MUHAMMAD SHAN GUL, J. This judgment shall decide the following four Writ Petitions bearing No.4884 of 2019 titled "Mst. Saima Naz v. Government of Punjab etc.", W.P.No.12659 of 2018 titled "Mst. Uzma Hashmi etc. v.
Government of Punjab etc." , W.P.No.12982 of 2018 titled "Mst. Farah Naz etc. v. Government of Punjab etc." and W.P.No.13729 titled "Mst. Najma-us-Sahar v. Government of Punjab etc." since common questions are involved in these petitions.
2. The petitioners in all these petitions are contractual employees whose contracts of appointment have not been renewed or extended and which is what has prompted the petitioners to approach this Court in its constitutional jurisdiction. It is trite and acknowledged that a contractual employee, short of stigmatization or short of canvasing a statutory dereliction, cannot approach this Court in its constitutional jurisdiction. Reliance with advantage is placed on "Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs v. Muhammad Azam Chatha" (2013 SCMR 120), "Pakistan Telecommunication Co. Ltd. through Chairman v. Iqbal Nasir and others" (PLD 2011 SC 132), "Nadeem Shahid and another v. Chairman, State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan and 3 others" (2003 PLC (CS) 719), "Aurangzeb v. Messrs Gool Bano Dr. Burjor Ankalseria and others" (2001 SCMR 909), "Pakistan Defence Officers' Housing Authority and others v. Lt. col. Syed Jawaid Ahmed" (2013 SCMR 1707 ), "Federation of Pakistan Chamber of Commerce and Industry , Karachi v. Ali Ahmed Qureshi" ( 2001 SCMR 1733 ) and "Abdul W ahab and others v . HBL and others" ( 2013 SCMR 1383 ).
3. The only remedy that a contractual employee has in the case of wrongful termination or for that matter non- extension in contractual service is that of a suit for damages and not an action rooted in reinstatement. In the matters before this Court the petitioners were appointed on contractual basis and their contracts of service contain an unequivocal clause about the currency of contract and which is subject to extension. Likewise, the contracts of appointment also contain a clause which conspicuously reads that no right of renewal or extension in contractual appointment can be claimed by the petitioners.
4. In this view of the matter , the non-extension in the contracts of the petitioners is covered in terms of their contracts of employment and therefore no exception can be claimed with respect to this aspect of non-extension.
5. It may be mentioned here that constitutional jurisdiction is meant to correct and rectify statutory dereliction and not contractual dereliction. Even otherwise it is trite that a contractual employee is governed by the principle of master and servant and hence cannot seek resort to constitutional jurisdiction to claim extension in contractual service.
6. Learned counsel for Danish School authority Syed Muzammal Hussain Bukhari, Advocate has placed on record copy of an order dated 20.04.2018 passed by the Honorable Apex Court in the case of similarly placed contractual employees working in the Punjab Danish Schools in Civil Petition No.1398 of 2017 titled "Safdar Ali v.
Government of Punjab etc." and by means of this order the Honorable Apex Court has only reiterated and reinforced this trite and acknowledged position of law. Had the petitioners' servic es been governed by statutory rules of service and had those rules been violated the petitioners may have had a case but this not being the position obtaining on the ground there is no way this Court can entertain the present petitions.
7. It needs to be stated unequivocally that the purpose of judicial review is based on ensuring that the intent of the Parliament as contained in the statute is upheld. What is sought to be remedied by resort to writ jurisdiction is the offence caused to the statute!
8. The question confronting the court pertains to the ambit, sweep and purview of judicial review/writ jurisdiction in the matter of terms and conditions of employees of a statutory entity . It is trite that the purpose of judicial review is to further the intent of Parliament as contained in the statute. If there is no statute there is no judicial review . All non-statutory actions come within the sphere of private law. It is equally trite that there is no jurisdiction to entertain a writ in a matter governed by a contract as no public law element is involved in a purely contractual matter and which contract is not fettered by statute. The Indian Supreme Court in "State of U.P. and Anr. v. Johri Mal" (2004)
4 SCC 714) at paragraph 24 has unequivocally ruled that public law remedy enforceable under Article 226 of the Indian Constitution can only be resorted to if the actions of the authority fell in the realm of public law .
9. Even the English courts are quite clear in this respect and in "R v. East Berkshire Health Authority , ex parte Walsh" (1984) 3 ALL ER 425) at 430 it has been lucidly observed, "in all three cases there was a special statutory provision bearing directly on the right of public authority to dismiss the plaintif f (and it is, therefore, that the court intervened) . It is the existence of these statutory provisions which inject the element of public law necessary in this context to attract the remedies of administrative law. Employment by a public authority does not per se inject any element of public law. Nor does the fact that the employee is an officer. This only makes it more likely that there should be statutory restrictions upon dismissal. It will be this statutory underpinning which injects the element of public law. Still less can I find any warrant for equating public law with the interest of the public. If the public through the Parliament gives effect to that interest by means of statutory provision that is quite different, but the interest of the public per se is not sufficient"............."the ordinary employer is free to act in breach of his contract of employment and if he does so his emplo yee will acquire certain private law rights and remedies in damages or compensation. Parliament can underpin the position of public authority employees by directly restricting the freedom of public authority to dismiss, thus giving the employee public law rights and at least making him a potential candidate for administrative law remedies .............. if however , Authority gives the employee the required contractual protection a breach of that contract is not a matter of public law".
10. In "Executive Committee of U.P. State v. Chandra Kiran Tyagi" (1970 (2) SCR 250) it has been held at page 259 that normally and apart from the intervention of statute there would never be a nullity in terminating an ordinary contract of master and servant ....... here we are concerned with a statutory scheme of employment and the scheme gives the dock workers a status". At page 261 of the judgment the famous English case of "Barber v.
Manchester Regional Hospital Board and another" (1958) 1 ALL ER 322) has been quoted, "I am unable to equate this case to the circumstances which were being considered by the House of Lords in the case of Vine.
There the plaintif f was working under a Code which had statutory powers and clearly in those circumstances the Lords who dealt with the case took the view that the case could not be dealt with as though it were an ordinary master and servant claim". At page 262, "but when a statutory status is given to an employee and there has been a violation of the provision of the statute the employee will be eligible to get the relief of the declaration and it will not be a mere case of master and servant". At page 268, "having due regard to the principles discussed above we are of the opinion that the High Court was not justified in granting the declaration....... as pointed out the Regulations are made under the powers reserved to the Corporation under 54 of the Act. No doubt they lay down the terms and conditions of relationship between the Corporation and its employe es. An order made in breach of the regulations would be contrary to such terms and conditions but would not be in breach of any statutory obligations".
11. In "Ram Babu Rahaur v. Divisional Manager , Life Insurance Corporation of India and others" (AIR 1961 Allahabad 502) at paragraph 5 it has been declared that a servant is ordinarily at the pleasure of the master unless that pleasure is curtailed by statutory provisions.
12. Durga Das Basu in his treatise on Administrative Law 2nd Edition at page 144 says that administrative instructions, Rules or Manuals which had no statutory force are not enforceable in a court of law.......... the reason is that not having the force of law , they cannot confer any legal right and cannot be enforced in writs.
13. In "Sukhdev Singh and others v. Bagatra m Sardar Singh" (1975 (3) SCR 619 at page 669) it has been clearly held, "while Rules are generally made by the government, regulations are made by a body which is a creature of the statute itself with its powers limited by the statute. While Rules apply to all matters covered by the statute the scope of the Regulations is narrower being usually confined to internal matters of the statutory body such as the conditions of service of its employees. When regulations standardize the conditions of service of the employees or purport to formulate them, their character is further diluted by the nature of the subject matter . For service or employment is basically a contract which is deeply rooted in private law. A mere standardization of the terms of service contract is not, therefore, sufficient to convert it into a statutory status . Because the statute itself is silent and does not confer any security of tenure on the employee. The Corporation has a complete discretion in framing the regulations as it thinks fit. The amount of the protection thus depends on the discretion of the Corporation/ Statutory Bodies. It is not given by way of a mandatory statutory obligation imposed on the Corporation from above. For a Corporat ion can vary the terms of the regulations at any time thus depriving its employees of the security of tenure of service".
14. In "H.K.Sema and R. v. Raveendran, JJ" (AIR 2008 SC 2594) at paragraph 11 it has been held, "thus there is a clear distinction between public employment governed by Statutory Rules and employment governed purely by contract. The test for deciding the nature of relief is whether the employment is governed purely by a contract or by a statute or Statutory Rules. Even where the employer is a statutory body but the relationship is purely governed by contract with no eleme nt of statutory governance, the contract of service will not be specifically enforceable".
15. In this view of the matter , the Danish School Authority may be a statutory entity but its relationship with its employees is governed by contract without any statutory prescription and henc e the relationship between the Danish School Authority and its employees rests in private law. The power to enter into contracts of service is not hedged or fettered by any statutory provisions. Hence the public law remedy afforded by Article 199 of the Constitution cannot be triggered.
16. Seen from whatever angle, these petitions are not maintainable and are accordingly dismissed.