' The petitioner was allotted 50 acres of land for a period of eight years in 1964 under the Bara Scheme. Under para. 2 of the scheme the petitioner was required to surrender the land and was not to grow any crop in the succeeding season. It, however, seems that nobody took notice of the expiry of the lease and even permission was granted to the petitioner on 15th July, 1978 by the Collector for associating petitioners Nos. 2 to 4 in the leasehold. In January of the same year, a part of this land was allotted for temporary cultivation to one Manzur, who has applied for being impleaded as party which application was allowed subject to just all exceptions. Manzur challenged the orders of the Collector dated 15th July, 1978 before the Additional Commissioner who allowed the appeal on 15th April, 1979 and remanded the case for fresh decision to the Collector. On remand the District Collector observed that the petitioner was guilty of not complying with the conditions of the lease inasmuch as he had not cultivated the land up to the required standard, had defaulted in payment of the rent and had not settled in the land as required under the scheme. The District Collector vide his order dated 22nd June, 1980 held that the lease in favour of Asghar Ali petitioner No, I will be deemed to have terminated. He, however, restored the allotment to Manzur etc. The petitioner challenged these orders before the Additional Commissioner, who vide his orders dated 15th November, 1980 confirmed the order of the Collector to the extent it related to the present petitioner and also non-suited Manzur. The petitioner and Manzur and others then took the matter to the Board of Revenue and the learned Member vide his order dated 1st January, 1981 confirmed the orders of the Additional Commissioner. This brings the petitioner to the High Court in writ petition. Manzur has applied for being impleaded as a party and the learned counsel for the writ petitioner seriously questions his locus standi. I have, however, heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of said Manzur. He argues that in the event of the rejection of writ petition the land will be available for further disposal, thus giving him a fresh opportunity to seek allotment.
2. As regards the writ petitioner, it is quite clear that the period of lease was only 8 years which expired in 1972. Under para. 21 of the scheme, the petitioner was required to surrender the possession peacefully on the expiry of the lease. The learned counsel, however, argues that the subsequent conduct of the respondents show that the lease was extended although he admits that there is no order of extension of the lease. Regarding the conduct referred to, the learned counsel has pointed out that when the Governor's Inspection Team pointed out in 1978 that the petitioner had not fulfilled the conditions of lease, he was given a notice by the Collector in response to which he deposited Rs, 2,750 on 8th May, 1978 for the period up to Kharif 1978 and Rs, 230 soon thereafter for the period 19.78-79. The contention raised is that by deposit of the rent the petitioner has rectified the breach of conditions, if any. He has also argued that the petitioner subsequently has also cultivated the land and any inspection on the spot can show that the breach by the petitioner of not having cultivated the land has also been rectified.
3. It is true that nobody bothered to resume the land from the petitioner when he did not surrender it on expiry of the lease in 1972. Bu this by itself does not confer any right on the petitioner. He cannot claim that the lease continued to be subsist until 22nd June, 1980 when the Collector passed the orders of terminating the lease. Also the fact that the petitioner was allowed permission to associate petitioners 2 to 4 in July, 1978 is of no consequence as this too was done after the expiry of the lease. What is more, these orders were set aside by the Additional Commissioner in 1979, which orders have only been confirmed by the subsequent proceedings up to the Board of Revenue. As regards the question of rectification, first of all this rectification could be made only during the continuance of a lease which expired in 1972. Any rectification subsequent to the expiry of the lease is of no consequence. Even otherwise, a rectification was possible only of payment of the defaulted amount but as regards the cultivation which was to be made up to a given standard and to the satisfaction of the authorities naturally during the period of the lease no rectification is possible after the lease has expired. It is, therefore, quite wrong to say that the breaches of cultivation were rectifiable and were actually rectified.
4. The learned counsel has argued that the petitioner was entitled to be dealt with in accordance with section 24 of the Colonization of Government Lands Act, but I am afraid that provision is not attracted to the facts of the present case. Section 24 relates to the question of termination of the leases during its continuance. No formal order of resumption is necessary after the lease has actually expired.
5. In view of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is dismissed with costs.