Ch. Muhammad Masood Jahangir , J. Inessential detail apart, Chief Administrator Auqaf, Punjab initially issued Notification of 14th May, 1979 under section 7 of The Waqaf Properties Ordinance, 1979 , which was further amended through another Notification of 20th May, 1980, whereby mosque and Khanqah Sidiq Ali Shah alias Sirki Shah along with five shops bearing khasra No.9873 were taken over as well. The present petitioner accompanied by proforma respondents No.7 to 12 on 13.02.2002 to dispute the said Notifications instituted declaratory suit asserting that the subject shops were not part of khasra No. 9873, rather those fell within the boundaries of adjoining khasra No.9874, therefore, respondents/defendants be permanently restrained from dispossessing them.
The Auqaf Department/respondents No.1 to 3 made two applications; one u/s. 10 for staying proceedings of the suit & the other u/o. VII r. 11 of the Code, 1908 for rejection of the plaint, whereas the petitioner/plaintif fs also tabled petitions for de-sealing of shops & demarcation of boundaries of khasras No.9873 & 9874. The learned Civil Court on 22.01.2015 dismissed applications of respondents and those of petitioner/plai ntiffs granted. Being aggrieved, the respondents approached learned Revisional Court, which through impugned order dated 04.08.2016 rejected the plaint, thus this petition was made.
2. Arguments heard. Record perused.
3. I have considered the plaint minutely and the prayer clause being relevant is given below:- 'In view of the above submissions, it is most respectfully prayed that the notification No.SOP-3 (93)/Aquaf/62 dated 20.05.1980 regarding the five shops in dispute may be declared as null and void illegal and inoperative upon the possessary rights of the plaintiffs over the suit property which is situated in khasra No.9874 and not in khasra No.9873. It is further prayed that the defen dants be permanently restrained from illegally and forcibly dispossessing the plaintiffs from the suit property including the five shops and the Madrassah Anwar -ul-Quran. Costs of the suit may also be awarded.
Any other relief which this Honourable Court deems necessary and fit may also be granted.'
The perusal thereof left no doubt that vires of Notification dated 20.05.1980 issued under section 7 of the Ordinance were vividly challenged through suit in hand. Moreover , the further act of the respondents initiated in pursuance of Notification was assailed as well through para No.7 of the plaint, which being relevant is reproduced as under:- 'That the notification No.SOP-3 (93)/Auqaf/62 dated 20.05.1980 is illegal and the act of the defendants of interference of the possession of the plaintiff is also unlawful and without any justification.'
The provisions of the Ordinance are very much clear , whereby not only protection is provided to the action of the Department, rather suit and other legal proceedings except filing of petition u/s. 11 before the District Court are specifically barred. To this ef fect, sections 21 & 23 of the Ordinance are reiterated here:- '21 Bar of jurisdiction. Save as expressly provided in this Ordinance, no Civil or Revenue Court or any other authority , shall have jurisdiction: a) to question the legality of anything done under this Ordinance by or at the instance of the Chief Administrator; or b) in respect of any matter which the Chief Administrator is empowered by or under this Ordinance to determine or settle: or c) to grant an injunction or other order in relation to any proceedings before the Chief Administrator under this Ordinance or anything done or intended to be done by or at the instance of the Chief Administrator under this Ordinance.'
'23 Protection of action taken under this Ordinance.-- No suit, prosecution or other legal proceedings shall be instituted against any person for anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done under this Ordinance or the rules made thereunder .'
These provisions left no room that jurisdiction of the Civil Court is specifically barred to deal with a suit wherein legality of anything done or intended to be done in good faith under the command of Ordinance ibid is questioned.
4. The case in hand was heard yesterday as well, when Mr. Muzaf far Aziz Khan, learned counsel for the petitioner finally sought postponement of case till today so that he could produce title document that property of the petitioner/plaintif fs fell in khasra No.9874, but today when he presented original gift deed dated 08.10.1990 (the copy whereof is retained on file) it is found that petitioner was owner in disputed khasra No.9873, which is the subject of Notification under suit. On the other hand, by bringing on record copy of Field Book, it stood strongly proved by respondents No.1 to 3 that khasra No.9874 never vested to any private person, rather it belonged to Provincial Government as well, thus the stance that subject shops fell within the boundaries of said khasra is not plausible. In addition thereto, copy of report dated 18.09.201 1 furnished by Tehsildar , Model Town, Lahore is another supportive document to conclude that subject property fell within the boundaries of khasra No.9873. It stood fully proved that the plaintif fs lacked cause of action as well as locus standi to maintain their suit before the learned Civil Court, whose jurisdiction even otherwise was clearly barred to make any indulgence. In fact the suit amounts to pre-empting an action unde r the Ordinance, 1979 and circumventi ng the law so as to defeat its purpose. The Ordinance itself provides remedy through a petition before the District Court, otherwise the legislature by promulgation of afore cited two provisions excluded the jurisdiction of Civil Court in respect of the proceedings & intended action. It is foremost principle of law that when law desires a thing to be done in a defined way then it is to be performed in that manner alone. Once it is established that jurisdiction of the Civil Court is ousted then no further inquiry is needed, rather plaint is liable to be rejected at its inception. See 'Chief Administrator Auqaf and another versus Haji Muhammad Sharif and another ' (1999 SCMR 2795 ). Therefore, the learned Revisional Court while exercising its lawful authority passed well-reasoned order .
5. The learned counsel for the respective parties at fag end of their arguments admitted that some others had already questioned vires of impugned Notification by making petition u/s. 11 to the concerned District Court, thus opportunity is still available to the petitioner to join the said proceedings by making application u/o. I r. 10 of the Code ibid, if he has any genuine cause.
6. For the foregoing reasons detailed in paras No.3 & 4 ante, this petition has no merit, therefore, is dismissed accordingly . No order as to costs.