MUHAMMAD SHAN GUL, J. Through this judgment the titled constitutional petition is sought to be decided.
2. The petitioner has laid a challenge to an order dated 18.09.2017 whereby his representation against an order of removal from service has been rejected by the respondent bank.
3. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner gained employment in the respondent bank as an Officer Grade-III but at the time of his appointment he (as it turned out) willfully, deliberately and contumaciously withheld material information from the respondent bank about his chequered criminal record. The petitioner gained contractual employment on 19.02.2013. He was removed from service vide order dated 20.02.2015 and whereafter an appeal against the said order also met the same fate vide order dated 18.09.2017 and which order has been challenged through the present petition.
4. On the last date of hearing, counsel for the petitioner was asked to gain acquaintance with the law laid down by the honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan in "Province of Punjab through Special Secretary, Specialized Healthcare and Medical Education Department, Lahore and others v. Khadim Hussain Abbasi" (2021 SCMR 1419). Today Mr. Zohaib Hassan Advocate has returned and submits that he has no arguments to offer because the law laid down by the honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan applies squarely to the facts of the instant case and therefore the matter may be decided on its own merits. Adds lamely that the petitioner stands acquitted in the criminal cases registered against him and the impugned order, therefore, offends Article 13 of the Constitution.
5. Sardar Riaz Karim Advocate legal Advisor for National Bank of Pakistan has appeared and submits that acquittal in the criminal cases in question has no bearing on the present matter since the charge against the petitioner is not of being involved in a criminal matter but of withholding such information, breaching the trust of the Bank and thereby gaining employment by playing truant!
6. Heard.
7. The petitioner gained employment as Officer Grade-III on contractual basis on 19.2.2013. During the course of due diligence by way of completion of post- employment formalities it was noticed that he had not submitted the police verification certificate to be obtained from the local police hierarchy. At that point in time it was not known to the respondent-Bank that the petitioner had consciously yet deliberately not submitted the police verification report. Upon enquiry from the local police by the concerned Regional Office, Multan, it was discovered that the petitioner was a nominated accused in case FIR No.177/12 dated 24.5.2012 under Sections 302/324/148/149, P.P.C., P.S. Karor as also a nominated accused in crime report No.137/14 dated 06.5.2014 under Section 13/20/65 A.O., P.S. Karor. Since the petitioner had intentionally concealed the fact about his involvement in a criminal case he was found to be in dereliction of Clause 5.6 of his contract of appointment and, therefore, his contract was terminated after affording him due process safeguards and after providing him numerous opportunities of being heard. An inquiry was also held in the matter and the petitioner was allowed to produce evidence in his defence. He was allowed the facility of being confronted with the documents in possession of the respondents and whereafter his contract was terminated since he had no explanation to offer.
8. It can be seen that at the time of gaining employment the petitioner was already involved and nominated in a crime report. He did not submit police verification report and concealed the same only so that he could gain employment. Not learning from his earlier mistake and rather reinforcing the same he also concealed the aspect of a second crime report being registered against him from the respondent-bank while being in service and, therefore, underpinned his misdemeanor, so to speak.
9. A perusal of the charge sheet and show-cause notice served upon the petitioner reveals that the charge framed against him on the administrative side (and this gains importance) is that of concealment of facts leading to misconduct. The charge sheet mentions that the petitioner in order to 'camouflage his criminal activities' deliberately withheld and concealed his involvement in criminal matters while gaining employment and thereby breached the trust of the respondent- bank and thereby committed misconduct. A copy of inquiry proceedings appended by the respondent-bank with its reply reveals that the petitioner acknowledged the charge against him and offered a reason which only braced his misconduct. The petitioner submitted during inquiry proceedings that since the matter had been compromised he did not bother to mention the crime report in question.
10. It may be noted that the acquittal based on compromise was secured much later in time and was not in the field at that point in time. It is, in this view of the matter, that the petitioner was shown the door by the respondent-bank vide dismissal order dated 20.2.2015. Thereafter, an appeal filed by the petitioner against this order of dismissal was also dismissed vide order dated 18.9.2017 and which is why the petitioner approached this Court in its constitutional jurisdiction.
11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of 'Pakistan in "Province of Punjab through Special Secretary, Specialized Healthcare and Medical Education Department, Lahore and others v. Khadim Hussain Abbasi" (2021 SCMR 1419) has held at paragraphs Nos.4 and 7 as follows:- "4... ...... It has further been pointed out that it is settled law that acquittal in criminal proceedings has no impact on the departmental proceedings as the two can simultaneously proceed and the result of one has no bearing on the outcome of the other unless the departmental proceedings have not been independently conducted and solely and exclusively rely on the criminal proceedings, which is not the case here.
7............. This Court has repeatedly held that departmental proceedings and criminal prosecution are not mutually exclusive, can be proceeded independently and acquittal in criminal proceedings does not affect the outcome of the departmental proceedings. It may be noted that departmental proceedings are undertaken under a different set of laws, are subject to different procedural requirements are based upon different evidentiary principles and a different threshold of proof is to be met. Criminal proceedings on the other hand are undertaken under a different set of laws, have different standards of proof are subject to different procedural requirements and different thresholds of proof are required to be met. Therefore, acquittal in criminal proceedings cannot and does not automatically knock off the outcome of the departmental proceedings if all legal and procedural formalities and due process have been followed independently."
12. In "Shahid Masood Malik v. Habib Bank Limited and another" (2008 SCMR 1151) it has been held at paragraph No.13 as follows:- "13. It has also come on record and has been established in the inquiry that the petitioner in connivance with other accomplices was engaged in opening fictitious accounts and withdrawing the amount therefrom fictitiously in the fake names, thus, misappropriated the bank drafts and was rightly found guilty of the misconduct. The contention of the petitioner's counsel that the dismissal of petitioner, consequent to the departmental proceedings, would be of no legal consequence as he had been already acquitted by the competent Court of law in criminal proceedings is devoid of force in view of the dictum laid down by this Court in the case of Inspector-General of Police, Punjab, Lahore and others v. Muhammad Tariq 2001 SCMR 789 wherein it has been held that acquittal in criminal cases would not debar the departmental authority to take action against delinquent in accordance with law and rules. Such acquittal does not give to a delinquent clean certificate of his absolvement from the departmental proceedings.
The proceedings are conducted respecting the case registered against delinquent while the departmental proceedings are regarding the charges of malversation and misconduct. Both the proceedings, however, can go side by side as their nature is totally different."
13. In "Muhammad Iqbal v. District Police Officer, Sahiwal and another" (2011 SCMR 534), it has been held at Paragraph No.8 as follows:- "8. This Court has already laid down in the case of Arif Ghafoor, that disciplinary proceedings and criminal proceedings are quite distinct to each other having altogether different characteristics and there is nothing common between the adjudicative forums by whom separate prescribed procedure and mechanism is followed for adjudication and both the forums have their own domain of jurisdiction. The decision of one forum would have no bearing on the decision of other forum in any manner whatsoever. In the said background, it would be a misconceived notion to consider the acquittal in a criminal trial as an embargo against disciplinary proceedings".
14. The petitioner's near sheepish plea of Article 13 being attracted to the facts of the instant case can also be put to rest by simply alluding to what has been held at Paragraph No.4 in "Nazir Ahmed v. Capital City Police Officer, Lahore and another" (2011 SCMR 484) wherein it has been held as follows:- "4. ......... We are not persuaded to agree with the prime contention of learned Advocate Supreme Court on behalf of petitioner that no disciplinary action could have been taken against the petitioner after his acquittal for the simple reason that criminal proceedings would have no substantial bearing on merits of the case because criminal proceedings and disciplinary proceedings are not synonymous or interchangeable having distinct features and characteristies. The provisions as enumerated under Article 13 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan would have no application in this case. It is well-established by now that "this Article sanctifies the well settled principle of law that no person will be tried for an offence on the same set of facts on which he has already been acquitted or convicted. For applicability of the rule of autre fois acquit essential conditions to be satisfied are (1) there must have been a trial of the accused for the offence charged against him, (2) the trial must have been by a Court of competent jurisdiction and (3) there must have been a judgment or order of acquittal, (4) the parties in the two trials must be the same, (5) fact-in-issue in the earlier trial must be identical with what is sought to be reagitated in the subsequent trial". (Ismail A. Rchman v. Muhammad Sadiq PLD 1990 Kar. 286, Ramzan Bibi v. Muzaffar Hussain PLD 1967 Lah.186, State v. Muhammad Moosa PLD 1970 Kar. 386). It is worth mentioning that the maxim nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa (no person should be twice disturbed for the same cause) is also not applicable in the case of petitioner."
15. The fact that criminal cases were registered against the petitioner and that he was acquitted is not relevant in the present matter. What, however, is relevant in the present matter is the fact that the petitioner concealed the factum of lodging of an FIR against him by not submitting and withholding the police verification report or even informing the bank about his arrest and involvement in the said crime report. The petitioner breached the trust of the respondent bank by concealing this important information and it is only upon the bank's own discovery that it learnt that the petitioner was involved in a criminal case prior to him gaining employment with the bank.
The petitioner by doing so displayed conduct unbecoming of an officer eligible to work in the public domain and breached the trust of the respondent bank and could not have possibly been allowed to continue in service so as to handle monies held by the bank in trust. The question in the present matter is not whether a criminal case was registered and the petitioner was acquitted but that the petitioner who deliberately concealed such a fact cannot be trusted.
16. Where, at the inception of his career the petitioner had made a false statement for the purpose of seeking recruitment he could not be expected to perform his duties honestly, diligently or in a manner even remotely trustworthy. Concealment of facts and misstatement on the part of the petitioner before entering into service itself shook the credibility of his character and disentitled him from seeking any relief. The petitioner tried to deceive the respondent-bank and nearly succeeded in his attempt but for the enquiry initiated by the respondent-bank itself and which enquiry revealed the misdemeanor on the part of the petitioner.
17. In somewhat similar circumstances this Court in "Zaka Ullah Bajwa v. Government of the Punjab through Secretary, Public Prosecution Department, Lahore" (2013 PLC (C.S.) 344) has held at paragraph No.7 as follows:- "7. Admittedly, neither the petitioner disclosed factum of pendency of inquiry or criminal case registered against him nor he filed application with the permission of the Appointing Authority as envisaged under Rule 8 of the Punjab Civil Service (Application for Posts) Rules, 1957. If the petitioner adopted proper course for filing of application then the pendency of inquiry and registration of criminal case must have been in the notice of the competent authority before issuance of offer of appointment. The petitioner deliberately avoided to disclose this fact as such when on verification it came to the notice of the competent authority that not only the petitioner has been removed from service vide order dated 26-2-2010 but also he is an accused of criminal case bearing F.I.R. No.1173/08, under sections 420/468/471/469, P.P.C. registered with Police Station Islampura. When these facts came to the notice of the competent authority, it while invoking condition No. ix reproduced supra withheld the appointment order of the petitioner."
18. In fact, the facts of the present case also squarely attract the law laid down by the honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan in "The District Police Officer, Mianwali and 2 others v. Amir Abdul Majid" (2021 SCMR 420) according to which acquittal in a criminal case becomes meaningless when the basis of disciplinary proceedings is rooted in something more than mere registration of a criminal case. It has been held at paragraph No.3 it has been held as follows:- "3. It is by now well settled that a civil servant facing expulsive proceedings on departmental side on account of his indictment on criminal charge may not save his job in the event of acquittal as the department still may have reasons/material, to conscionably consider his stay in the service as inexpedient; there are additional reasons to disregard his acquittal inasmuch as criminal dispensation of justice involving corporeal consequences, comparatively, requires an higher standard of proof so as to drive home the charge beyond doubt, an exercise to be routed through a procedure stringently adversarial, therefore, factuality of the charge notwithstanding, procedural loopholes or absence of evidence, sufficient enough to sustain the charge, at times occasion in failures essentially to maintain safe administration of criminal justice out of abundant caution. Departmental jurisdiction, on the other hand, can assess the suitability of a civil servant, confronted with a charge through a f act finding method, somewhat inquisitorial in nature without heavier procedural riders, otherwise required in criminal jurisdiction to eliminate any potential risk of error, therefore, the Tribunal has undoubtedly misdirected itself in reinstating the respondent, considering his acquittal as the sole criterion in isolation to the totality of circumstances whereunder he had succeeded to vindicate his position."
19. A Division Bench of this Court in "Abdul Manan v. Provincial Police Officer" (2017 PLC (C. S.)
862) has held that not coming out clean with relevant information for the purpose of securing employment in the public domain is an act unbecoming of a person seeking employment as a public servant and, therefore, deplorable and not worthy of being treated with leniency. It is as not as if the bank is not operating in the public domain so as to not to attract the law laid down above.
20. Order dated 18.09.2017 that has been brought under challenge in the present matter is unexceptionable since it has been passed in accordance with law and in terms of the contract of appointment itself i.e. Clause 5.6 of the Contract and, therefore, this petition cannot make any headway.
21. Seen from all angles this petition does not call for any interference and is, therefore, dismissed.