MUHAMMAD NAEEM ANW AR, J.- The petitioner , Syed Shahin Shah, through the instant writ petition, filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, has prayed for the following relief: - "It is, therefore, humbly prayed that on acceptance of this Writ Petition, the respondents may be directed to issue notification for the grant of Account and Audit Allowance to the petitioner w.e.f.
01/12/2017 @ 20% and in the In-action of the respondents may be declared as illegal, unlawful, without lawful authority, unconstitutional and discriminatory.
Any other remedy in favour, not specifically prayed for, may also be awarded in favour of petitioner."
02. Brief facts of the case as per petition in hand are that the petitioner is selectee of Public Service Commission and is serving the respondents' departme nt since 01.07.1991. In the year 2001, the petitioner was adjusted in the office of DCO, Peshawar and he, vide Notification dated 12 October, 2018, was promoted to the post of Deputy Director (Finance & Accounts) from BPS-17 to BPS-18 and posted in the Local Government & Rural Development Department, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Peshawar. The Government of Pakistan, Finance Division (Regulations Wing) in pursuance of Prime Minister's Approval for the officers and staff of office of Controller General of Accounts and Auditor General of Pakistan granted Audit and Accounts Allowance @ 20 % of the Basic Pay scale, whereas the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Finance Department, Peshawar vide Notification dated 11.12.2017 granted Audit & Accounts Allowance at the rate of 20% of the Basic Pay per month to the employees of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Treasury Service with effect from December, 2017. Grievance of the petitioner is that he is working at the same post with same functions as that of employees of Treasuryth Service since 01.07.1991 and being selectee of Public Service Commission for Accounts and Audit as well as instructor of Accounting, is also entitled for the said allowance however, despite various applications, departmental representation and appeal, the benefit of the notification of the Provincial Government was not extended to him, therefore, action and inaction of respondents is illegal, against the law and violation of Article 4, 25, 27 & 38 (e) of the Constitution. Hence, the instant writ petition.
3. Respondents were put on notice, who have submitted their joint para-wise comments and have opposed the issuance of desired writ on various legal and factual objections.
4. During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that in accordance with the principle laid down by the apex Court in case titled "Government of NWFP through Chief Secretary & 2 others vs. Rizwanullah Registrar, Labour Appellate Tribunal & others" (1999 SCMR 2475) and "Government of the Punjab through Secretary Finance Department vs. Mubarak Ali Khan and others & Government of NWFP through Secretary Finance vs. Bashir Ahmad & 10 others" (PLD 1993 SC 375), the petitioner is entitled for the extension of the benefit of nonfiction of the provincial government. Respondents in their comments have categorically denied and contended that Audit and Accounts Allowance was for specific department @ of 20 % of the Basic Pay Scale and the Finance Department has restricted the scope of the allowance only to the extent of employees of Treasury either permanent or on deputation, as such, it cannot be extended to the employees of Local Government & Rural Development Department.
5. Arguments heard and record perused.
6. Before dilating upon the issue with respect to the extension of benefit of the notification, it is an admitted position that petitioner is the employee of Local Government, Election and Rural Development, Department, working as Deputy Director (Finance & Accounts) in Directorate General, since 12-12-2018, as such, neither he is the employee of federal nor provincial treasury service or Controller General of Accounts and Auditor General of Pakistan, whereas, the Audit & Accounts Allowance is exclusively meant for by the Provincial Government for the employees of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Treasury Service. In essence, the grievance of petitioner is that he was discriminated by not extending the benefit of notification having no difference in the job description being performed by him and those to whom the benefit was extended. We understand that expression "intelligible differentia" means difference capable of being understood. A factor that distinguishes or in different state or class from another which is capable of being understood. It is now universally accepted principle that persons may be classified into groups and such groups may be treated differently , if there is a reasonable basis for such difference. Article 25 forbids class legislation; it does not forbid classification or differentiation which rests upon reasonable grounds of distinction. The principle of equality does not mean that every law must have universal application to all the persons who are not by nature , attainment or circumstances in the same position. The varying needs of different classes of persons require different treatment. In order to pass the test for permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled, firstly : the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia, which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group, and secondly : the differentia must have a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question.
07. More importantly, the equal protection of laws guaranteed by Article 25 does not mean that all laws must be general in character. It does not mean that the same laws should apply to all persons. It does not attainment or circumstances in the same position. The varying need of different classes of persons often requires separate treatment. From the very nature of society there should be different laws in different places and the legitimate controls the policy and enacts laws in the best intere st of the safety and security of the state. In fact, identical treatment in unequal circumstances would amount to inequality . So, a reaso nable classification is only not permitted but is necessary if society is to progress. Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the subject issue has laid down renowned principle in the case of "Pakcom Limited V. Federation of Pakistan" (PLD 2011 SC 44) as under: " (i) The expression 'equality before law' or the 'equal protection of law' does not mean that it secures to all persons the benefit of the same laws and the same remedies. It only requires that all persons similarly situated or circumstanced shall be treated alike.
(ii) The guarantee of equal protection of law does not mean that all laws must be general in character and universal in application and the State has no power to distinguish and classify persons or thing for the purpose of legislation.
(iii) The guarantee of equal protection of laws forbids class legislation but does not forbid reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation. The guarantee does not prohibit discrimination with respect to things that are different. The State has the power to classify persons or things and to make laws applicable only to the persons or things within the class.
(iv) The classification, if it is not to offend against the constitutional guarantee must be based upon some intelligible differential bearing a reasonable and just relation to the object sought to be achieved by the legislation.
(v) Reasonableness of classification is a matter for the courts to determine and when determining this question, the courts may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times and to sustain the classification, they must assume the existence of any state of facts which can reasonably be conceived to exist at the time of legislation.
(vi) The classification will not be held to be invalid merely because the law might have been extended to other persons who in some respect might resemble the class for which the law is made because the legislature is the best judge to the needs of particular classes and the degree of harm so as to adjust its legislation according to the exigencies found to exist.
(vii) One who assails the classification must show that it does not rest on any reasonable basis.
(viii) Where the legislature lays down the law and indicates the persons or things to whom its provisions are intended to apply and leaves the application of law to an administrative authority while indicating the policy and purpose of law and laying down the standards or norms for the guidance of the designated authority in exercise of its powers, no question of violation of Article 25 arises. In case, however, the designated authority abuses its powers or transgresses the limits when exercising the, power, the actual order of the authority and not the State would be condemned as unconstitutional.
(ix) Where the State itself does not make any classification of persons or things and leaves it in the discretion of the Government to selec t and 'classify persons or things, without laying down any principle or policy to guide the Government in exercise of discretion, the statute will be struck down on the ground of making excessive delegation of power to the Government so as to enable it to discriminate between the persons or the things similarly situated."
The Indian Supreme Court in case of Charanjit Lai v. Union of India (AIR (38) 1951 Supreme Court 41) has held that: "A law applying to one person or one class of persons is constitutional if there is sufficient basis or reason for it. Any classification which is arbitrary and which is made without any basis is no classification and a proper classification must always rest upon some difference and must bear a reasonable and just relation to the thing in respect of which it is proposed. The presumption is always in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment, and the burden is upon him who attracts it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles."
08. As regards the case-law cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner as 1999 SCMR 2475 & PLD 1993 SC 375, learned counsel has failed to establish that any act of the respondents is mala fide and in colourable exercise of power, as there is no discrimination within a class or group of services of petitioner and those of employees of treasury service. The apex court while interpreting Article 4 & 25 in Dr Mobashir Hassan' s case (PLD 2010 SC 265 ) has held that: "Article 4 of the Constitution commands that all the citizens without any discrimination shall be dealt with in accordance with law, so enforcemen t of the law leaves no room for creating any distinction between the citizens, except a particular class, on the basis of the intelligible differentia---"Intelligible differentia" means in the case of the law differentiating between two sets of the people or objects, all such differentiations should be easily understood as logica l and lucid and it should not be artificial or contrived---Intelligible differentia distinguishes persons or things from the other persons or things, who have been left out.
Art.25---Equality of citizens--Reasonable classification---Principles. In order to make a classification reasonable, it should be based: (a) on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are-grouped together from those who have been left out; (b) that the differentia must have rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by such classification. Any classification which is arbitrary and which is made without any basis is no classification and a proper classification must always rest upon some difference and must bear a reasonable and just relation to the things in respect of which it is proposed."
9. On the strength of above discussion and law on the subject, we are not hesitant to hold that the impugned notification is specific for the persons of a specific group/ class, particular, for the employees of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Treasury Service leaving the persons of other groups/ departments, which in no canon of law can be termed as discrimination with the petitioner or other group of services.
10. Thus, in view of the above discussion, this petition stands dismissed being without substance.