SHAMS MEHMOOD MIRZA, J.----This writ petition calls into question order dated 06.11,2019 passed by the full bench of National Industrial Relation Commission (the Commission ) whereby the appeal filed by the petitio ner against the decision of the Single Member of the Commission was dismissed being time barred,
2. The facts of the case in brief are that the petitioner was dismissed from service by respondent No.1 on 02,05.2017. This action was called into question by the petitioner by filing a petition before the labour court, Lahore after serving the grievance notice dated 17.05.2017. The petition was returned by the labour court on the issue of territorial jurisdiction. The petitioner filed a fresh petition before the Commission on 19.03.2018 on account of the fact that respondent No.1 was a trans-provincial organization. The petition was accompanied by an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 seeking condonation of delay . The petition was, however , dismissed by the Single Member of the Commission on 17.07.2018 for being barred by limitation. The petitioner filed the appeal before the full Bench of the Commission on 04.09.2018, which appeal was again dismissed for being time barred.
3. Learned counsel submits that the petitioner's counsel duly informed the Reader of the Commission on 26.06.2018 that he was proceeding abroad with the request that the case be fixed in the second week of September , 2018. It is stated that a writte n slip was also handed over to the Reader . It was accordingly contended that the Single Member of NIRC erred in passing the order against the petitioner by dismissing the petition on the ground of limitation without adverting to the contents of the application seeking condonation of delay .
4. Learned counsel for respondent No.1 by placing reliance on the judgment reported as Mst. Khalida Begum and 2 others v. Mst. Yasmin and others 2000 CLC 1290 contended that the petitioner could not have filed a fresh petition before the Commission and that the petition returned to him by the labou r court was required to be filed before the Commission. He furthermore submits that riot only the petition but the appeal filed before the full bench of the Commission was patently time barred and, therefore, the impugned orders were rightly passed against the petitioner .
5. Arguments heard, record perused.
6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Khusi Muhammad through L.Rs. and others v. Mst. Fazal Bibi and others PLD 2016 SC 872 has clearly held that the provisions of Limitation Act, 1908 are required to be construed strictly and that ignorance, negligence or mistake on the part of the litigant shall not save limitation.
7. It is an admitted fact that the grievance notice was served by the petitioner on 17.05.2017 whereas the petition before the Commission was filed on 19.03.2018 which was patently outside the limitation period provided in section 33 of the Pakistan Industrial Relations Act, 2012. The petitioner inexplicably did not file any application under section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908 along with the petition. Similarly , the petition returned to the petitioner by the labour court was not filed before the Commission and instead a fresh petition was filed which was in violation of the law laid down in Mst. Khalida Begum's case referred to above. In the circumsta nces, the Single Member of the Commission rightly dismissed the petition holding it to be barred by limitation.
8. The petitioner one again did not file the appeal within the stipulated time frame before the full bench of the Commission. The appeal was held to be filed after the delay of 13 days before the full bench of the Commission whereas according to the petitioner it was filed after the delay of 11 days. The reason put forth by the learned counsel is that he informed the reader for adjourning the case to September , 2018 as he was proceeding abroad.
He further stated that after his return he inquired about the date of hearing of the case when he was intimated that Single Member of the Commission had already dismissed the petition on 17.07.2018. Order dated 17.07.2018, however , clearly reflects the presence of learned counsel for the petitioner and the arguments addressed by him. In the circumstances, the plea put forward by the learned counsel cannot be accepted. Admittedly , the appeal before the full bench of the Commission was not filed within the prescribed period and there is also no lawful justification for the delay . The full bench of the ' Commission rightly dismissed the appeal.
9. In the circumstances, this writ petition being devoid of any merit is dismissed.