ABDUL HAMID CHAUDHRY (MEMBER)---The appellant, Mr. Ahmed-ul-Nabi has made this appeal wherein he has impleaded Superintendent of Police, Multan and Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Multan Range, Multan as respondents.
2. By virtue of this appeal the appellant has prayed that he be re--instated in service with all consequential benefits .By way of setting aside impugned orders of Superintendent of Police', Multan and Deputy Inspector-General of Police; Multan Range, Multan.
3. Brief facts of the case are that appellant, Ahmed-ul-Nabi ex---Constable No. 941 in the year 1980 was posted to Police Station Cantt. Multan. On 11-10-1980, he was handed over 20 summons for service. He left the police station the same days vide D. D. Entry No. 18. How--ever, the appellant neither reported back nor delivered the summons and remained absent till 20-11-1980. A show- cause notice for wilful absence was issued and the appellant was directed) to submit his written reply within 8 days of the receipt of a show-cause notice, stating at the same time if he desires to be heard in person. He failed to submit any reply. Eventually, ex pane proceedings were taken against the appellant and he was dismissed from service w.e.f. 11-i0-1980, the date on which he absented from duty. The appellant made an appeal to Deputy Inspector---General of Police, Multan Range, Multan, which was also dismissed by D.I.-G., Multan Range and sent to the appellant vide endorsement No. 759-60, B E, dated 2-1-1982. Hence this appeal.
4. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the appellant was issued a show-cause notice under rule 6 (3) (a) of the Punjab Police (E & D) Rules, 1975, wherein the enquiry was dispensed with. No solid reasons have been given for dispensing with the enquiry. The matter was of "such" nature that it needed regular enquiry so that the appellant could defend himself by producing the evidence. Also this show-cause notice is defective, as grounds of the action proposed are not appearing in the show-cause notice. The learned counsel of the appellant further argued that the order of S. P. Multan. No. 9640, dated 24-2-1981, through which the appellant has been dismissed mention different grounds than in the show--cause notice. Even the dates of absence are differents in both cases. Thus, it is clear that the appellant has been dismissed not on the same charge as was given in the show-cause notice. Thus, the order of dismissal of the appellant is defective and illegal as show-cause notice and this dismissal order, are not dependent on each other. Furthermore, while dismissing the appellant the authority i.e. S. P., Multan has mentioned that the appellant was habitual absentee, incorrigible and his conduct was un-- becoming of a good Police Officer. Thus, this dismissal order is treated by the sentiments of the authority hidden in his mind. Therefore, the authority has passed appellant's dismissal order influenced by the facts which are not subject-matter of the case. The learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that actually the appellant was not in sound mind due to death of his son as is apparent from the death certificate of his son as per Annexure ---D'. It is also not correct to say that processes were not served as these processes were duly served upon the parties and were sent directly to the relevant Courts. As a token of receipt of the summons in the different courts, the appellant secured the signatures of the respective officials. A reference be made to Annexure 'E', copy of the diary maintained by the appellant for securing such signatures: Therefore, the allegation was unfounded by facts. The learned counsel for the appellant also relied on various authorities i.e. 1973 PLC 361 ; 1982 PLC 128 and 1981 PLC (C. S.) 576. The appellant's counsel concluded that in view of the above argument advanced by him and keeping in view the authorities quoted by him the order of the dis--missal of the appellant is ultra vires. The dismissal order contains allega--tion extraneous to that of the show-cause notice and thus this order of dismissal is void ab initio, illegal and without any substance. He prayed that the impugned orders be quashed on this ground, alone. On the other hand, the learned District Attorney submitted that it is la hard fact that the appellant absented himself from duty from 11-10-1980 and he never returned in spite of the fact that the show-cause notice was served to him. Thus, the misconduct of wilful absence is proved against the appellant and he has been dismissed from service lawfully and correctly.
5. I have given my anxious thoughts to the arguments of the parties and have also consulted the record carefully. It is a fact that the grounds given, in the show-cause nonce dated 12-11-1980 of S. P., Multan and his dismissal Order No. 9640, dated 24-2-1981, are different. Thus, while passing the dismissal order by the authority, the contents of the show--cause notice have not been kept in view. Even the dates of the absence given are different in both these cases. In show-cause notice the date of absence given is since 24-10-1980 while in the case of dismissal order the date given is 11-10-1980. Thus, the dismissal order is contradictory to the show-cause notice. It is clear that the authority has not applied his mind properly while passing the dismissal order. Furthermore, the show-cause notice is also not a detailed one and is not comprehensive. I am also in agreement with the learned counsel for the appellant that while passing the dismissal order the authority has been influenced by the facts which are not subject matter of the case and thus the authority has depended on extraneous matter rather than the charge given in the show-cause notice. The order of dis--missal has also been passed in haste and the appellant should have been given another opportunity to defend himself specially when he was to be pro--ceeded against ex parte.
6. Keeping the above facts in view, impugned orders are set aside, the case is remanded to the authority i.e. Superintendent of Police, Multan to proceed afresh in accordance with the provisions of the law as enumerated above. The appellant is directed to be re-instated in service to bestow upon him the status of a civil servant to proceed against him. The period from the date of his dismissal to his re-instatement in service would be considered as extraordinary leave, without pay.