ROZI KHAN BARRECH, J.----Through the instant appeal the appellant has questioned the validity , legality and propriety of the judgment/order dated 18.04.2019 passed by the learned Distri ct Judge Mastung (trial court ) whereby the application filed by respondent No.1 under Section 372 of the Succession Act, 1925 was allowed.
2. Brief facts of the case are that the respondent No. 1/applicant filed an application under Section 372 of the Succession Act, 1925 before the trial court against the appellant and respondents Nos. 2 and 3 with the averment that respondent No. 1/applicant is son of late Khuda Bakhsh, the appellant is widow of late Khuda Bakbsh and respondent No.2 Shehnaz Baloch is daughter of late Khuda Bakhsh. The deceased Khuda Bakhsh passed away on 09.06.2018 due to natural death at Mastung. The deceased maintained a bank account in National Bank of Pakistan Civil Secretariat Branch Quetta and an amount of Rs.60,99,997/- are lying in the said account and lastly prayed for issuance of succession certificate.
3. The trial court issued notice and publication was also made in daily newspap er Mashriq' Quetta for general public. The appellant appeared through her counsel and contested the application by way of filing reply and denied the claim of the respondent/applicant over the total amount by claiming that only Rs.34,45,1 13/- is distributable among the legal heirs of the deceased. However , the respondent No. 2 through her counsel filed reply in which she admitted the contents of the application and supported the claim of the applicant.
Out of the pleading of the parties the trial court framed the following issues: "1. Whether the legal heirs of deceased Khuda Bakhsh are entitled according to their Maria shares in the whole amount of Rs.6,099,997/- left by him in the account No.4002284162, in National Bank of Pakistan Civil Sec: Branch Quetta. Or Out of Rs.6,099,997/- only Rs.34451 13/- is divisible among the legal heirs, while the rest belongs to respondent No.1?
2. Whether the applicant is entitled to relief claim for?
3. 'Relief?"
After hearing the arguments of learned counsel for the parties the trial court accepted the application filed by respondent No.1 /applicant vide order dated 18.04.2019 and directed to issue the certificate in accordance with their respective shares.
Being aggrieved from the order dated 18.04.2019 passed by the trial court the appellant has filed the instant appeal.
4. I have heard the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the record with their able assistance.
5. 1 the claim of the applicant/respondent No.1 is that the applicant himself namely Hatima Ameer is son of late Khuda Bakhsh while appellant (Shabana Khuda Bakhsh) is widow of late Khuda Bakhsh and responder it No.2 (Shehnaz Baloch) is daughter of late Khuda Bakhsh are entitled to for the amount lying in the account of late Khuda Bakhsh according to their legal shares. On the other hand the claim of the appellant is that her deceased husband Khuda Bakhsh in the year 2016 purchased two residential plots in Sangar Housing project Gwadar and the same were lawfully allotted to the name of the appellant as well as her decea Lsed husband on 24.05.2016 and thereafter in the month of March 20 17 both the plots were further sold out to one Ahmed Nadeem son of Abdul Rahim resident of Gwadar in consideratio n of Rs.5 millions. As a token Rs.2 millions were deposited in the account No.4002284162 of dceased Khuda Bakhsh at National Bank Civil Secretariat through center branch transaction National Bank of Pakistan Gwadar branch (079) and thereafter the remaining consideration amount of plots in question were also deposited in the above stated account of the deceased, beside this one month pension amount of Rs.84,884/- was also deposited in the account of deceased on 28.06.2018 after his death and the same is deemed to be the share of respondent No.1 exclusively as such claim of appellant against 2.5 millon out of Rs.60,99,997/- deposited in the account of deceased Khuda Bakhsh is baseless actually the deceased left behind only an amount of Rs.3,515,1 13/- whereas Rs.70,000/- is fixed as dower amount of respondent No.1 which is still outstanding against the deceased and according to Sharia the amount left by the deceased and the remaining amount of Rs.3,445,1 13/- is distributable among the legal heirs of the deceased. The learned trial court while relying on the judgment passed by this court in the case titled as Mst. Aisha and 2 others v. Mst. Mah Gul and 2 others' (2015 CLC 1719 ) passed the impugned judgment and held that: "13... the applicant and respondents Nos.1 and 2 have right to the certificate in accordance with their respective shares.
14. The parties have following shares out of Rs.6,099.997.5/- S.No Name. Relation. Shares Amount. Hatim Ameer Baloch. Son 14 Rs.3558331.875 Shabana Khuda BaldishWidow 03 Rs.762499.6875 Shenaz Baloch Daughter 07 Rs.1779165.938 Total. 24 Rs.6,099,997.5
15. Thus three separate certificates be issued to the applicant and respondents Nos.1 and 2. Subject to their filing surety equal to the amount of their respective shares mentioned above."
6. It is an admitted position that the petition for the grant of succession certificate was filed by the petitioner under Section 373 of the Succession Act, 1925, and that the proceedings before the learn ed Civil Court were summary in nature. Intricate questions could not be resolved in such proceedings. Questions of title to property have to be left to be decided in a suit before a Court of plenary jurisdiction. Subsection (3) of the section 373 of the Act, 1925 is clear enough which reads as under: "Section 373(3). If the Judge cannot decide the right to the certificate without determining questions of law or fact which seeks to be too intricate and difficu lt for determination in a summary proceedings, lie may nevertheless grant a certificate to the applicant if he appears to be the person having prima facie the best title thereto."
Subsection (4) of the section ibid is an addition thereto, which reads as under:-- "Section 373(4). When there are more applicants than one for a certificate, and it appears to the Judge that more than one of such applicants are interested in the estate of the deceased, the Judge may, in deciding to whom the certificate is to he granted, have regard to the extent of interest and the fitness in other respects of the applicant."
7. The determination of title is beyond the scope of the section. An applicant who can claim his preferential right for payment of debts would become entitled for issuance of the certificate, subject to (sic.) he has a prima facie title in his favour . The remaining questions pertaining to determination of title and the extent are to be dealt with in a suit filed for the purpose to establish the claim and also for recovery of the shares respectively claimed.
In Aziz Ahmed v . Hakimzadi and 7 others (2013 CLC 406 Sindh ) it was has held that:- "From the bare perusal of the above sub proviso of, section 373 of Succession Act, 1925, it appears that this section is related to the extent of the share of one applicant and same is relevant when dispute on some share arose and also on this point the dictum of honourable Supreme Court in which authoritative proposition of law is laid down which is to the effect that the proceedings under Succession Act, being summary in nature, cannot help in determining the issue of status of a party hence in the event of dispute of status of a party the proper course would be for parties to approach the competent Civil Court for declaration of such disputed status and then to resort to course, provided under the Act "
In Mst. Samina Sikandar v. Public-at-Large (PLD 2011 Lahore 192), it has been held that summary' proceedings under section 373 or the Succession Act, 1925, are to determine whether the petitioner had a right to a succession certificate. Furthermore, it was held that a succession certificate is not a final adjudication of the question as to who is the next heir, and the grant of such a certificate merely clothes its holder with an authority to realize the debts of the deceased and to give an authority of discharge. The Hon'ble Lahore High Court also quoted with approval the following passage from the judgment in the case of Banarasi Dass v. Tekka Dutta (2005) 4 SCC 4491) which reads as under: "8. Succession Certificate neither gives any general power of administration on the estate of the deceased nor establishes title of the grantee as the heir of the deceased. It only furnishes the grantee with authority to collect debts due to the deceased and allows the debtors to make payments to him withou t incurring loss. Thus the object of the said certificate is to facilitate the collection of the debts, to regulate the administration of Succession and to protect person who deals with the alleged representatives."
8. The learned trial court, vide order dated 18.04.2019, had allowed the respondent No. 1 's application for the issuance of a succession certificate in favour of legal heirs of late Khuda Bakhsh, including the respondent No.1, subject to the "filing of local surety bonds in the equal amount to the satisfaction of trial court." All the legal heirs were held to be entitled to withdraw their respective shares from late Khuda Bakhs's legacy separately and independently . The requirement to furnish surety bonds is in conformity with Section 375 of the Succession Act, 1925, which empowers the Court to requisition security from the grantee of the succession certificate. The said Section provides inter alia that the Court may require, as a condition precedent to the granting of a succession certificate, that the person to whom the Court proposes to make the grant shall give a bond with one or more sureties, or other sufficient security , for rendering an account of debts and securities received by him and for indemnity of persons who may be entitled to the whole or any part of those debts and securities.
In view of the above discussion no illegality or irregularity has been found in the impugned judgment/order of the trial court to warrant interference by this court, therefore, the instant appeal is dismissed being devoid of merits.