A. O. RAZIUR RAHMAN (MEMBER).-This is a Misc. Petition dated 31st July, 1982 filed in continuation of Appeal No. 508(L)/1982, dated 31st July, 1982, against the orders passed respectively by the Member (Power), WAPDA, Lahore (respondent No. 3), and the Chairman, WAPDA (respondent No. 2), inflicting certain punishments on the appellant.
2. The original order dated 28th October, 1981, was passed by the Member (Power), WAPDA, imposing the following two penalties on the Appellant:
(i) Reduction in pay from the then stage to the initial pay of Superin--tending Engineer in NPS-19.
(ii) Stoppage of three increments without further effect.
Subsequently, when the appellant preferred an appeal before the Chair--man, WAPDA, respondent No. 2, the appeal was dismissed on 10th June, 1982 and the punishment enhanced by reducing him in rank and placing him in the initial stage of NPS-18, instead of reduction in pay to the initial pay of NPS-19 and stoppage of three increments. This order was given retrospective effect from the date of the original order, namely, 28th October, 1981. Against this appellate order, the appellant preferred a second appeal before the Authority (WAPDA), which also was rejected.
3. A large number of grounds have been adduced in support of the appeal filed before the Tribunal and they will be considered in due course after giving full hearing to the parties. It is, however, worth noting at this stage that the enhanced punishment inflicted on the appellant has reduced his basic pay from R s. 2,650 p.m. To Rs. 1,350 p.m., which is a very severe and drastic reduction in emoluments. Further, although, the appellate order was passed on 10th June, 1982, the reduction in rank and pay has been given effect to retrospectively from 28th October, 1981.
4. In the Miscellaneous Petition under disposal, the appellant has prayed for staying the implementation of the above order on the ground that it will cause irreparable loss to him if action on the impugned order is not suspended till the disposal of the main appeal and that the balance of convenience is in favour of the petitioner.
5. We have heard both the parties on 15th September, 1982 on the question whether, in the circumstances of the case, the appellant deserves an interim relief by way of suspension of the impugned order till the disposal of the appeal. On behalf of the appellant, it was urged that, as already mentioned above, the drastic reduction of emoluments was bound to cause irreparable financial loss to him, because of the fact that, in the event of the appeal succeeding, the reimbursement of the amounts with--held would not make up for the hardship caused by non- payment of the full emoluments for a considerable time. Moreover, it was emphasised that the mental agony, humiliation and disgrace which the appellant would have to undergo all the time could not be undone, written of or washed away by the mere setting aside of the impugned order.
It was further argued that no administrative inconvenience was likely to be caused if the impugned orders were held in abeyance till the disposal of the appeal.
6. On behalf of the respondents, it was urged that the appellant was reverted to the post of Senior Engineer at the initial stage of NPS-18 on 10th June, 1982 and, thereafter, allowed 90 days leave with effect from 10th June, 1982 and that his salary was to be charged to the vacant post of Deputy Commercial Manager, Islamabad Region. It was argued that, if this arrangement were disturbed, it would be difficult to find a post against which the salary of the appellant could be drawn.
7. We have given our full thought to the objections, noted above, raised by the respondents, to the passing of any order suspending the operation of the orders of reduction in rank passed against the appellant. We do not agree that, by suspending the operation of the impugned orders, which are of a very drastic nature, any great administrative incon--venience and problems would be caused. From the record of the case, we find that the appellant was first served a show-cause notice as far back as 16th May, 1978, and thereafter, he was charge-sheeted on 27th November, 1978. He answered the charge-sheet on 10th December 1978. He was again charge-sheeted on 14th January, 1979 and he replied to this charge-sheet on 20th January, 1979. Thereafter, it was as late as 28th October, 1981 that the Member (Power), WAPDA (respondent No. 3), passed an order reducing the pay of the appellant and stopping three increments. Subsequently, on the appellant preferring an appeal against this order, it was as late as 10th June, 1982 that the enhanced punishment was ordered by the Chairman, WAPDA. It would, thus, be seen that, between the first show-cause notice, served on the appellant on 16th May, 1978 and the final order reducing the officer in rank, more than 3 years and a half elapsed. During all these years and months, the appellant remained in service and continued to work as an officer of the rank of Superintending Engineer, without apparent dislocation of work or any noticeable harm to the working of the organization. Since the latest order has been impugned and is under appeal before this Tribunal, the proceedings cannot be considered to have ended and the said order cannot be considered to be the last work in the matter. Since the main purport of the order is its penal character, it would be putting the cart before the horse to inflict the punishment before it has been upheld or confirmed by the Tribunal. Indeed, it would be contrary to all principles of natural justice to refuse to withhold infliction of the punishment ordered against an appellant, without considering the question as to how an interim Stay order in the particular case would create administrative problems or difficulties, which cannot be surmounted. So far as this particular case is concerned, as already observed, the appellant has been on trial almost for full four years. If he could continue to be on trial all this time, without having to br reduced in rank or emoluments, it is not clear to us what special administrative advantage can be derived by refusing to allow him to continue in his own rank and scale of pay till the final decision in the matter. If he is ultimately found to deserve the punishment ordered by the Chairman and confirmed by the Authority, the punishment can be carried out after dismissal of his appeal by the Tribunal. In that case, the only loss that would be caused to the Authority would be the payment of higher emoluments to the appellant till the disposal of his appeal. This, however, is something that cannot be avoided if unnecessary and undeserved hardship to the appellant is to be prevented in the event o the appeal succeeding and the appellant being founded not to have deserved the punishment ordered. However, the Authority can minimise the loss by helping the Tribunal to dispose of the appeal at an early date.
8. There is no doubt that, as pointed out on behalf of the learned counsel for the respondents, this Tribunal has itself refused to grant temporary injunction in another case, Muhammad Saleem v.
WAPDA (Misc. Petition No. 22/82), wherein, by its order dated 7th July, 1982, it has held that it "did not think that the petitioner would suffer an irre--parable loss or that the balance of convenience was not in favour of the respondent". The decision given in the case referred to was based on the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case, Province of West Pakistan v. Malik Asghar Khan (1971 SCMR 569), according to which a temporary injunction should not be ordinarily issued unless there are compelling reasons to do so. In the present case, the position can be fully appre--ciated if the facts are further elaborated in addition to what has already been stated earlier. The appellant joined as Junior Engineer on 4th January, 1962 and, on the basis of good service record, was promoted as Assistant Director (Senior Engineer) on 13th April, 1974 and was later promoted as Superintending Engineer on 13th September, 1977. His reduction to the rank of Assistant Engineer, after serving for a period of five year: as Superintending Engineer, would be a great set-back to him in his service career and, if found to be unjustified, would result in uncalled for suffering and humiliation, which cannot be compensated for in any way whatsoever. If the stay is not granted and the appeal is ultimately accepted, he will be working as Executive Engineer (Grade-18) during the interim period but will actually get the pay of Superintending Engineer (Grade-19)-a position which is obviously anomalous and not very satis--factory even from the departmental point of view. But what is worse is that he will be working under his juniors, although he is much senior to those under whom he will have to work during the pendency of the appeal. It would also be ridiculous and even undesirable from the administrative point of view if, in the event of his appeal succeeding, he is restored to his original status of Superintending Engineer (Grade-19) and once again posted over those very juniors under whom he had to work during the pendency of the appeal. As against this, in the event of the appeal being dismissed, he will ultimately take his proper place in the lower grade without causing any administrative anomalies or problems whatsoever. In the meantime, he will be getting the pay of the post against which he would be working without any additional financial burden on the organization.
9. From the above, it would appear that an interim stay can be ordered without deviating from the principles laid down and the guide--lines provided in the Supreme Court ruling on the subject, to which reference has already been made.
10. Without going in detail into the merits of the appeal itself, it may be relevant to note that, so far as the order of reduction in rank is concerned, this was passed on 10th June, 1982, whereas it has been, retrospectively given effect to from 28th October, 1981, vide salary slip issued by the Budget and Accounts Officer, WAPDA, on 14th June, 1982. Moreover, as stated in the Memo. Of appeal, it appears that respondents Nos. 2 and'3, who had passed the impugned orders dated 28th October, 1981 and 10th June, 1982, respectively, were also present in the meeting of the Authority (WAPDA), which considered and disposed of the second departmental appeal of the appellant. Apparently, such action on their part was contrary to the accepted norms of justice and could be assailed on the ground that the decision of the authority was vitiated by the fact that the same persons against whose orders the appeal/ representation was made by the aggrieved party themselves set in judgment in the matter. While final decision on these two points can be given only after full hearing of the appeal, we feel that these two infirmities, prima facie, make out a strong case for the setting aside of the impugned order. In such a situa--tion, it will be clearly and patently unjust, unfair, and contrary to all canons of justice-legal and natural--to insist on implementation of the impugned order before the disposal of the appeal challenging the order.
11. Considering all aspects of the case, we are of the view that Stay Order would be justified, both because the appellant has, prima facie, a good case and the balance of convenience lies in favour of the grant of the injunction prayed for, besides the fact that the appellant will suffer undeserved loss by way of reduction in income, mental torture and agony as well as financial hardships, if the injunction is refused now and the appeal succeeds later. In this connection, the three basic consideration enunciated by the honourable Supreme Court in the case of Muhammad Umar Beg v. Sultan Mahmood (PLD 1970 SC 139) have been fully kept in mind by us while formulating our view on this Misc. Petition.
12. In the result, we allow the interim relief prayed for and order that the operation of the impugned orders, dated 28th October, 1981 and 10th June, 1982 respectively, be held in abeyance till the disposal of Appeal No. 508(L)/1982. Simultaneously, it is ordered that the said appeal should come up for hearing before the Tribunal as early as possible.