" is defined both in the Transfer of Property Act and in the Stamp Act. Under S. 105, T.P. Act, a lease is a transfer of right to enjoy immovable property made for a certain time, express or implied, or in perpetuity in consideration of a price paid or promised, etc. If we had to go entirely by the definition of "lease" as contained S.105, it may be difficult to hold that a transaction amounts to a lease when there is no transfer of a right to enjoy the property for a certain time. But S. 2, sub-s. 16, Stamp Act, while presumably borrowing the definition of "lease" as contained in the Transfer of Property Act, adds thereto a provision that "lease" shall include also among other things a kabuliat or other undertaking in writing (not being a counterpart of a lease) to cultivate, occupy or pay or deliver rent for immovable property. The use of the words "include also" obviously implies that the definition of "lease" as contained in the Stamp Act is wider and more comprehensive than the definition of it in S. 105, T.P. Act......"
If the conduct of the respondents towards reliance on the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 for the purpose of defining the word "lease" is considered in the light of afore-referred judgment, it becomes crystal clear that the documents, which do not fall within the definition of lease in terms of section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, can also be treated so, for the purpose of levy of stamp duty, thus, the reliance of respondents on the provisions of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 are erroneous.
12. There is no cavil with the proposition that when a word, term or phrase has not been defined in an enactment, reference can be made for the said purpose to some other related enactment or its general meanings are taken to decide lis pending before a forum but when the language of a Statute itself is unambiguous about any word, term or phrase, reference to other Statutes for the said purpose is not permissible. Reliance in this regard is placed on the case reported as Justice Qazi Faez Isa and others v. The President of Pakistan and others (PLD 2021 SC 1) wherein the query, under discussion, has been answered in the following words: - "94. Mr. Farough Naseem, the learned counsel for the official respondents, being an expert on Income Tax law law, and perhaps knowing fully well that Section 114, read with Section 116 of the ITO does not at all require a filer to declare the assets of his non-dependent wife, and children, nor is there any other provision in the ITO, 2001 creating any such obligation on a filer, i.e. requiring him to disclose the assets of his non-dependent wife and children along with his/her income returns, has in his attempt to justify the claim of the Federation, that the petitioner was instead so required, which claim forms the very basis of the purported Reference, and in his endeavor to save the Reference from being quashed, has referred to three different Asset Declaration Acts, being, Asset Declaration Act 2019, Voluntary Declaration of Domestic Assets Act, 2018, and Foreign Assets (Declaration and Repatriation) Act, 2018, under which Acts, amnesty was offered in respect of undisclosed assets to all, except "holders of public office", which phrase, in the context of the said three Acts, according to the learned counsel, included the Judges of the superior Courts, their spouses and dependents, without any distinction between a dependent and a non-dependent spouse. He submitted that the above description of the term "Holder of Public Office", may be used as a guideline to treat a Judge of a superior Court along with his/her spouse (whether dependent or not), and the dependent children, as holder of public office, as one single distinct class, in the context of those other dispensation, dealing with similar situation, and where the relevant terms have not been defined, and may well be employed to treat the spouse of a Judge of a superior Court, whether dependent or not, as of the same class and category, as a Judge himself. Mr. Farough Nasim in his endevour to draw a similar analogy went on to refer to Regulation 31 of the Money Laundering and combating of financial terrorism regulation for banks and DFIs, issued by the State Bank of Pakistan, where according to the learned counsel, the term politically exposed person (PEPs) have been defined to include senior judicial officials, and their close associates and family members also, irrespective of the spouse being dependent or non-dependent. Mr. Farough Nasim also referred to Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (Anti Money Laundering and countering financing of terrorism) Regulation 2018, where also PEPs as defined through its regulation 2(t)(ii), includes senior judicial officials, and the formalities and requirements thereunder in terms of its regulation 10(4), extends to the family members and close associates of PEPs, and in the same vein referred to Martial Law Regulation 59, dated 02.12.1969. The learned counsel submitted that the foregoing shows that in ordinary and popular sense the Judges of the superior Courts and their spouses, whether dependent or not, are clubbed, to fall into one class or category. So the learned counsel was suggesting to us to read the word "Judge", as employed in Article 209 of the Constitution, as meaning not only the judge himself, but also his/her spouse and children and on the analogy of the provisions of the regulations referred by him, expand/stretch the meaning of the word, so as to include even the "close associates" and "family members" of the Judge, which defies even the common sense, and to say the least is absolutely preposterous.
It shows the hollowness of the case made up against the petitioner. Through his above submission, the learned counsel is, in fact, seeking certain purported descriptions in some statutes enacted for a very limited purpose, scope and application and for a very short life span, to be enforced as guidelines for stretching the meaning of a straight forward simple word, with an unnatural result, and also to control the meaning, scope, application, and interpretation of one of the most significant provision of the Constitution, based on a sacred principles of our jurisprudence and polity, being the independence of judiciary. The learned counsel has perhaps lost sight of a well settled proposition of law that interpretation of a word or a phrase cannot be transported from one statute to another and that it is unsafe to compare the language of one statute with that employed in another, even though the subjects covered by the two may involve similarities-Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi v. Additional and Sessions Judge (1994 SCMR 1299) and Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance v. Haji Mohammad Sadiq and others (2007 PTD 67)."
If the conduct of respondent No.2 to import the definition of word "lease" from the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is adjudged on the touchstone of the afore-referred decision of the Apex Court of the country there leaves no ambiguity that he misdirected himself while deciding the matter relating to levy of stamp duty on the Lease Deed in favour of the petitioner-company. Further, mala-fide intention of respondent No.2 is also evident from the fact that though he referred to section 105 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 but did not bother to even mention about Section 2(16) of the Act, 1899, despite the fact that the Act, 1899 was relevant for the purpose of determination of question relating to chargeability of stamp duty on a document produced for registration.
13. The next question which crops up for determination by this Court is as to whether the Local Commission, appointed for completion of codal formalities for registration of a document, can impound a document or not. Admittedly, the reasons and authority which may examine and impound a document have been categorized under Section 33 of the Act, 1899, which for convenience of reference is reproduced herein-below:- "33. Examination and impounding of instruments.-
(1) Every person having by law or consent of parties authority to receive evidence, and every person in charge of a public office, except an officer of police, before whom any instrument, chargeable in his opinion, with duty, is produced or comes in the performance of his functions, shall, if it appears to him that such instrument is not duly stamped, impound the same.
(2) For that purpose every such person shall examine every instrument so chargeable and so produced or coming before him, in order to ascertain whether it is stamped with a stamp of the value and description required by the law in force in Pakistan when such instrument was executed or first executed: Provided that-
(a) nothing herein contained shall be deemed to require any Magistrate or Judge of a Criminal Court to examine or impound, if he does not think fit so to do, any instrument coming before him in the course of any proceeding other than a proceeding under Chapter XII or Chapter XXXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898;
(b) in the case of a Judge of a High Court, the duty of examining and impounding any instrument under this section may be delegated to such officer as the Court appoints in this behalf.
(3) For the purposes of this section, in cases of doubt,-
(a) the Government may determine what offices shall be deemed to be public offices; and
(b) the Government may determine who shall be deemed to be persons in charge of public offices."
According to above-quoted provision, if a person in-charge of a public office before whom an instrument is presented for registration, comes to the conclusion that the same is not duly stamped, can impound the same. Further, according to proviso to Section 2 of Section 33, it is incumbent upon the Provincial Government to determine which offices shall be deemed to be public offices but the respondents nowhere have clarified that the Local Commission falls within the definition of said term. Moreover, according to proviso (b) to subsection 3 of Section 33, it is also duty of the Provincial Government to determine the persons who can be considered as in- charge of public offices. To clarify the terms "public office" and "public officer" sections 2(22A) & 2(22B) were inserted in the Act, 1899 through Stamp (Punjab Amendment) Act (XXVI of 1973), which read as follows:- "(22A) "public office" includes an office of the Government, a local government, a statutory corporation or a similar body set up by the Federal Government or the Government, a commercial or industrial concern whether singly owned or run through partnership having more than twenty employees, a development authority, a private housing scheme or a housing authority, a cooperative housing society, a real estate developer or a real estate broker, a banking company and any other entity whether registered or unregistered under any law for the time being in force;] (22-B) "Public Officer" includes an Officer-in-charge of a Public Office."
The terms, under discussion, were also exhaustively dealt with by the Sindh High Court in the case of Hotel Metropole Ltd. v. Government of Sindh and 2 others (PLD 1982 Karachi 810) in the following manner:- "It may be noticed that the term public office or public officer may have different meaning according to the enactment in which they are given. However, generally in order to make an office public one, the pay must be given out of national and not out of local funds and the office must be public in the strict sense of the term. A Public Officer must be said to be one who discharges duties, in which the public are interested and if a person is paid out of fund provided by the public, he is clearly a person holding such office."
A conjunctive reading of Sections 2(22A) & 2(22B) of the Act, 1899 and afore-quoted judgment renders it crystal clear that public office means an office which is being maintained out of national exchequer and public officer means who is being paid from the national exchequer. If the status of the Local Commission is considered in the light of afore-referred decision of the Hon'ble Sindh High Court, there leaves no ambiguity that since the Local Commission is not paid out of the national exchequer rather he receives fee to be determined by a Sub-Registrar, in consultation with the party concerned, he cannot be considered as in-charge of a public office for the purpose of the Act, 1899, thus, the Local Commission has no authority to impound any document handed over to him for completion.
14. There is no denying the fact that a Local Commission acts on behalf of a Sub-Registrar but in case of any omission or commission, instead of taking action by himself, Local Commission is bound to report the matter to the Sub-Registrar. At the maximum we can say that status of Local Commission is that of a representative of Sub-Registrar.
15. It is golden principle of interpretation of a statute that it should be presumed that the legislator chooses its words carefully and if a word or phrase had been added somewhere such addition was not deemed to be redundant. The Apex Court of the country while highlighting the importance of said principle, in Reference No.1 of 2012 (PLD 2013 SC 279) has inter-alia concluded as under: - "74. Generally, in interpreting statutes, it is presumed that the Legislature chooses its words carefully. Therefore, if a word or phrase has been added somewhere, such addition is not to be deemed redundant; conversely, if a word or phrase has been left out somewhere, such omission is not be deemed inconsequential. Instead, a change in language implies a change in intent......."
If the authenticity of the impugned order passed by respondent No.2 is seen in the light of the afore-referred judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan, it becomes abundantly clear that he defied the principles set down by Apex Court of the country in its various decisions despite the fact that the same had binding force upon him in terms of Article 189 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, thus, the same cannot be allowed to remain in field even for a moment.
16. It is well entrenched by now that while defining any provision of an enactment, plain meanings of a word, term or phrase should be applied instead of stretching or minimizing the intent of the legislature by borrowing its meanings from other enactments to the disinterest of a particular party. Reliance in this regard is placed on the case reported as Federation of Pakistan through Secretary M/o Petroleum and Natural Resources and another v. Durrani Ceramics and others (2014 SCMR 1630). Since the term "in-charge of a public office" has not only been defined in the Act, 1899 but also in the afore-referred judgment of the Hon'ble Sindh High Court, it stands established that the respondents de-tracked themselves while holding that Local Commission could impound a document.
17. It is of common knowledge that while interpreting any charging provision of a fiscal Statue, in the event of two possible interpretations, the one favouring the individual should be applied.
Reliance in this regard is placed on the case reported as The Commissioner Inland Revenue Zone-II, Larger Taxpayers Unit, Lahore v. Kohinoor Sugar Mills Limited and another (2021 SCMR 536) and Commissioner of Income Tax and another v. Balochistan Concrete and Block Workers Ltd. and others (2017 SCMR 1). As far as the case in hand is concerned, the respondents instead of giving cushion of bona-fide deposit of the deficient stamp duty by the petitioner-company, proceeded to decide matter against it which speaks volumes about the fact that instead of performing their duties towards ensuring payment of requisite dues on the documents/ instruments, being presented for registration, the respondents were endeavoring to take action against the petitioner-company.
18. Now dealing with the objection raised by the learned Law Officer that the petitioner-company is equipped with alternate remedy of revision, I am of the view that firstly the remedy, referred by the learned Law Officer being not efficacious one cannot be used to knock out the petitioner-company on the point of maintainability and secondly the same does not hold much water for the reason that similar situation cropped before this Court in the case reported as Nadeem Ellahi through Special Attorney v. Deputy District Officer (Registration)/Sub-Registrar and another (2011 MLD 1961) wherein the same was responded in the following manner: - "12. Turning now to the first question whether the foregoing legal defect is liable to correction in the constitutional jurisdiction or ought to be left to the determination of the statutory remedial fora.
With regard to availability of an alternate remedy there is abundant case-law that the same must be adequate in term of Article 199 of the Constitution. In a case as the present one involving a question of law, the settled view is that primarily it is the duty of the superior courts to interpret the law. Reference is made to Messrs Shamim and Co. v. Tehsil Municipal Administration, Multan City through Nazim and 2 others (2004 YLR 366), Messrs Pioneer Cement Ltd. v. Province of the Punjab and another (2000 CLC 54 Lahore), United Business Lines S.I.E. Gujranwala and another v. Government of Punjab and 5 others (PLD 1997 Lahore 456) and Khadim Hussain and another v.
District Council, Lyallpur and another (PLD 1976 Lahore 1044). Consequently, notwithstanding the pendency of proceedings before the Collector Lahore regarding the question of law raised in the dispute, the said forum does not constitute an adequate remedy for resolution of a question of law and a constitutional petition is maintainable. Clearly, the object of the constitutional jurisdiction is to prevent injustice caused by excessive exercise of power by a public authority. This is such a case. Petition allowed. The amount deposited with the D.R. (Judl.) of this Court shall be refunded to the petitioner."
If the objection raised by the learned Law Officer is considered while putting it in juxtaposition to the afore-referred judgment of this Court it becomes crystal clear that this Court entertained Writ Petition during pendency of matter before the Collector, irrespective of any issue relating to the Act, 1899, thus, the petitioner-company cannot be knocked out on the basis that it can file a revision petition against the order passed by respondent No.2.
19. For what has been discussed above, I have no hesitation to hold that the petitioner-company is not liable to pay stamp duty in lieu of the amount, to be paid by it to the lessor, in lieu of service charges. Further, after deposit of Rs.50,44,378/- by the petitioner-company, respondent No.1 had no authority to impound the Lease Deed. Consequently, instant petition is accepted, impugned order of respondent No.1 impounding the Lease Deed and order passed by respondent No.2 rejecting the representation of the petitioner-company are set-aside. As a result, respondent No.1 is directed to register Lease Deed of the petitioner-company and return the original to the petitioner-company.
No order as to costs.