' This is a Civil Revision admitted on 31st August, 1973. Briefly the facts are that the opponent Baboo alias Muhammad Ibrahim filed a suit being the Suit No, 9 of 1970 in the Court of Civil Judge, Tando Allahyar for declaration, and mesne profits. The agricultural land measuring about 534 acres situated in deb Landhi taluka Tando Allahyar belonged to opponent namely Baboo alias Muhammad Ibrahim. He had leased out the said land for five years to appellant No, 1 namely All Muhammad son of Haji Muhammad at the rate of Rs, 22 per acre commencing from the year 1965- 66 after having executed registered lease-deed. The applicant No, 1 again sublet the said agricultural land to applicant No, 2 without consent of the opponent, contrary to the terms of the lease-deed. Applicant No, 1 paid to the opponent an amount of Rs, 1,184.70 only being the lease money for the first year i. e. 1965-66. Similarly the applicant No, 1 paid for the second year the same amount. The applicants, however, taking undue advantage of the opponent's illiteracy, wrote on the receipt 1967-68 instead of 1966-67. They also paid the amount for the third year and deceptively mentioned the date on receipt as 1968-69. The opponent in fact, therefore, was paid lease amount for only three years whereas the applicants through deception and forged receipts have maintained that the lease amount was fully paid to the opponent. They refused to vacate the land and hand over the possession to the opponent. A suit was filed wherein prayers were :-
(1) That the applicants be declared to be no longer lessees of the. Opponent.
(2) That the applicants be directed to pay the mesne profits and costs.
2. The written statement was filed by .The applicants admitting the lease in favour of the applicant No, 1 for five years and further alleging that with consent of the opponent the sub-lease was given to the applicant No, 2 by applicant No, 1 and the payment of the annual rent was also made by the applicant No, 2 to the opponent directly. It was also pleaded that the opponent had given a fresh and further lease to the applicant No, 2 for five years from 1970-71 to 1974-75.
3. However by a joint application dated 4th July, 1970 the parties applied before the Court for appointment of Mr. Najmuddin Sarawal as the sole arbitrator to decide the matter and it was prayed that reference be made by the Court. The parties had agreed to abide by the award of the said arbitrator. The case was fixed on 10th July, 1970. The learned Civil Judge directed that a letter be sent to the arbitrator and adjourned the hearing on 28th July, 1970. On 17th July, 1970 both the opponent and the applicant appeared before the arbitrator, led the evidence, all were duly heard by the arbitrator who gave an award on 23rd July, 1970 entitled "Faisla". The faisla was to the effect that all the dues of the rent for the first lease upto its termination viz. 1969-70 had already been paid and the claim of the suit is duly satisfied. The award was submitted in the Court on 24th July, 1970. It was adjourned to 28th July, 1970 for objections. Thereafter it was adjourned to 11th August, 1970 when none of the parties were present and hence the suit was dismissed. However it was restored on 4th September, 1970. Ultimately since there were no objections filed, the award was made the rule of the Court on 26th November, 1970.
4. Against the order.Au appeal was filed before the Additional District Judge, Hyderabad who accepted the appeal and remanded the matter to the Civil Judge, Tando Allahyar for deciding the issues from the stage, before the passing the order of reference. Against the judgment and decree passed by the Additional District Judge, Hyderabad the present revision is filed.
5. Mr. B. J. Desa, Advocate argued on behalf of the applicants while Mr. Ashraf Kazi, Advocate argued on behalf of the opponents. The appellate Court found that the provisions of section 23 of the Arbitration Act were not strictly complied with and hence he set aside the order of lower Court.
The learned counsel Mr. Desa referred to the Exh. 16 in the original file where the parties agreed that the matter may be referred to Najmuddin Sarawal as a sole arbitrator who decided the above matter. They had prayed for making reference to him. They also agreed to abide by the award of the said arbitrator. The learned Civil Judge made the following order :- "Issue letter to the arbitrator. Costs, Hg : 28th July, 1970."
' The learned counsel argued that the letter issued to the arbitrator was a direction and no adverse meaning could be put on the wording of the letter. The appellate Court has observed that the letter of reference passed by the learned Civil Judge does not appear to be consistent with the provisions of section 23 of the said Act. It is better to quote section 23 of the said Act which is as under :- "23. Order of reference.-(1) The Court shall, by order, refer to the arbitrator the matter in difference which he is required to determine, and shall in the order specify such time as it thinks reasonable for the making of the award.
(2) Where a matter is referred to arbitration, the Court shall not, save in the manner and to the extent provided in this Act, deal with such matter in the suit."
' In order to vest jurisdiction in the arbitrations to deal with a pending suit it is necessary that the Court should make an order under section 23(1) referring the suit to them and should specify in the order such time as it thinks reasonable for making the award. The issuing of letter to the arbitrator is an order of reference to arbitrator and there is no ambiguity in the said letter and it is complied with necessary ingredient of the section 23 of the said Act. Mr. Ashraf Kazi, learned counsel for the opponents has pointed out that the letter is vague while Mr. Desa, Advocate for the applicants has argued that this letter as quoted above is not vague and is a reference to the arbitrator and is consistence with the wording of section 23(1) of the Arbitration Act. In the order the hearing is noted to be 28th July, 1970 meaning thereby that this is the time limit given to the arbitrator to decide the matter. The matter means "disputes and the differences which are alleged by the parties in the suit". There is no vagueness in the order. The application Exh. 16 is perused by me and it makes clear that both the parties have agreed to appoint arbitrator named by them in the joint application and have also agreed that they would abide by his decision. There is no omission in passing the order of reference to arbitrator, as such the proceedings are not vitiated in the order so passed by the learned Civil Judge. Time is specified till .28th July, 1970. Even if the time be not specified it was held by the Supreme Court of India in the case of Subbarama v. Siddama that what is imperative is the fixation of time for making the award. But it does not follow that where the Court omits in the order of reference, it does not vitiate the reference. Where the Court leaves it to the discretion of the arbitrator to complete the award within a reasonable time and he does so it cannot be said that there has been substantial miscarriage of justice merely because the Court did not fix any time within which the award was to be submitted. Section 28 Part (1) of the said Act empowers the Court to extend the time for making award from time to time as it thinks fit.
6. Mr. Ashraf Kazi has referred to AIR 1919 Pat. 1974 pointing out that the terms of reference in the agreement between the parties were vague and were not reasonable. This objection has no force.
Exh. 16 is quite clear and the entire dispute was referred to the arbitrator and the arbitrator after hearing the parties fully, has given the award.
7. I have considered the application under section 23 of the Arbitration Act and on the face of it, its provisions are complied with satisfactorily. The order of reference made by the Civil Judge is correct on the application made by the parties agreeing to appoint a particular arbitratror and also, that they would abide by his decision. However the opponent/plaintiff did not submit the objections and went on adopting delaying tactics and hence the learned Civil Judge was constraint to observe that the award is within the scope of the suit and that it was not otherwise illegal and confirmed the award. This order of making the award to be the .Rule of the Court is in consonance with the law. In the circumstances, I allow the Revision and set aside the judgment and the decree of the IInd Additional District Judge, Hyderabad. There will be no order as to costs. AIR 1962 SC 671