MUHAMMAD AMEER BHA TTI, J. The grievance, in precise, that surfaced the record of the instant petition refers to the petitioner 's claim of advance increments, in pursuance of notifications issued from time to time, on the premise of attaining additional qualification over and above the minimum prescribe d qualification of F.A/F.Sc. along with C.T. for Middle/Elementary Teacher . There is no denying the fact that these notifications were eventually declared redundant and practice to grant increments was discontinued as a result of placing the Elementary Teachers, only to the extent of those possessing the qualification of B.A./B.Sc./pr escribed professional training in BS-14 with 1/3rd, in Selection Grade BS-15. However , all those who did not possess such higher qualification were obliged to get the existing pay scales with the selection grade.
2. The action of the respondents to withhold such grant of increments was called in question and in due course of law, the matter in issue, when reached the apex hierarchical level, was minutely examined by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case reported as Government of the Punjab through Secretary Education & others vs. Faqir Hussain and 5-others [ 2004 PLC (C.S.) 491 ] wherein it was held as under:- "Be as it may, according to the latest prevalent position of the elementary teachers who possess qualification of B.A./B.S.C. (IInd Division) plus prescribed professional training are placed in BS-1 4 with 1/3rd in Selection Grade BS-15. The all other teachers who do not possess higher qualification are getting existing pay scale with selection grade. As such they are no more entitled for any advance increment granted from time to time in view of up- gradation of their pay scales which amounts to double benefit not admissible under any canon of interpretation.
The last clarification was made on 08.05.1998 which should be considered as cutof f date. The advance increments received after 8.5.1998 be deducted in easy installments from respondents and their pay be refixed in accordance with existing pay scales". (underline supplied)
The petitioner had claimed the increment s after the cut-of f date fixed by Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the esteemed judgment referred supra, on the ground of discrimination; and she primarily relied on the judgment of the Service Tribunal which permitted grant of those increments as enunciated in the notifications, to the petitioners before the Service Tribunal. It goes without saying that the judgment passed by the Service Tribunal did not reflect consideration of judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred supra. Although the judgment of the Service Tribunal was assailed before Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan where the leave to appeal was refused, and the petitioner while relying on such leave refusing order contends that since the judgment of the Service Tribunal granting advance increments has been approved, therefore, she may also be held entitled to the alike relief by means of issuing writ in this regard. I am afraid, the contention raised has no force.
3. There is no other view than the one that Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan has diligently , equitably and justly approved the effect of notifications, in its judgment reported as Government of the Punjab through Secretary Education & others vs. Faqir Hussain and 5-others [2004 PLC (C.S.) 491] and thereby unequivocally directed discontinuation of the practice of granting increments as such. As a consequence thereof, the cut-of f date for the claim under scrutiny , as stipulated by notification dated 8.05.1998, was declared as valid permitting recovery of unauthorized received increment beyond the said notification dated 08.05.1998, however , such receiving after cut- off date, was ordered to be recovered in easy installments. Needless to mention that the principle manifestly enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above-mentioned judgment has a binding effect on this court in view of Article 189 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. This Court is under legal obligation to follow and give effect to the legal principl es laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said judgment. Since the leave refusing order referred by the learned counsel for the petitioner had been rendered without referring to the authoritative principle flowing from the given judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court, therefore, mere factum of leave refusing order can hardly be characterized to have a binding force as against the spirit of the finding of the apex court recorded in the afore-referred judgment because adjudication was conclusive and equitable; hence judgment in rem. In this context I am fortified from the judgment reported as Kareem Mawaz Khan vs, the State through PGP and another ( 2016 SCMR 291 ) wherein it was held as under:- "Suffice it to say that leave granting order has no binding effect as against the settled legal proposition in this regard as discussed, inter alia, in the above cited cases"
In "Shipyard K,Damen International vs, Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works Ltd (2003 CLD 1) it was articulated as under:- "A leave granting order passed by Supreme Court does not lay down law to be followed, hence this aspect of the matter hardly needs any further elaboration".
Hon'ble Supreme Court in "The Commissioner Inland Revenue vs. The Secretary Revenue Division and others ( 2020 SCMR 2055 ), held that:- "We may also note, with respect, that the decision in Husnain Cotex was a leave refusing order . It is now the jurisprudence of this Court that such orders do not constitute binding authority . Thus, on any view of the matter , the reliance placed by learned counsel for the department on certain portions of the judgment is, with respect, not correct".
Similar view was also taken in "Gulistan Textile Mills Ltd and another vs. Soneri Bank Ltd. and another (2018 CLD 203 ). The relevant paragraphs is reproduced as under:- "We are of the view that the argument by the learned counsel for the appellant that the second application was barred by the principle of res judicata is misconceived. The case of Hashir Ahmad (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant is a leave refusing order and is thus not the law laid down by this Court".
Hence, I am not convinced with the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner to issue the writ that might conflict with the ratio of referred judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan. Resultantly , this petition has no force; hence dismissed . No order as to costs.