' This second appeal is directed against the order dated 2nd June, 1975 passed by the learned District Judge upholding that of the learned Rent Controller dated 4th July, 1973 whereby he accepted the ejectment petition filed by the respondent against the appellant.
2. The facts of the case are fully and accurately given in the orders of the two Courts below and need not be repeated. It will, however, facilitate if the issues framed in the case are reproduced below :-
(1) At what rate the petitioner is entitled to claim rent from the respondent ? 0. P. Parties.
(2) Whether the respondent has been making tender of the due rent to the petitioner for the alleged period of default ? O. P. P.
(3) Whether the petitioner in good faith requires the shop for his personal use ? O. P. P.
(4) Whether the respondent has committed act which has materially reduced the utility and value of the shop in dispute ? O. P. P.
(5) What is the effect of the respondent being in possession of two other shops situated in Satellite Town, Gujranwala, and being used by him as his clinic ? O. P. P.
(6) Relief.
' After recording evidence and hearing the parties, the learned Rent Controller decided issue No, 2 in favour of the appellant. Issue No, 3 was decided in favour of the respondent. The decision on issue No, 4 was against the respondent while issue No, 5 was decided in the negative. Under issue No, 1, the learned Rent Controller held that the respondent was entitled to receive rent from the appellant at the rate of Rs, 50 per month. In the light of his decision under issue No, 3 the learned Rent Controller accepted the ejectment petition and passed the order of eviction against the appellant. In appeal before the learned District Judge, District Judge after the appellant assailed the finding on issue No,
3. The learned hearing the learned counsel for the parties, concurred with the finding of the learned Rent Controller and consequently dismissed the appeal.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the respondent before filing the ejectment petition, had insisted on enhancement of the rent and, therefore, his plea of bona fide requirement was evidently taking in the case. The learned counsel invited my attention to letter Exh. R. I, which, according to him, had not been judiciously construed by both the Courts below which has caused great prejudice to the appellant's case. He took me through the letter, especially the following portion thereof :- "Property No, B-II-2S-17, inside Thakar Singh Gate, known as Zinco Building, has been purchased by me. Its registration in my name has been finalised on 9th March, 1970. You are, therefore, requested to contact me immediately to execute a rent deed on terms and conditions mutually agreed upon with effect from 9th March, 1970."
' The learned counsel for the appellant has strenuously argued that after purchasing the property the respondent had only intended to seek enhancement of the rent which intention can further be gathered from the averments made in the ejectment petition wherein the respondent had also claimed rent of the demised premises at the rate of Rs, 250 per month as against Rs, 40 which the appellant had been paying to the previous landlord. He further submitted that the respondent is an old man with no business experience and had brought the ejectment petition only after he got the re-assessm ent made at the rate of Rs, 250. He next contended that although the property was purchased by the respondent on 9th March, 1970, yet he did not file the ejectment petition immediately thereafter, which in fact was filed on 27th July, 1972. According to him if the need of the respondent was genuine he would have filed the petition immediately after purchasing the property. On the basis of these submissions it was argued that the requirement of the respondent could not be considered to be bona fide.
4. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, vehemently argued that the two Courts below have concurrently found that the requirement of the respondent was bona fide and this could not be interfered with in second appeal. Reliance in this behalf was placed on the case reported as Mohammad Shafi v. Allah Rakha. He next argued that it was not established on record that the respondent had ever insisted or demanded increase in the monthly rent. He added that even assuming for the sake of arguments that the respondent, had ever demanded increase in rent, it cannot be viewed with any suspicion on the bona fide requirement of the respondent. He cited Badoruddin Hasan Farooqui v. Maghi Industrial Home in support of this proposition.
5. I have gone through the letter Exh. R. 1 written by the respondent to the appellant asking him to settle the terms and conditions of the tenancy and to execute the rent note. There is no harm in demanding execution of the rent note but when the existing tenant is required, at the same time, to agree and settle terms, the only reasonable conclusion can be that the landlord is demanding the revision of the rent, No doubt a mere demand for the increase in rent is generally not viewed with any suspicion but if it is coupled with some other circumstances it becomes clear that in the garb of personal requirement the intentions are to pressurize the tenant for increase in rent.
6. It is an admitted position that the property was purchased by the respondent on 9th March, 1970 but the present ejectment petition was brought by him on 27th July, 1972, I. e. About 2 years later. In paragraph 6 of the petition an averment is made to the effect that the cause of action had accrued to the respondent on 10th May, 1970. If that be the case it is not explained as to why the respondent waited for such a long time to file the present petition. Besides that the Courts below under issue No, I had found that the rent of the property was Rs, 50 whereas the respondent in the ejectment petition had claimed rent up to 8th March, 1972 at the rate of Rs, 100 and thereafter at the rate of Rs, 250. This shows the mind of the respondent that he was only interested in increase of1 2 the rent and not in the ejectment of the appellant. It was averred by the respondent that he was jobless and wanted the disputed premises for establishing some business. During evidence however, it was brought on record that the respondent was also earn his livelihood from agricultural land and in this view of the matter it cannot be said that the respondent was not engaged in any vocation and required in good faith the premises for doing any business so as to arrive his livelihood. If that had been the case he would have filed ejectment petition immediately after purchasing the property on 9th March, 1970. The respondent entered the witness-box and on 19th April, 1973 made a statement to the effect that he was 66 years of age and still owned about 51 square of land. He further stated that his other two tenants had increased the rent i. e. The Bata Shoe Company increased to Rs, 250 from Rs, 55 and Montgomery Biscuit Factory made the increase from Rs, 55 to Rs,
100. I am, therefore, inclined to agree with the learned counsel for the appellant that the primary object of the respondent was to pressurize the appellant into agreeing to the increase in the rent.
7. There is no dispute to the proposition that a concurrent finding of fact recorded by the two Courts below cannot be disturbed by the High Court in second appeal but in the case in hand the certain important and material facts, such as the advanced age of the respondent his lack of business experience, his refusal to accept the rent remitted by the appellant through Money Order, his successful efforts towards the revision of the rental assessment, his act of taking vexatious pleas in the C ejectment petition and above all not filing the petition immediately after 15th March, 1970, have not been judiciously considered by the two Courts below and, therefore, the finding recorded by them cannot be construed as concurrent. I am, therefore, of the considered opinion that the plea of requirement of the disputed premises as put forth by the respondent was not in good faith.
8. For the reasons given above, I accept the appeal and set aside the orders of both the Courts below meaning thereby that ejectment petition brought by the respondent against the appellant stands dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, however, parties are left to bear their own costs. 1978 SCM R 437 PLD 1976 Kar. 620