SHAHID WAHEED, J. This judgment shall dispose of two petitions brought under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, to wit, W.P.No.256002 of 2018 titled "Prof. Dr. Asad Aslam Khan v.
Government of Punjab & others" (hereinafter called the first petition) and W.P.No.41040 of 2020 titled "Prof. Dr. Muhammad Sarwar Khan v. Government of Punjab & others" (hereinafter called the second petition) as they involve identical questions in controversy .
2. The petitioner of the first petition and respondent No.3 of the second petition are in the twilight of their careers as Professor . The petitions before us, as we understood, canvass the notion that a University cannot perform its functions in a befitting manner and deliver optimum results unless its officers are appointed in the manner which is prescribed in the law. Both the petitions have thus, called upon us that while interpreting the provisions relating to the terms and conditions of the Pro-V ice Chancellor , the appointment of the present incumbent of the said post be declared illegal.
3. Before proceeding further , it is essential to sketch briefly how these two petitions have come to be heard by this Bench. The first petition is related to the appointment of the Pro-V ice Chancellor in the King Edward Medical University (the KEMU) under the King Edward Medical University , Lahore Act, 2005 (the KEMU Act). This petition was first presented to one of us, namely , Shahid Waheed, J., hearing in Single Bench. At the preliminary hearing, it was argued that the impugned Notification No.SO (ME) 4-7/2018 (KEMU) dated 7th November , 2018 was issued by Government of the Punjab in pursuance of the interpretation made by this Cour t in Shoaib' s case, which would be appropriate to re-examine in the light of Moazzam Hussain' s case and Fazal Rahman Khundkar 's case .
Considering the argument, it was deeme d appropriate that the matter be referred to the Hon'ble Chief Justice for sending the case to a Division Bench for authoritative interpretation of the law. The case was accordingly referred1 2 3 to the Division Bench. In the meantime, Dr. Muhammad Iqbal Zafar had brought his petition seeking a declaration from this Court to the effect that his appointment as Pro-V ice Chancellor of the University of Agriculture, Faisalabad (the UOA) was liable to continue from the date of his appointment till three years in terms of Section 15-A of the University of Agriculture Faisalabad Act, 1973 notwithstanding the fact that he had attained the age of superannuation. This petition was presented before one of us (Shams Mehmood Mirza, J.). It is to be noted that the language of Section 15-A of the University of Agriculture Faisalabad Act, 1973 (the UOA Act) is identical with that of Section 15 of the KEMU Act but neverthe less the interpretation made in the case of Muhammad Iqbal Zafar was contrary to the one which was expressed in Shoaib' s case. Subsequently , the petition of Prof. Dr. Muhammad Sarwar Khan challenging the nomination made by the Vice Chancellor of the UOA for the post of Pro-V ice Chancellor was laid before Shams Mehmood Mirza, J. On the peremptory date of hearing of this petition, it was noticed that the view taken in Shoaib' s case was not adhered to in the case of Dr. Muhammad Iqbal Zafar and thus, it was thought desirable to get the matter settled by a Division Bench of this Court. During the pendency of the petition brought by Prof. Dr. Muhammad Sarwar Khan, appointment was made to the post of Pro-V ice Chancellor in the UOA. This appointment led Dr. Muhammad Sarwar Khan to file another petition, that is, W.P.No.41040 of 2020 (the second petition) to challenge the appointment on the basis of interpretation made in Shoaib' s case. The files were accordingly put up before the Hon'ble Chief Justice for appropriate orders. It appears that since the view expressed in the case of Dr. Muhammad Iqbal Zafar was approved by the learned Judges of the Division Bench of this Court in I.C.A. No.223243 of 2018 , these petitions alongwith the connected cases, in pursuance of the above- referred referring order , has been placed before us.
4. Now, it will be proper to set out the respective stands taken up by the petitioners and the respondents in these two petitions. Admitted fact of the first petition is that the Chancellor selected and approved the name of respondent No.7, Prof. Ijaz Hussain, for appointment to the post of Pro-V ice Chancellor of the KEMU from amongst the panel of following professors made by the V ice Chancellor: -
1. Prof. Asad Aslam Khan, Professor of Ophthalmology
2. Prof. Irshad Hussain Qureshi, Professor of Medicine
3. Prof. Muhammad Arshad Chohan, Professor of Obstt & Gynae
4. Prof. Aftab Asif, Professor of Psychiatry
5. Prof. Ijaz Hussain, Professor of Dermatology
6. Prof. Ayesha Malik, Professor of Obstt & Gynae In pursuance of above-stated approval respondent No.7 was appointed as Pro-V ice Chancellor of the KEMU for a term of three years vide Notification No.SO (ME) 4-7/2018 (KEMU) dated 7th November , 2018. Petitioner , Prof. Asad Aslam Khan, is aggrieved by the said notification. His grouse is that he being the senior-most Professor in the KEMU had a legitimate expectancy to be appointed to the post of Pro-V ice Chancellor but he was illegally ignored solely on the pretext that his remaining length of service was less than three years . It is his plea that the provisions contained in Section 15(1) of the KEMU Act do not lend to the Government any interpretation that a Professor having remaining length of service less than three years would be ignored from making his appointment as Pro- Vice Chancellor; and, that if the appointment of respondent No.7 is allowed to be continued, it would compel the petitioner and other seniors to render remaining period of service under a junior colleague, which would not be wholesome for the affairs of the University . On the other hand the common defence of the respondents is that the petitioner cannot be allowed to throw challenge to the appointment of respondent No.7 to the post of the Pro-V ice Chancellor as it has been made in the light of interpretation made by this Court in Shoaib' s case wherein it was held that any Professor with the remaining service of less than three years could not complete the term of office to the post of the Pro-V ice Chancellor and, therefore, did not meet the statutory requirement of Section 15 of the KEMU Act.
5. The second petition pertains to the appointment made by Government of the Punjab in the Agriculture Department to the post of Pro-V ice Chancellor in the UOA vide Notification No.SO (R&E) 24-2/2019-Pro-VC (UAF) dated 31st August, 2020, which reads as under:-4 5 6 "The Governor/Chancellor , in terms of Section 15-A (1) read with Section 10, 11(8) & 41 of the University of Agriculture Faisalabad Act, 1973, has been pleased to nominate Prof. Dr. Asif Tanveer , Chairman, Department of Agronomy/Director Academics, University of Agriculture Faisalabad as Pro-V ice Chancellor , University of Agriculture Faisalabad for a period of three (03) years or till attaining the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier ."
Dr. Muhammad Sarwar Khan has questioned the validity of the above-cited notification on the ground which is diametrically opposed to the one that has been urged in the first petition. Here plea of the petitioner is that since the remaining length of service of Dr. Asif Tanveer is less than three years, he per Shoaib' s case could not be appointed as Pro-V ice Chancellor of the UOA whereas the defence of the respondents is that appointment is valid as it has been made in the light of interpretation made by this Court in Muhammad Iqbal Zafar 's case.
6. The pleadings of both the cases raise only one question as to which of the two interpretations of the terms and conditions related to the post of the Pro-V ice Chancellor , which has come to the light through Shoaib' s case and Muhammad Iqbal Zafar 's case, is correct. This question, in fact, in its fold encompa sses three sub-questions for our consideration. First, what is the eligibility criteria for making appointment to the post of Pro-V ice Chancellor?
Second, what is the tenure of the incumb ent of the post of Pro-V ice Chancellor? Third, what kind of relief can be granted? It would be pertinent to mention here that it was very easy for us to answer the above-stated questions in the light of interpretation made by the learned Judges of the Division Bench of this Court in Muhammad Iqbal Zafar 's case but we did not consider it appropriate and thought it expedient to re-examine the law so as to make authoritative pronouncement relating to the terms and conditions of the post of Pro-V ice Chancellor .
7. To answer the afore-stated questions, it is essential to make a quick survey of the relevant provisions of the law.
In this case two laws are involved, that is to say, the KEMU Act and the UOA Act. The language of the relevant sections of the two laws is more or less identical. Whatever is the difference, it is not of much significance and shall be explained in due course. The first relevant provision of the KEMU Act is Section 8 wherein the details of the Officers of the KEMU have been enumerated and this is to the following ef fect: - "8. Officers of the University : the following shall be the of ficers of the University , namely
(i) the V ice Chancellor;
(ii) the Pro-V ice Chancellor;
(iii) the Deans;
(iv) the Directors;
(v) the Chairman;
(vi) the Registrar;
(vii) the Controller of Examinations;
(viii) the Treasurer;
(ix) the Librarian; and
(x) such other persons as may be prescribed."
The details of Of ficers of the UOA have been given in Section 10 of the UOA Act, which reads as under: - "10. Officers of the University : the following shall be the of ficers of the University:-
(i) the Chancellor:
(ii) the Pro-Chancellor;
(iii) the V ice-Chancellor; (iii a) Pro-V ice Chancellor
(iv) the Deans;
(v) the Directors;
(vi) Principal of the Constituent College:
(vii) the Chairmen of the Teaching Departments;
(viii) the Registrar;
(ix) the Treasure;
(x) the Controller of Examinations;
(xi) the Librarian; and
(xii) such other persons as may be prescribed."
A comparative study of the two laws indicates that the UOA has three additional Officers, namely , the Chancellor , the Pro-Chancellor and the Principal of the Constituent College and list of all other Officers is the same in both the laws.
8. The second important provision in both the laws pertains to the post of Pro-V ice Chancellor . It is interesting to note that the post of the Pro-V ice Chancellor in the KEMU as well as in the UOA was created by making amendment in their respective Acts in the year 2012 and, it appears, for this reaso n the language of Section 15 of the KEMU Act and Section 15-A of the UOA Act is selfsame and reads as under:- "Pro-V ice Chancellor -(1) the Chancellor shall nominate the Pro-V ice Chancellor of the University , from amongst three senior most Professors of the University , for a term of three years.
(2) The Pro-V ice Chancellor shall perform such functions as may be assigned to him under this Act, statutes or regulations.
(3) The Syndicate or the Vice Chancellor may assign any other functions to the Pro-V ice Chancellor in addition to his duties as Professor ."
9. Last provision of law governing the questions, under consideration, relates to retirement from service. In this context Section 36 of the KEMU Act provides that: - "36. Retirement .-An officer, other than the Vice Chancellor , teacher or other employee of the University shall have the right to retire from service on such date, after he has completed twenty years of service qualifying for pension or other retirement benefits as the competent authority may, in the public interest, direct; or where no direction is given, on the completion of sixtieth year of his age.
Explanation.- In this section "competent authority" means the appointing authority or a person duly authorized by the appointing authority in that behalf, not being a person lower in rank to the officer, teacher or other employee concerned."
Whereas Section 41 of the UOA contains the provision of retirement from service in following words:- "41. Retirement from Service . - An officer, "other than the Chancello r, Pro-Chancellor and Vice Chancellor" teacher or other employee of the University shall retire from service-
(i) on such date, after he has completed twenty-five years of service qualifying for pension or other retirement benefits, as the competent authority may , in the public interest, direct, or
(ii) where no direction is given under clause (i) on the completion of sixtieth year of his age.
Explanation- In this section "competent authority" means the appointing authority or a person duly authorized by the appointing authority or in that behalf, not being person lower in rank to the officer, teacher or other employee concerned."
Except the words "the Chancellor", "Pro-Chancellor" and "twenty-five" used in Section 41 of the UOA Act, the provisions relating to retirement in both the laws are identical.
10. The above survey of laws makes it pellucid that the relevant provisions governing the terms and conditions of the post of Pro-V ice Chancellor in both the universities are similar and thus, commo n interpretation would be suffice to answer the questions which fall for our consideration in this case.
11. We have now reached to the stage where we have to read the provisions of the above-stated laws under the well-recognized principles of interpretation so as to find out the answers to the questions under consideration.
Before getting into that exercise, it is to be noted that inasmuch as the language of a statute constitutes the depository or reservoir of the legislative intent, in order to ascertain or discover that intent, the statute must be considered as a whole, just as it is necessary to consider a sentence in its entirety in order to grasp its true meaning. Consequently , effect and meaning must be given to every part of the statute - to every section, sentence, clause, phrase and words. In the wake of this principle, when we dissect the provisions of the KEMU Act or the UOA Act, it transpires that performing of the duties of the Pro-V ice Chancellor is an additional responsibility that the Chancellor assigns to a person who is not only a Professor but also one of the three senior most Professors at the University . It means that a direct recruitment to the post of Pro-V ice Chancellor is prohibited and the eligibility criteria for the post of Pro-V ice Chancellor is twofold: firstly , that a candidate should be a Professor; and, secondly , he should be amongst three senior most Professors of the University . This eligibility being in plain and clear words admits no further condition that the three senior most Professors must also have at least three years of remaining service.
12. On the contrary we see that in Shoaib' s case it has been held that any Professor with the remaining service of less than three years cannot complete the term of office to the post of Pro-V ice Chancellor and, therefore, does not meet the statutory requirements of the Act. This interpretation, in our view, adds the words "with at least three years of remaining service" in Section 15(1) of the KEMU Act or Section 15-A (1) of the UOA Act. It is a trite saying that on questions of construction different minds may come to different conclusions and we are content to say, with all due deference, that we do not agree with the reading of above-stated words in the clear language of the statute as no principle of interpretation or statutory construction approves injection of a word of one's own choice where the language of the statute unmistakably points to the meaning and presents no difficulty in understanding . Such type of inter-meddling with legislative intent and purpose appears to be an echo of what was said by Denning, L.J., in Magor 's case while sitting in the Court of Appeal. He said, "we sit here to find out the intention of Parliament and of Ministers and carry it out, and we do this better by filling in the gaps and making sense of the enactment than by opening it up to destructive analysis". We do not agree with the above-stated opinio n of Denning, L.J., and for it we rely upon the observation that the House of Lords made while hearing appeal against the said opinion. House of Lords said, "it appears to be a naked usurpation of the legislative function under the thin disguise of interpretation, and it is the less justifiable when it is guesswork with what material the legislature would, if it had discovered the gap, have filled it in. If a gap is disclosed, the remedy lies in an amending Act."
13. Our examination of the different provisions of the KEMU Act or the UOA Act and the principles of the interpretation suggests that the post of Pro-V ice Chancellor is a tenure post. The words "tenure post" is capable of different interpretations depending on the language of statutes. In civil service the tenure means a term during which an office is held. It is a condition of holding the office. Once a person is appointed to a tenure post, his appointment to the said office begins when he joins and it comes to an end on the completion of the tenure but no right is conferred to hold the post for the entire period. The tenure could be curtailed on attaining the age of superannuation by the incumbent of the post . The same condition applies to the cases in hands. The tenure prescribed in the statutes, under consideration, is three years and it is intended to allow the Professor , holding the post of Pro-V ice Chancellor , to share his intellectual opinions, even if he is in opposition to opinions of people in other positions of high power . In fact, tenure in the affairs of University encourages commitment, discipline, collegiality and compassion to the institution. Applying the maxim de una aliqua ejus particula proposita judicare vel respondere (it is unjust to decide or respond as to any particular part of a law without examin ing the whole of the law), the conjoint reading of law suggests that since Section 15 of the KEMU Act (Section 15-A of the UOA Act) does not contain any non-obstante clause, it cannot be said to override the provisions contained in Section 36 of the KEMU Act (Section 41 of the UOA Act) and the consequence would be that the appointment to the post of Pro- Vice Chancellor though shall be made on a three years tenure but it could be curta iled on the completion of sixtieth year of age of the incumbent. We, therefore, concur with the view expressed by the learned Single Judge in Muhammad Iqbal Zafar 's case that notwithstanding the fixed tenure attached to the office of Pro-V ice Chancellor , the incumbent thereof on attaining the age of superannuation before the expiry of three years will have to retire as he/she does not enjoy the immunity from retirement allowed to the of fice of Chancellor .
14. Lastly , we address the question that what kind of relief can be granted in these petitions. As far as the first petition is concerned, our conclusion is that since the Notification No.SO (ME) 4-7/2018 (KEMU) dated 7th November , 2018 appointing Prof. Dr. Ijaz Hussain as Pro-V ice Chancellor in the KEMU was issued on the basis of interpretation made in Shoaib' s case, which does not find our favour , the said Notification is not valid and thus, respondent No.7 can neither be allowed to plead estoppel nor to gain any right on the basis thereof . In the second petition the appointment made to the post of Pro-V ice Chancellor in the UOA is found valid and thus, interference therewith is uncalled for .
15. In the result, the first petition (i.e. W.P.No.256002 of 2018) is accepted and consequently , the Notification No.SO (ME) 4-7/2018 (KEMU) dated 7th November , 2018 is set aside declaring that it has been issued without7 8 9 10 11 lawful authority and is of no legal effect. Since the post of Pro-V ice Chancellor cannot be allowed to be left vacant for an unlimited period of time, respondents No.1 to 4 are directed to make fresh appointment to the post of Pro- Vice Chancellor , King Edward Medical University in the light of interpretation of provisions of the laws made hereinabove within a period of one month. The second petition (i.e. W.P.No.410 40 of 2020) lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed.
16. One of us (Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi, J.) has agreed with the decision subject to his own reasons recorded in the additional note attached herewith.
MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI , J. I have had the privilege of reading the judgment handed down by my learned brother Shahid Waheed, J., and I agree with the decision subject to the following reasons on difference of opinion in the decisions rendered by two learned Single Benches in the cases of Shoaib and Dr. Muhammad Iqbal Zafar (supra).
2. In Shoaib' s case , the learned Single Bench, while interpreting Section 15 of the KEMU Act, observed that a Professor with the remaining service of less than three years cannot complete the term of the office of Pro-V ice Chancellor , therefore, he does not meet the statutory requirements of Section 15 of the Act. It was further observed that Pro-V ice Chancellor is an officer within the contemplation of Section 8(ii) of the Act with retiring age of sixty years, in view of Section 36 of the Act, therefore, a person having service less than three years cannot be appointed as Pro-V ice Chancellor . The said judgment was not further assailed and was implemented.
3. In the case of Dr. Muhammad Iqbal Zafar , petitioner sought declaration to the effect that his appointment as Pro- Vice Chancellor of UOA was liable to continue from the date of his appointment till three years in terms of Section 15-A of the UOA Act notwithstanding the fact that he had attained the age of superannuation. The learned Single Bench, vide order dated 1.06.2018, refused to issue the declaration that the petitioner was entitled to complete the tenure of the post of Pro-V ice Chancellor as a matter of right even though he had attained the age of superannuation. Said judgment was assailed in ICA No. 223243/2018 and the learned Division Bench in its judgment dated 05.07.2018 observed that when a Professor who was nominated as Pro-V ice Chancellor was no more a Professor on superannuation was also no more a Pro-V ice Chancellor , and the post of Pro-V ice Chancellor was nomination post and not an appointment upon a tenure post.
4. As is evident from the aforesaid, the judgment rendered by learned Single Bench in the case of Dr. Muhammad Iqbal Zafar was affirmed by the learned Division Bench on 05.07.2018. Learned Single Bench, being not aware of the said judgment of learned Division Bench, referred the matter to Hon'ble Chief Justice vide order dated 30.07.2020 for fixing the case before the learned Division Bench of this Court. However , the matter was referred to this Full Bench wherein it transpired that the view in Dr. Muhammad Iqbal Zafar 's case has already been affirmed by the learned Division Bench. After the said decision, there was no need to further deliberate upon the issue as there is no contra view of any other learned Division Bench on the issue in hand, nor judgment dated 05.07.2018 of learned Division Bench is subject matter of the reference, however , we decided to pronounce authoritative judgment on the issue in hand. No doub t this Full Bench can form an independe nt opinion in the presence of a judgment of learned Division Bench but, since we have not noticed any flaw in the judgment of learned Division Bench rendered in the case of Dr. Muhammad Zafar Iqbal , therefore, without overruling it, concurrence can be made with the judgment of learned Division Bench under the doctrine of merger . Reference in this regard can be made to judgments reported as Gangadhara Palo v. Revenue Divisional Officer and another [(201 1) 4 SCC 602], Sahabzadi Maharunisa v. Mst. Ghulam Sughran (PLD 2016 SC 358) and Nasrullah Khan v. Mukhatar- ul-Hassan (PLD 2013 SC 478). In the case of Gangadhara Palo it was held by the Supreme Court of India as under: "According to the doctrine of merger , the judgment of the lower court merges into the judgment of the higher court.
Hence, if some reasons, however meagre, are given by this Court while dismissing the special leave petition, then by the doctrine of merger , the judgment of the High Court merges into the judgment of this Court and after merger there is no judgment of the High Court. Hence, obviously , there can be no review of a judgment which does not even exist."
In view of the above stated legal position, I concur with the said decision of learned Division Bench.
5. To elaborate it further , it can be seen from reading of KEMU Act and UOA Act that the offices / posts under the two statutes are not of same nature. There are offices to which persons are nominated, and there are posts to which persons are appointed. Then there are expressly provided ex-of ficio posts. Different posts are of different natures and status. There are full time office holders e.g. Registrar and Teachers. Then there are posts to which a person is appointed for a term e.g. Vice-Chancellor . There are office holders who are nominated e.g. Pro-V ice Chancellor , members of Senate and Syndicate, and there are elections and elected members to the authorities.
And thus, their terms of of fice depends on the nature of their status.
6. So far as the office of Pro-V ice Chancellor is concerned, one of the three senior most Professors is nominated by the Chancellor to hold this office. Under Section 15 of the KEMU Act and Section 15-A of the UOA Act the Pro-V ice Chancellor is nominated for a term of three years . Under the said provisions, apparently there is no prohibition regarding nomination of a Professor with less than three year service for the post of Pro-V ice Chancellor . It is established principle that whatever is not specifically prohibited is permissible and as a matter of general principle, prohibition cannot be presumed. Reference in this regard can be made to Additional Collector-II Sales Tax, Lahore v. Messrs Abdullah Sugar Mills Ltd. (2003 SCMR 1026 ), and Asma Zafarul Hassan v. United Bank Ltd. and another ( 1981 SCMR 108 ).
7. On the other hand, under Section 36 of the KEMU Act and Section 41 of the UOA Act, a Professor is bound to retire from service on attaining age of superannuation. If Section 15 of the KEMU Act and Section 15-A of the UOA Act is interpreted as a Professor who cannot complete the term of three years cann ot be considered for nomination for the post of Pro-V ice Chancellor , then the text of the said provisions will have to be read as follows: "from amongst three senior most Professors of the University [whose age on the date of nomination is not above 57 years], for a term of three years.". If the said text or similar words are not read into the text of said provisions, then the condition of nomination from amongst three senior most Professors will be compromised. If the said provisions are interpreted without filling in the gaps in their text, the words "three senior most Professors" will become redundant or will have to be read down. Similarly , the words "for a term of three years" have been reduced to futility with the interpretation given by learned Single as well as Division Bench in the case of Dr. Muhammad Zafar Iqbal .
Needless to say that fundamental rule of interpretation is that in construing the provisions of a statute, the Court has to find out the express intention from the words of the statute and eschew the construction which leads to absurdity and give rise to practical inconvenience or make the provisions of the existing law nugatory . In order to remove the apparent defect and to give force and life to the intention of legislature, doctrine of harmonious construction has been employed by the learned Single Bench, Division Bench and has been followed in the main judgment which in my view is not wrong in the given circumstances but, more appropriately , such gaps have to be filled by the legislature by amending Acts, as held by the House of Lords in the case of Magor and St. Mellons Rural District Council (supra). Therefore, clarifications / amend ments in the KEMU Act and UOA Act with regard to nomination of a Professor having service less than the tenure of the post of Pro-V ice Chancellor and his status after his retirement to hold the post in question, are necessary to be explicitly incorporated in the relevant statutes.
Steering thoughts can be gathered from Indian jurisdiction. For example, Section 13 of the Kannur University Act, 1996, deals with appointment of Pro-V ice Chancellor for a term of four years and its sub-section (2) specifically provides that person who is more than 56-years of age shall not be appointed against said post. Therefore, I suggest that necessary amendments in two Acts ibid, with regard to above discussed points are required to be incorporated by the Legislature by adopting due course of law to manifest its intention regarding the term for the post of Pro-V ice Chancellor . Ch. Shoaib Saleem v . The King Edward Medical University , etc (W.P.No.9316 of 2015) Pakistan (through the Secretary , Cabinet Secretiarat, Karachi) v. (1) Moazz am Hussain Khan (2) Mian Anwar Ali, Director of Intelligence Bureau Karachi (PLD 1959 Supreme Court 13) Pakistan v . Fazal Rahman Khundkar and another (PLD 1959 Supreme Court 82) Dr. Muhammad Iqbal Zafar v . Province of Punjab (W.P.No.217977 of 2018)1 2 3 4 Prof. Dr. Muhammad Sarwar Khan v. University of Agriculture, etc (W.P.No.33710 of 2020). Though this petition is clubbed with these petitions but it has been disposed of through separate order of even date. Prof. Dr. Muhammad Iqbal Zafar v. The Province of Punjab through Secretary to the Government of Punjab, Agriculture Department, Lahore and others ( 2019 PLC (C.S.) 63 ) Pakistan v . Messrs Zeal Pak Cement Factory Ltd. ( 1985 SCMR 1968 ) Magor and St. Mellons Rural District Council v . Newport Corporation (1950) 2 All. E. R. 1226 Magor and St. Mellons Rural District Council v . Newport Corporation (1951) 2 All. E. R. 839 Pakistan (through the Secretary , Cabinet Secretiarat, Karachi) v. (1) Moazzam Hussain Khan (2) Mian Anwar Ali, Director of Intelligence Bure au Karachi (PLD 1959 Supreme Court 13) Pakistan v. Fazal Rahman Khundkar and another (PLD 1959 Supreme Court 82) Abdul Haque Indhar and others v. Province of Singh through Secretary Forest, Fisheries and Livestock Department, Karachi and 3 others (2000 SCMR 907) Muhammad Ikhlaq Memon v. Zakaria Ghani and others (PLD 2005 SC 819 )