The appellant, namely, Muhammad Mumtaz Khan was appointed as Driver in the Punjab Civil Secretariat, Motor Transport Wing, Services and General Administration Department, Government of Punjab, vide order dated 2nd of April, 2018 on contract basis inter-alia on the following conditions: i) "Your selection will be subject to verification of driving license, academic certificates, antecedents and characters certificate". ii) "If at any stage, it is discovered that you had obtained the appointment on the basis of forged/bogus documents or thorough deceit by any means, the appointment shall be considered to be void ab initio and you shall be liable to refund all amounts received from the Govt. as a consequence of appointment in addition to such other action as may be taken against you under the law."
2. Subsequently upon verification license of the appellant was found bogus and thus, the respondents invoking the afore-stated conditions terminated his appointment vide order dated 28th of August, 2018. Taking note of this fact the learned Single Judge relying upon the case of "Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs v. Muhammad Azam Chatha" (2013 SCMR 120) dismissed the appellant's constitutional petition i.e. Writ Petition No.39917 of 2020 with the observation that he could not resort to the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court for re-instatement in service and that his only remedy was to seek damages on account of wrongful dismissal. So, this appeal.
3. It is now well established that if a person is employed on contract basis and if the terms of employment provide the manner of termination of his services, the same can be terminated in terms thereof. In the case at hands the competent authority in exercise of clause 9 of the offer of appointment letter, reproduced above, has terminated the services of the appellant. Thus, we are of the view that termination letter does not suffer from any infirmity.
4. There is another good reason to decline the prayer made in this appeal. The appellant being contractual employee could not file writ petition to seek redress in respect of grievance relating to terms and conditions of his services. The reason is that a writ may be granted only in a case where there is statutory duty imposed upon the officer concerned and there is failure on part of that officer to discharge that statutory obligation. The principal function of the writ is to compel the performance of public duty prescribed by the statute and to keep the subordinate officer exercising public function within the limits of his jurisdiction. In the present case, the appointment of the appellant as Driver was contractual in nature and there was no statutory obligation as between him and the respondents. Thus, any duty or obligation falling upon a public servant out of a contract entered into by him as such public servant, cannot be enforced by the machinery of with under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. This view finds support from the cases of "Abid Iqbal Hafiz and others v. Secretary, Public Prosecution Department, Government of the Punjab, Lahore and others" (PLD 2010 Supreme Court 841)
"Pakistan Telecommunication Co. Ltd. Through Chairman v. Iqbal Nasir and others" (2011 PLC (C.S) 623) and "Muzaffar Khan and others v. Government of Pakistan and others" (2013 SCMR 304).
5. In the result we are of the view that the order dated 19th of October, 2020 made by the learned Single Judge dismissing the constitutional petition does not suffer from any infirmity and thus, interference therewith is uncalled for. This appeal is accordingly dismissed.