MUHAMMAD AMEER BHA TTI, J.--- This single judgment shall dispose of Civil Revision No. 222055/2018 (Shahbaz, etc. vs. Muhammad Farooq Zahid, etc.), Civil Revision No. 231405/2018 (Amjad Ali vs. Muhammad Farooq Zahid, etc.) and Civil Revision No 233280/2018 (Zulfiqar Ali Lone & another vs. Muhammad Farooq Zahid, etc.) as all these petitions involve common question of law and facts and arise out of same judgments and decrees rendered by both the learned Courts below dated 20.12.2012 & 05.06.2018, respectively .
2. The facts relevant for disposal of afore said revision petitions are that initially a suit for specific performance of agreement to sell, declaration alongwith possession and permanent injunction was instituted by Muhammad Farooq Zahid on 18.01.2007 averring therein that he purchased the suit property (detailed in the plaint) from Munir Ahmed and Muhammad Latif, being Directors of company viz Munir Brothers Engineering Works (Pvt.) Ltd. Alipur Chathha through agreements to sell dated 15.08.2006, 13.12.2003 and 16.11.2006 against consideration of Rs.
40,00,000/- paid to them in toto, but the sale-deed was deferred which was promised to be executed by aforesaid two Directors after redemption of suit property and receiving NOC from I.D.B.P . It was further asserted that instead of performing their part of contract, said Directors transferred the property-in-que stion to Amjad Ali (petitioner in C.R., No. 231405/2018) vide registered sale-deed dated 17.01.2007 against consideration of Rs. 20,00,000/-. It was also alleged that while writing third agreement to sell dated 16.11.2006, Muhammad Munir and Muhammad Latif executed two General Power-of-Attorneys in favour of Muhammad Sharif with the undertaking that the same would not be cancelled but instead of transferring the suit property in his favour , the same was transferred in favour of Amjad Ali, who further transferred the same in favour of Zulfiqar Ali Lone and Mubashir Iqbal (petitioners in C.R.
No. 233280/2018). The suit brought by Muhammad Farooq Zahid was contested by the present petitioners. On 15.05.2008 Amjad All also instituted a suit for declaration alongwith permanent and mandatory injunction claiming him to be owner-in-possession of the suit property . The petitioners in C.R. No. 233280/2018 claiming them to be bona fide purchaser with consideration and without notice from Amjad Ali, after their impleadment, contested the suit. All the suits were contested on legal as well as factual grounds. The learned trial Court framed consolidated issues and evidence of the parties was invited which was recorded. Thereafter , the learned trial Court proceeded to decree the suit filed by respondent No. 1 whereas the suit brought by Amjad Ali-petitioner was dismissed; hence these revision petitions.
For expediency , Shahbaz and others (petitioners in C.R. No. 222055/2018) are hereinafter referred to as the petitioners whereas Muhammad Farooq Zahid, etc. are called as respondents.
3. It is noticed that co-executant of the agreement to sell namely Muhammad Latif filed. his independent written statement, wherein he admitted the execution of the agreement to sell, signatures thereon by both the owners and receiving of the total consideration amount mentioned therein although he did not appear and got his statement recorded on account of poor health which was admitted by witness of other defend ants. Co-owner of the property- in-dispute namely Munir Ahmad, predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners, in his written statement, denied the existence of the agreement to sell with respondents but he also did not appear in the witness-box, as he died before reaching that stage of the suit. One of the sons of deceased Munir Ahme d also filed independent written statement conceding all factual position of the case as elaborated by the plaintif f in his plaint but he also did not appear because he died before recording of evidence. Hence, evidence led by the legal heirs of Munir Ahmad was hearsay evidence. Although, the predecessor-in-interest of the present petitioners namely Munir Ahmed denied execution of the agreement to sell with present respondents but he admitted their signatures embossed thereon in his written statement. This admission in written statement if read with the written statement submitted by co-owner namely Muhammad Latif coupled with other evidence led by the petitioners-defendants, which is insuf ficient to prove procurement of thumb impressions on plain papers through fraudulent mean s, therefore, the stance taken by co-owner Muhammad Latif in his writte n statement, which was specific, clear , unambiguous and categorical regarding execution of agreement to sell, receiving of consideration amount and execution of irrevocable General Power-of-Attorney , can safely be relied upon inasmuch as the same cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that the said defendant had not appeared in the witness-box to depose-confirm narration of written statement on oath because many other admitted documents available on record corroborated the narration/assertions made in the written statement. Reliance in this regard is placed on G.R. Syed vs. Muhammad Afzal (2007 SCMR 433), wherein it has been held: "It is a settled proposition of law that under Order XII, rule 6 of C.P.C. the Court is empowered to pass a judgment on the basis of admissions of facts by the addressee made by the parties to their pleadings, at any stage of the proceedings. The learned High Court to adjudge the controversy between the parties placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in case of Amir Bibi v. Muhammad Khurshid and others 2003 SCMR 1261 , and applying the rules laid down therein concluded that as the admission of the petitioner was specific, clear , unambiguous, categorical and definite, therefore, the trial Court had rightly granted decree under Order XII, rule 6 of C.P .C."
Another important aspect of the case is that both the co-owners had executed two independent irrevocable General Power-of-Attorneys in favour of Muhammad Sharif on the same date when the last agreement to sell was executed and in this agreement execution of Power-of-Attorney was disclosed. Although subsequently irrevocable Power of Attorney were rescinded by Munir Ahmad and thereafter property was -sold to Amjad Ali without consent of Muhammad Latif as he did not participate in the sale in dispute. Therefore, sale of whole property in favour of Amjad Ali itself was defective and this fact is enough to hold that he had not probed the ownership documents and other facts before entering into sale. The stand of the petitioners that Muhammad Latif was not owner also stood falsified from the General Power of Attorney executed by Muhammad Latif wherein he claimed himself owner of the property-in-dispute.
4. The stance of Munir Ahmad taken in the written statement denying execution of the agreements to sell, General Power of Attorneys and forged-fictitious signatures thereon also stood falsifie d from revocation deed. This contradiction itself coupled with admission of co-owner Muhammad Latif in his written statement about the execution of agreement to sell, by receiving full price of the property-in-dispute suffice to prove that both the co- owners Munir Ahmad and Muhammad Latif, after receiving the whole considera tion amount not only executed agreement to sell in terms mentioned therein with their full conscious and free-will but Power-of-Attorneys were also executed. It is also noticed that in written statement and evidence, signatures on agreement to sell have been admitted but reasons alleged to have not been proved as it was obligation of the petitioners to discharge their duties regarding the alleged reasons as onus to that extent had been shifted upon the petitioners owing to admission of their signatures on the disputed agreement to sell which by not leading any cogent evidence remained unsubstantiated, besides the witnesses produced by the plaintif fs/respondents sufficiently proved the factum of execution of agreements to sell. Examining of record also proved that both learned Courts below have correctly concluded proof of payment of full consideration amount to clear the Bank loan obtained by the original owners because there is no rebuttal of evidence led by the respondent/plaintif f to prove the execution of agreement to sell and executants have also failed to discharge their duties. Hence. it is held that learned Counsel appearing on behalf of petitioners failed to point-out any piece of evidence which is enough to arrive at a dif ferent conclusion.
5. So far as the case of the subsequent vendee-Amjad Ali is concerned he claimed himself a bona fide purchaser without notice but mere assertion is not recognized in law. For getting the benefit as provided under section 27(b) of Specific Relief Act, his obligation is to prove all those steps he had taken to dig-out whether the land-in-dispute was free of all encumbrances.
It is settled law that a subsequent vendee in order to succeed in getting protection under Section 27(b) of the Specific Relief Act is obliged to prove:-
(i) that he acted in good faith.
(ii) that he had no notice of the original contract.
(iii) and that he made, reasonable inquiries to ascertain in respect of first agreement to sell.
The evidence of the subsequent vendee DW-3 is silent with regard to proof/inquiry regarding agreements to sell in favour of plaintif f/respondent despite the fact that he was witness of cancellation/revocation deed executed by Munir and Latif, owners of the property of their General Power-of-Attorney executed in favour of Muhammad Sharif.
There is nothing on the record that he ever raised any query about execution of irrevocable General Power-of- Attorney either from Muhammad Sharif or from its executants. Denial of its execution was out of question because he was witness of its revocation deed. Obtaining of loan from IDBP by the princip al owner and its clearance had also not been denied by the subsequent vendee but he had not demanded its Clearance Certificate which was produced by the respondent/plaintif f in his evidence. Discrepancies in payment of remaining consideration amount could also easily be pointed-out in the testimony of DWs inasmuch as he admitted in his testimony regarding payment of remaining consideration amount at Gujranwala after execution of sale-deed upon its registration, whereas sale-deed showed payment to the vendor at the time of registration before the Registrar . Another fatal discrepancy is with regard to possession. Exh. D.3 executed after transfer of land through a registered sale-deed in favour of Amjad Ali, subsequent vendee, indicates handing over of possession at the time of execution of purported agreement to sell after receiving Rs. 10.00,000/- as earnest money and since then the possession was with said Amjad Ali. Exh. D.1/3, alleged agreement to sell dated 14.06.1999, also proved delivery of possession to Amjad Ali- subsequent vendee at the time of its execution and payment of earnest money of Rs. 10,00,000/-but on the other hand, in his testimony Amjad Ali disclosed the delivery of possession of the whole property after its registry/sale- deed.
6. Evidence available on record produc ed by the subsequent vendee-Amjad Ali quite reveals that he before entering into alleged agreement to sell or at the time of execution of sale-deed did not conduct any inquiry from Muhammad Farooq Zahid who daimed that he was in possession and Amjad Ali forcefully dispossessed him which was denied by Amjad Ali but carrying-on business in the same premises by Muhammad Farooq Zahid had been admitted and in that eventuality holding of inquiry about his doing business was necessary . He admitted in his examination-in-chief that he took possession after completion of registration of sale-deed in his favour which was registered at Wazirabad, whereas property was situated at Gujranwala. Moreover admission of Amjad Ali, subsequent vendee, that he was running business of furnace oil in building adjacent to the disputed property and he used to sell furnce oil to Munir brother and he also admitted that he had good relations with the original owner but there is no evidence on record to the effect that he made any inquiry about holding of business by the plaintif f- respondent in the same premises and in what capacity he was doing business in the same property . He had also not probed about story of execution of irrevocable General Power-of-Attorney in favour of Muhammad Sharif even from Muhammad Sharif or its executant. If he had done so, the position would have been different and could, have acquired the knowledge of existence of relationship of the owner and respondent/plaintif f; hence in these circumstances to get the benefit of clause (b) of Section 27 of the Specific Relief Act, Amjad Ali-subsequent vendee has failed to discharge his obligation to prove that he was a transferee for value in good faith and without notice of previous agreement because the evidence led by him is silent with regard to conducting of inquiry in respect of title of the property-in-dispute. possession of the respondent/doing his business, therefore, he cannot be presumed to have purchased the disputed property for value in good faith and without notice of agreement' to sell executed in favour of the respondent/plaintif f.
7. Since Amjad Ali failed to get benefit of clause (b) of Section 27 of the Specific Relief Act as bona fide purchaser without notice of previous agreement executed in favour of the respondent. therefore, from whom the persons purchased the land during the pendency of this litigation he got no better status; hence, his revision also fails.
8. I have noticed that the learned lower Appellate Court decided the case against the petitioners after proper appreciation of material available on record and rightly observed in issues No. 1 to 3,4 & 5-A. Although the above findings rendered by the learned lower Appellate Court are exceptional, yet in the interest of justice, I have also re- examined the material on record in light of the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners. I do not find any illegality or infirmity in the judgments impugned warranting indulgence of this Court. Hence, these revision petitions have no merit and the same are dismissed with no order as to costs.