CH. MUHAMMAD MASOOD JAHANGIR, J. The three sons of Muhammad Banaras Khan, namely, Iftikhar Hussain, Pervaiz Akhtar and Muhammad Afaaq were the exclusive owners of the subject land, whose father was their duly appointed Attorney through Agency Deed dated 18.02.1987. Nisar Ahmed and Zia Ullah, respondents Nos.5 and 6 respectively, approached the learned Civil Court on 07.06.1993 through a suit for specific performance of agreement to sell dated 04.08.1992 (Exh.P1) alleging therein that Muhammad Banaras had settled the sale with them. Within couple of months, present petitioners also filed a suit of similar nature contending therein that the same Agent had already agreed to sell the land to them vide agreement dated 17.05.1992 (Exh.D1). Both the suits were clubbed with each other. The vendors submitted their written statement through their father/Attorney and conceded the execution of Exh.D1, whereas that of Exh.P1 was denied, however, subsequently, one of the vendors, Pervaiz Akhtar/respondent No.2 appeared before the learned Civil Court on 15,02.1995 and being Attorney on behalf of rest of the vendors antipodal to the written statement conceded that vide agreement (Exh.P1) the sale had been settled with respondents Nos.5 and 6, who in the same breath denied that no contract was finalized with the petitioners while claiming it to be forged and fictitious one. The ultimate result of conjunctive trial was that on 25.01.2005, a money decree to the tune of Rs.756,000/- was granted to respondents Nos.5 and 6 (the beneficiaries of Exh.P1), whereas the petitioners were equipped with conditional decree for specific performance of their contract (Exh.D1) directing them to pay the outstanding amount of Rs.900,000/-within one month up till 25.02.2005. Being dejected, two civil appeals were preferred by respondents Nos.5 and 6, who subsequently were also allowed to amend their appeal by inserting a fresh ground therein that the petitioners having failed to fulfil the condition, their suit would deem to be dismissed. Although a receipt dated 12.02.2005 was presented before the learned District Court seized of the appeals to claim that outside of the Court, the decretal amount had already been paid to Muhammad Javed, Special Attorney of the vendors but the learned Appellate Court did not agree that the condition was genuinely fulfilled and while relying upon admission made on behalf of vendors before the learned Trial Court in favour of respondents Nos.5 and 6, not only their appeal was allowed, but their suit for specific performance of agreement (Exh.P1) was also decreed with the further conclusion that in default to fulfil condition regarding payment of balance sale consideration, the rival suit of the petitioners stood dismissed vide judgment and decrees of 28th August, 2009, impugned in this Petition as well as connected C.R.No.1815 of 2009. As both the /is have arisen out of a joint trial as well as consolidated judgment and common questions of facts and law are involved, therefore, for all intents and purposes, I am going to decide the same jointly through this single judgment.
2. Arguments heard and record perused.
3. The execution of Exh.D1 and Exh.P1 inter se the petitioners and respondents Nos.5 and 6 were disputed from the very inception of the litigation, whereas the vendors at initial stage through their pleadings admitted the execution of Exh.D1, but denied that of Exh.P1, however, at a subsequent stage, the stance was altogether changed by them claiming that Exh.P1 was genuinely executed, whereas Exh.D1 was declared to be forged and fictitious and in such scenario, respondents Nos.5 and 6 were awarded a money decree, whereas the petitioners were granted a conditional decree for specific performance of Exh.D1 subject to payment of certain amount within specified time with the further clarification that in case of default of payment of amount, their suit would be dismissed.
Now to understand the unbelief granted to the parties as well as import of condition, it would be advantageous to reproduce the said clause here:- "In the light of my above discussion of issues Nos.1 and 2, the suit titled Abdul Razzaq and others v.
Iftikhar Hussain and others is decreed subject to payment of Rs.9,00,000/-within one month up till 25.2.2005, otherwise, the suit of the Plaintiffs (Abdul Razzaq etc.) shall stand dismissed and the depositing of remaining consideration of Rs.9,00,000/ Abdul Razzaq and Tahir Javed shall be entitled to get executed sale deed in their favour according to law. While the other suit Nisar Ahmed and others v. Iftikhar Hussain and others is decreed in the way that they (Nisar Ahmed and Zia Ullah) are entitled to recover Rs.7,56,000/- (including the amount deposited in the court) from the defendants Nos. 1 to 4 (Iftikhar Hussain, Perveriz Akhter, Muhammad Aafaq and Muhammad Banaras)."
Admittedly, the petitioners never ever approached the Court either to deposit the said amount or with a prayer to summon the vendors so that outstanding consideration could be paid to them, rather they managed a receipt to show that on 12.02.2005 the balance amount had been paid to Muhammad Javed, the alleged Attorney of the vendors. Admittedly, Muhammad Javed was not the agent, who executed any of the contracts. Although during trial his statement by DW3 was recorded, but even then he did not expose his such status, whereas the alleged Power of Attorney brought on record was scribed much prior to it. Important to note that in his deposition, DW3 explicitly admitted his relationship with the petitioners, as such the possibility of maneuvering of Agency Deed in his favour could not be ruled out. Moreover, the most vital part of his statement was that he stated that Banaras Khan, the admitted General Attorney of the vendors was not known to him, but most surprisingly, Banaras Khan was the person, who allegedly appointed him his Special Attorney on 17.02.1994, whereas the statement of DW3 was recorded much thereafter on 26.02.2000. As such execution of Agency Deed in favour of Muhammad Javed was highly doubted and perfectly disbelieved by the learned Appellate Court. Withal the copy of said Agency Deed is available on file wherein no such authority was assigned to the said Agent by his Principal that he was competent to receive the balance sale consideration on his behalf, as such any act on behalf of the petitioners and that too outside of the Court with a person, who was not duly competent in this behalf could not be made basis to hold that condition was fulfilled as per mandate of decree.
4. The argument of learned counsel for the petitioners that appeals preferred by respondents Nos.5 and 6 were already admitted for regular hearing wherein injunction was also granted, as such the Courts below were obliged to extend the target date for fulfilling the condition is self-contradictory and destructive to his earlier stance that balance amount had already been paid to the vendors through their Attorney. he perusal of record reveals that although appeals of the respondents Nos.5 and 6 were admitted for regular hearing on 08.02.2005 much prior to the target date, but the operation of the decree of the petitioners was never suspended and only status quo was ordered to be maintained, as such there was no hindrance for the petitioners to fulfil the condition.
Moreover, the injunctive order was not a bar in any situation, however, without conceding, if it is admitted correct that for some injunctive order the petitioners were not in a position to make deposit of the balance amount then it was also applicable to them outside of the Court and payment as per receipt would have also not been made. In the given circumstances, the suit of the petitioners stood dismissed for non-compliance of the condition imposed by the learned Trial Court, as such there being left no decree in their favour; they became out of the picture leaving no pedestal for them to resist the suit of respondents Nos.5 and 6, whereas the vendors had already conceded their contract while making statement on 15.02.1995 before the learned Trial Court and the suit of IG respondents Nos.5 and 6 could only be resisted by said vendors, but the petitioners definitely lacked any locus standi to any further contest the contract of their rivals when they have already lost their case.
5. The learned counsel for the petitioners was not able to persuade that impugned judgment was either perverse, infirm or the learned Additional District Judge committed material irregularity or illegality or wrongly exercised its revisional jurisdiction, thus these Civil Revisions Ill having no merit and force are dismissed with no orders as to cost.