MUHAMMAD IQBAL KALHORO, J. Petitioner, who is facing three separate trials in FIR No.04/2020 under section 489-F, P.P.C., FIR No.160/2020 under sections 420/406, P.P.C. both registered at Police Station Jamshed Quarters and FIR No.309 under section 489-F, P.P.C. registered at Police Station Preedy, Karachi, is seeking quashment of last two FIRs on the ground of being violative of dicta laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mst. Sughra Bibi v. The State (PLD 2018 SC 595).
His case is that all these FIRs are in respect of one and same transaction executed at the same time for sale of CNG Rickshaws to him by Respondent No.6, the complainant, against which he had issued him different cheques, but he in order to blackmail and harass him has lodged three separate FIRs against dishonorment of those cheques, which is not only illegal but breaches his rights guaranteed under the Constitution besides being against the scheme under section 71, P.P.C. which provides punishment of an offence made up of several offences. His counsel in his arguments has highlighted these facts and has relied upon the case of Mst. Sughra Bibi (supra).
2. Learned DPG however did not cede to that position and submitted that in all the FIRs, the report under section 173, Cr.P.C. has been filed and the courts have taken cognizance of the offence, as such the petitioner may approach the trial courts for the relief sought here.
3. We have heard the parties and perused the record. There is no one denying the fact that in the light of dicta laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mst. Sughra Bibi, the issue of registration of multiple FIRs based on different versions qua the same incident has been effectively checked. And it has been held that after, an FIR, the matter becomes a case and the I.O. in the investigation of the case could record any number of versions of the same incident brought to his notice by different persons but those would be treated statements recorded under section 160, Cr.P.C. and for which no separate FIR would be required to be lodged. The I.O. is bound to investigate all such versions of the incident in the case and is not obligated to focus on establishing correctness of the story of incident contained in the FIR. He is not required to be restricted or guided or controlled by version in the FIR either. If the information collected in the investigation points to a version and background different than what is revealed in the FIR, the same would be deemed only a version of first informant, and nothing more. Further, the report under section 173, Cr.P.C. is to be based on final opinion of the I.O. which has to be influenced by information/evidence collected from any number of persons acquainted with the circumstance of the case.
4. But the facts involved here are quite distinctive and do not seem to be hit by the ratio laid down in Mst. Sughra Bibi's case which, as noted above, lays down a curb on registration of multiple FIRs of the incident on the basis of every new version thereof. Here apparently 1st FIR No.04/2020 was lodged against three dishonored cheques of Rs.56 lacs given by the petitioner to the complainant against purchase of 56 CNG Rickshaws pursuant to a transaction executed in 2019. Whereas 2nd FIR No.309/2020 was lodged for two dishonored cheques of Rs.29 lacs and is respecting sale of 20 Sazgar CNG Rickshaws to the petitioner following a transaction executed in 2018/2019. These two transactions appear to be distinct in every dimension from each other and were done at different points of time. There is nothing on record to presume otherwise or consider version in one FIR overlapping the incident contained in the other. Mere nature of transactions being the same i.e. sale and purchase of the Rickshaws between the same parties would not make them as one and same incident to be probed only in one FIR. Further, the amounts and cheaques involved in both the cases are different and were issued in consideration of sale price of different tranches of Rickshaws following transactions staggered in time.
5. 3rd FIR No.160/2020 is altogether different and has been lodged for commission of offences of breach of trust; and cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property under sections 420 and 406, P.P.C. As per allegations in this FIR, the petitioner had given files of 7 Rickshaws and 2 Cars to the complainant as a guarantee against the delivery of Rickshaws sold to him and had executed such agreement. But when cheques got dishonored, and the complainant tried to get possession thereof, he found the Rickshaws and cars registered in the name of some other persons, and file of one car fake.
6. In the light above, we are of a humble view that ratio laid down in the case of Mst. Sughra Bibi is not attracted to the facts of this case and on the basis thereof the subsequent two FIRs cannot be quashed. As to section 71, P.P.C., it unambiguously speaks of limit of punishment to be inflicted to an accused for having committed an offence made up of parts constituting separate offences instead of punishing him for each such separate offence and would be attracted only for executing sentence for that offence when the accused has been convicted, which is not the situation in hand.
Besides, since the reports under section 173, Cr.P.C. have been submitted, the petitioner has a remedy under section 249-A or 265-K, Cr.P.C. as the case may be before the trial courts for the same relief, which he may avail regardless of this foiled attempt before this court. Consequently, the petition is dismissed along with pending applications accordingly.