ADNAN IQBAL CHAUDHRY, J.---The petitioner/employer seeks a writ of certiorari against judgment dated 12-6-2018 (impugned judgment) passed by the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal [Appellate Tribunal] whereby the Petitioner's appeal was dismissed and the appeal of the Respondent No.1/workman was allowed.
2. The relationship of employer (Petitioner) and workman (Respondent No.1.) between the parties is not denied. Per the grievance application of the respondent No.1 presented on or about 21-1-2016 before the Labour Court, when he went to the factory to perform his duty on 3-11-2015, he was denied entry by the Security Guard who informed him that he (respondent No.1) had been dismissed from service. Per the Respondent No.1 he was never given any order in writing stating the reason for dismissal from service, a violation of Standing Order 12(3) of the erstwhile Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 [ICESOO] and therefore he prayed for reinstatement with all back benefits.
3. Per the written statement of the Petitioner filed before the Labour Court, the respondent No.1 had left the job voluntarily without any notice and therefore the petitioner had directed its Security Guard not to let the respondent No.1 enter the factory. It was contended by the petitioner that the respondent No.1 had never given the petitioner any grievance notice required under section 34 of the Sindh Industrial Relations Act, 2013 and thus the grievance application before the Labour Court was not maintainable.
4. In the first round of litigation, the grievance application of the respondent No.1 was dismissed by the Labour Court vide order dated 19-8-2017 on the ground that the respondent No.1 had not given the mandatory grievance notice to the petitioner. That dismissal was set aside in Appeal No.87 of 2017 by the Appellate Tribunal vide judgment dated 24-10-2017 and the matter was remanded to the Labour Court for decision afresh after giving the parties opportunity to lead evidence.
5. In the second round of litigation, the one impugned herein, after recording evidence, the Labour Court found for the respondent No.1 vide order dated 7-3-2018. The Labour Court held that the respondent No.1 had in fact given a grievance notice to the petitioner; and that the dismissal of the respondent No.1 from service, was without notice or written order and thus unlawful. However, citing estranged, relations between the employer and employee, the Labour Court declined the respondent No.1 the relief of reinstatement, but in lieu thereof he was awarded compensation of 12 months basic pay.
6. The aforesaid order dated 7-3-2018 passed by the Labour Court was appealed to the Appellate Tribunal both by the petitioner and the respondent No 1. The appeal of the petitioner was against compensation granted to the respondent No.1, whereas the appeal of the respondent No.1 was that he was entitled to reinstatement with all back benefits. Vide the impugned judgment dated 12-6- 2018, the Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeal of the petitioner and allowed the appeal of the respondent No.1 ordering his reinstatement with all back benefits on the ground that the action of the petitioner in dispensing with the service of the respondent No.1 was contrary to Standing Order 12(3) of the ICESOO.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that both the Labour Court and the Appellate Tribunal had erred in holding that the grievance notice had been sent by the respondent No.1 to the petitioner; and that both the said fora had failed to appreciate that it was not the petitioner who had dismissed that respondent No.1 from service but that it was the respondent No.1 who had left employment voluntarily leaving the petitioner with no option but to instruct their security guard that the respondent No.1 should now not be allowed entry the factory.
Learned counsel for the respondent No.1 supported the findings arrived in the impugned judgment.
8. Heard the learned counsel and perused the record.
That a grievance notice had been sent by the respondent No.1 to the petitioner, is a concurrent finding of fact arrived at by both the fora A below after considering the postal receipt of the grievance notice. Learned counsel for the petitioner had not been able to demonstrate that such finding of fact is perverse or is otherwise a result of mis-reading or non-reading of the evidence.
Therefore, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment on that score.
9. On the merits, the case of the petitioner was that it was the respondent No.1 who had stopped coming to work, although it was not disputed that he had come to work on the day he was stopped by the petitioner's security guard from entering the factory. The petitioner did not bring documentary evidence to show that the respondent No.1 had not been attending work. On cross- examination the petitioner's witness had acknowledged that the respondent No.1 had never tendered resignation; and that he was never sent any notice to show-cause for his absence nor a written notice of dismissal from service. Assuming that the respondent No.1 had stopped coming to work without leave of absence thereby committing misconduct within the meaning of Standing Order 15(3) of the ICESOO, it was still obligation upon the petitioner to adhere to Standing Order 12(3) of the ICESOO i.e., by any order in writing stating the reason for the action taken. Admittedly, that was never done. Therefore, the finding of the Appellate Tribunal that the action of the petitioner in dispensing with the service of the respondent No.1 was contrary to Standing Order 12(3) of the ICESOO, also does not call for any interference.
By a short order dated 28-10-2019 we had dismissed this petition. Above are the reasons for the same.