' This is a petition under Article 9 of Provisional Constitution Order, 1981 whereby Alam Ali and Abdul Waheed petitioners want this court to declare the judgment and decree dated 7-12-1981 passed by the learned District Judge, Multan in revision titled as 'Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority, Lahore v. Alam Ali and Abdul Waheed', to be without lawful authority of no legal effect.
2. The facts leading up to this petition in brief are that the petitioners herein own land measuring 48 kanlas situated in village Mabni Sial, Teh. Kabirwala, District Multan which has been shown as mango garden in the Revenue Record. The WAPDA, respondent No, 2 wanted to install poles therein and pass 500 K. M. Tower line therefrom without having paid the compensation. On 8.8.1979, the petitioners filed a suit for perpetual injunction obviously under section 54 of the Specific Relief Act against respondents Nos. 2 to 4 for restraining them from doing so, averring that in case the garden is removed, they would suffer a loss of Rs, 15,00,000. Since these were summer vacations, the suit was entertained by Additional District Judge (as a vacation Judge) who after granting interim relief till 2-9-1979, entrusted the suit to Senior Civil Judge, Multan. On 2-9-1979, the counsel for the petitioners appeared before the Senior Civil Judge, Mr. Muhammad Khurshid Alam appeared on behalf of respondents/defendants as Law Officer and filed written statement duly signed and verified by him and by Assistant Land Acquisition Officer, respondent No,
3. On the same day a compromise was also filed by the parties. The learned Senior Civil Judge, however, transferred the case to Ch. Faiz Talib Khan, Civil Judge, 1st Class, Multan for further proceedings and directed the parties to appear before him on 4-9-1979. On 4-9-1979, Mr. Khurshid Alam, Law Officer and Mr. Khurshid Ahmad, Assistant Land Acquisition Officer appeared on behalf of defendants.
They owned compromise Exh. C. I. To the effect that defendants/respondents would not pass 500 K.
M. Tower line through the land of the petitioners/plaintiffs without making payment of compensation as mentioned in letter No, 2638-40/ $E (500 K. W.)T/TI. Dated 17-7-1979, The trial Court, therefore decreed the suit in favour of plaintiffs/petitioners and against respondents/defendants. It so happened that the respondents without performing their part of the decree i. e. The payment of compensation as agreed upon, installed the poles and passed 5C0 K.
W. Tower line tiro ugh the land after cutting the mango trees. Consequently, the petitioners filed execution proceedings for the recovery of the compensation to the tune of Rs, 25,67,600 and also moved application for contempt proceedings On the other hand, on 23-5-1980 WAPDA, respondent No, 2 moved application under section 12 (2), C.P.C. For setting aside the compromise decree dated 4-9-1979 being fraudulent and obtained against respondent No, 2 by misrepresentation on the following grounds :
(a) that the decree is collusive between Mr. Khurshid Alam, Junior Law Officer, WAPDA, Mr. Khurshid Ahmad, Assistant Land Acquisition Officer and the plaintiffs/petitioners.
(b) that neither the Assistant Land Acquisition Officer, Mr. Khurshid Ahmad nor Junior Law Officer, Mr. Khurshid Alam was authorised to give statement and get the compromise passed against the WAPDA, hence it is the result of misrepresentation by the above Officers.
(c) that being illegal and void, the impugned decree is neither executable nor binding on WAPDA.
(d) that the decree in the present form is not executable and sustainable and could not be passed because it is not an executable decree.
' The bare reading of section 12(2), C. P. C. Makes crystal clear that grounds C & D' are not envisaged by this section. Since the judgment and decree dated 4-9-1979 cannot be challenged on these grounds, the same have to be excluded from consideration. It has, therefore, to be assumed that WAPDA had challenged the decree on two grounds i. e. Collusion detailed in ground `A' and misrepresentation explained in ground 'B' as mentioned above. It is remarkable that the validity of judgment and decreb dated 4.9-1979 had not been challenged on the plea of want of jurisdiction. On 18=9-1980, however, an amended application under section 12(2), C. P. C. Was filed wherein besides grounds 'A to D' detailed above, the following grounds were added :-
(e) That WAPDA or its Chairman was never served with any notice or summons of the suit. Mr. Khurshid Alam, Junior Law Officer, WAPDA, Multan could appear only in cases against the WAPDA upto the amount of Rs, 50,000 only after being duly entrusted with such cases by the concerned Chief Engineer, WAPDA. He was never given the said authorisation by the concerned Chief Engineer, WAPDA to appear in this case. Even in the case where he was authorised to appear by the concerned Chief Engineer WAPDA, his power is restricted under the Resolution No, 373 of 1977 passed by the Authority. Under this Resolution he had no power to enter into any compromise, settlement or agreement on behalf of WAPDA.
(f) That Mr. Khurshid Alam entered into the alleged compromise Exh. C. I. Involving the WAPDA in a ridiculously excessive and illegal claim which according to the plaintiffs themselves worked out at the fabulous amount of Rs, 25,67,600 without the knowledge of WAPDA, for patently corrupt and dishonest motive. The alleged compromise is thus clearly fraudulent, absolutely void and not binding on WAPDA.
(g) That a combined reading of sections 12 to 16t 18 and 19 and 51 of the Electricity Act, 1910 read with sections 10 and 16 of Part III of Telegraph Act, 11,85 and Government of West Pakistan Notification No, S. O. II (E) 2/5-0 dated 6-1-1961, unmistakably shows that the Civil Court lacked the jurisdiction to pass the impugned decree. Compensation in such cases, on account of any damage caused, could be awarded only by the District Judge of the District, or in some cases by the Deputy Commissioner of the District concerned. It is also respectfully pointed out that the towers for that transmission Lines were to be erected at a distance of more than one furlong from each other and each such tower could not cover more than a few square yards of land on which only one mango tree, if any, could be standing. There could be no question of any damage being caused to the trees standing between the various towers and there was no necessity for WAPDA to remove any of these trees. WAPDA never removed any tree even from the places where towers were erected and the claim for the removal and destruction of more than 50 trees is fantastic.
(h) That the defendants Nos. 2 & 3 were neither legal nor natural persons. These were more designations of the functionaries of the WAPDA. They could not be sued in their official designations. The suit was thus badly constituted against these defendants.
' In grounds E & F', the Authority of Mr. Khurshid Alam, J. L. O. To appear and compromise and in ground 'H' the constitution of the suit by impleading defendants Nos. 2 and 3 as a party have been challenged. Ground `H' is again not recognized by section 12 2), C. P. C. It may be mentioned here with some advantage that in ground G', the plea of want of jurisdiction of the Civil Court has been taken on the ground that combined reading of sections 12 to 16, 18, 19 and 51 of the Electricity Act read with sections 10, 16 of the Telegraph Act plus notification No, S.
0. II (1) 2/5-60 dated 6-1-1961 ousts the jurisdiction of the Civil Court.
3. The petitioners herein contested the amended application by filing reply to the same, wherein 4 preliminary objections were raised and the assertions made in that application were refuted. The trial Court, however, without framing issues on the preliminary objections and factual controversy, dismissed the application on 17-12-1980. Feeling aggrieved, WAPDA filed revision before the learned District Judge, Multan who vide his impugned judgment dated 7-12-1981, while accepting the revision set aside the order dated 17-12-1980, whereby, the petition of WAPDA under section 12(2), C.P.C. Was dismissed ; set aside the judgment and decree dated 4-9-1979 i. e. The compromise decree for permanent injunction passed against WAPDA and also rejected the plaint of the suit for permanent injunction, filed by the petitioners against WAPDA. Hence this writ petition.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioners while assailing the impugned judgment raised following points :-
1. As far rejection of plaint:
(i) Since revision before District Judge had arisen from order dated 17-12-1980, dismissing the application filed by WAPDA under section 12(2), C. P. C., against compromise decree dated 4-9- 1979, the District Judge had no authority to reject the plaint straightaway.
(ii) The learned District Judge was not competent to reject the plaint on the basis of the material foreign to the plaint.
2. As far setting aside the compromise decree dated 4-9-1979 : The learned counsel submits :- That since the allegations of fraud, collusion, misrepresentation and lack of jurisdiction made in the amended petition under section 12 (2), C. P. C. Were denied and despite denial neither the issues were framed nor the petitioners were given opportunity to adduce evidence to rebut the assertions made in the application, the learned District Judge was not legally competent tcy set aside the compromise decree without proof of the grounds contemplated by section 12 (2), C. P. C.
3. As far the Reversal of the order dated 17-12-1980 dismissing the application filed by WAPDA under section 12 (2), C. P. C. : ' Learned counsel submits ' That since the assertions in application under section 12 (2), C. P. C., having been refuted and preliminary objections raised but no issues were framed and the parties were not given opportunity to lead the evidence, the learned District Judge could, therefore, at the worst remand the application for framing of issues and recording evidence but could not accept the application.
' As against this, the learned counsel for WAPDA, respondent No, 2 has vigorously defended the impugned judgment and decree dated 1-12-1981. He pointed out the following guiding legal principles ' If a right is given to an individual by a statute and the mode of obtaining that right is provided in the statue itself, a suit to enforce the right is not maintainable in Civil Court. If the right to receive compensation exists independently of a statute and the statute only affirms it and provides a particular forum of a remedy, that remedy is exclusive and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred by implication. He relied upon AIR 1936 Pat. 87 ;
(b) That when an act of Legislature sets up a Special Tribunal (in this case District Judge) and prescribes a specific procedure for the determining of rights and liabilities created by the Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in respect of those rights and liabilities is impliedly barred. He relied upon PLD 1967 Kar. 55 and 1954 Lah.
551.
(c) That absence of jurisdiction nullifies judgment and even the parties, cannot confer the jurisdiction. He relied upon AIR 1926 Bom. 1, 1923 Cal. 619, PLD 1975 SC 331, 1925 P C 155, 1947 P C 19 and 1979 CLC 509.
(d) That the rule of construction in case of a pleader is at par with a trade where the usage becomes an additional term of the contract "if not contrary to the general law or excluded by express agreement". Reliance was placed on AIR 1947 Nag.
17.
(e) That the authority to conduct all proceedings in the case does not include power to refer case to arbitration unless earmarked and that a pleader has no authority to enter into a compromise on his own responsibility unless `Wakalatnama' in his favour confers such authorities on him and a compromise decree effected by pleader without necessary authority is not binding on the client even in the case of express authority in writing, the general power to conduct the case imply a specific power authorising the Advocate to agree to a compromise on his own responsibility.
Reliance has been placed on PLD 1954 Pesh. 61, AIR 1954 MYS 167 and AIR 1949 Mad.
98.
' ALAM ALI V. DISTRICT JUDGE, MULTAN (Muhammad Munir Khan, .T) .
( f) That prior to the addition of section 12(2), C. P. C. By Ordinance, 10 of 1980, the decree and judgment of a court could be questioned before same court by an application or through separate suit on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, fraud or the collusion but after the enforcement of Ordinance 10 of 1980 on 26-3-1980, a judgment and decree can be challenged before the court passing it through an application on the grounds of want of jurisdiction, fraud, misrepresentation and no separate suit is competent. Reliance has been placed on 1981 SCMR 878, PLD 1964 Pesh.
283, AIR 1951 All. 351 and AIR 1929 Oudh 385.
After explaining the aforesaid guiding principles, the learned counsel made following submissions :-
(i) that the court can reject the plaint under Order VII, rule 11, C. P. C. By taking into account legal provisions having bearing on that question, and if, the assertions made in the plaint are belied by law on subject, the court is not precluded from taking with law and as such, the District Judge has rightly rejected the plaint. He relied upon 1982 CLC 167.
(ii) that since no express power was given to Mr. Khurshid Alam and Mr. Khurshid Ahmad to compromise the suit, as such no implied authority could be deemed to have been conferred upon them to make a compromise binding on WAPDA. In any case, the compromise decree affected by them being without necessary authority is not binding on. WAPDA.
(iii) that the combined reading of sections 12 to 16, 18, 19 and 51 of the Electricity Act, 1910 read with sections 10 and 16 of Part III of the Telegraph Act and Government of the Punjab Notification No, S.
0. II (E) 2/S-60 dated 5-1-1961 completely ousts the jurisdiction of Civil Court to pass the impugned decree dated 4-9-1979.
5. After having considered the arguments of the parties in the light of record available before me, I find that the petitioners had filed a suit for perpetual injunction simpliciter requesting an injunction for restraining the defendants therein from installing poles and passing. 500 K. W. Tower line through their land without paying compensation. The value of the suit for the purposes of the jurisdiction was Rs, 200 only. Mr. Khurshid Alam appeared before the court obviously under the authority of the respondent as Law Officer and Mr. Khurshid Ahmad as Assistant Land Acquisition Officer. They filed compromise to the effect that the defendants therein .Shall pay compensation for trees, etc. In accordance with the letter No, 2638-40/SE (500 K. W.) T/L dated 17-7-1979 before doing the needful. The trial Court recorded the statements of the two officers and plaintiff's counsel which are as under : {{URDU TEXT}} ' and passed a compromise decree accordingly.
' After about one year and 9 months of the decree, the WAPDA, the judgment-debtor moved application under section 12(2), C. P. C. For setting aside the compromise decree date 3-9-1979 on the grounds 'A to H' as already detailed in the early part of the judgment. The examination of these grounds would show that the decree has been challenged on the ground of collusion of the two Officers with the petitioners/plaintiffs, misrepresentation by Mr. Khurshid Alam and Mr. Khurshid Ahmad in the sense that although Mr. Khurshid Alam was not competent to appear in the suit because the value exceeded Rs, 50,000 and that the two Officers had no express or implied authority to compromise or to make statement therefor yet they posing themselves as competent to do so, not only entered appearance but also effected compromise Exh. C. I. According to the learned counsel this action of the two Officers amounts to misrepresentation and fraud which led to the passing of the impugned consent decree dated 4-9-1979.
' The petitioners contested the application by raising preliminary objections and denying the factual assertions and refuting the grounds 'A to H' of the petition. The perusal of the amended petition under section 12(2), C. P. C. And the written reply thereto dated 16-10-1980 indicates that the controversy required factual investigation and could not be resolved, unless the parties were put on issues and opportunity to prove or rebut the issues were given to them. The trial Court, however, on 17-12-1980, unfortunately without framing the issues and having evidence thereon, dismissed the application under section 12(2), C. P. C. Filed by the WAPDA. Aggrieved by that order, the WAPDA, respondent herein, filed a revision before the learned District Judge, who vide his impugned order accepted the petition under section 12(2), C. P. C. And although there was no issue and evidence in application under section 12(2), C. P. C., yet he set aside the compromise judgment and decree and instead of remanding back the suit or application under section 12(2), C. P. C. To the trial Court for framing issues, etc., himself rejected the plaint of the suit for permanent injunction while sitting in revision against the order dated 17-12-1980. Passed in an application under section 12(2), C. P. C.
6. Since no appeal or revision was filed against the compromise decree, the same had attained finality and could, of course, be challenged under section 12(2), C. P. C. Which reads as follows :- "Where a person challenges the validity of a judgment, decree or order on the plea of fraud, misrepresentation or want of jurisdiction, he shall seek his remedy making an application to the Court which passed the final judgment, decree or order and not by a separate suit."
' Since this provision of law appears to be an exception to the general rules of appeal, revision, review and authorises the trial Court to adjudicate the validity of the decree passed by it, in certain circumstances, I am of the view that the provisions of subsection (2) of section 12, C. P. C. Have to be construed and applied strictly and as such the onus would lie on the applicant to prove the application strictly within the scope and premises of section 12(2), C. P. C. And that the trial Court shall not set aside or interfere with the decree unless a strong and clear case for interference is made out by the applicant within the corners of section 12(2), C. P. C.
7. In the circumstances of the case, I propose to examine first the lawful authority of District Judge to reject the plaint of the suit for permanent injunction while sitting in revision against the order dated 17-12-1980, whereby, application under section 12(2), C. P. C. Of the WAPDA was dismissed.
There may be no denial of the law that the learned District Judge whit sitting in revision against the order passed in application under section 12(2), c C. P. C. Could pass all orders which the trial Court was competent to make under section 12(2), C. P. C. And also could exercise all powers which the trial Court could exercise under section 12(2), C. P. C. It has to be noted that the revision was not directed against the original decree dated 4-9-1979 and as such the scope of the revision before the District Judge was not wide enough at it would have been in revision against the original judgment and decree. Therefore, the question which engages the attention is whether under section 12(2), C. P. C., the trial Court or the District Judge when sitting in revision against the order passed in application under section 12(2), C. P. C., D was competent to straightaway reject the plaint of the suit for permanent injunction by exercising powers under Order VII, rule 11, C. P. C. For that it would be useful to quote the relevant provisions of Order VII, rule 11, C. P. C. And section 12(2), C. P. C. At the cost of repetition : "(11) The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases :-
(a) Where it does not disclose a cause of action ;
(b) Where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so ;
(c) Whether the relief claimed is properly valued, but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the c ourt to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so
(d) Where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law."
"Section 12(2), C. P. C.-Where a person challenges the validity of a judgment, decree or order on the plea of fraud, misrepresentation or want of jurisdiction, he shall seek his remedy by making an application to the Court which passed the final judgment, decree or order and not by a separate suit."
' The plain reading of these provisions makes crystal clear that two different terms have been used therein. In section 12(2), C. P. C., the grounds for the rejection of the plaint under Order VII, rule 11, C. P.
C. Are not given. The learned counsel, however, has argued that the term "want of jurisdiction" used in section 12(2), C. P. C. And the "suit barred by any law" in Order VII, rule 11, C. P. C. Are identical and that the term "want of jurisdiction" used in section 12(2), C. P. C. Includes therein the term "barred by any law" used under Order VII, rule 11, C. P. C.
' On this aspect of the case, the learned counsel for WAPDA who has, otherwise, argued the case with appreciable ability has neither advanced convincing reasons nor could he cite any relevant case law. He has simply been attempting to stretch the scope of term "want of jurisdiction" to include therein ground for rejection of the plaint contemplated by Order VII, rule 11, C. P. C. I am clear in my mind that the language "suit appears to be barred by law" is of great significance and contemplates only those suits, the cognizance or the trial of which is specifically barred by the provisions of law. I am afraid if the attempts of the learned counsel to stretch the provisions of section 12(2), C. P. C. To include therein the grounds for the rejection of the plaint as given under Order VII, r. II, C. P. C. Succeed, the same may tantamount to adding more grounds to challenge the validity of the decree under section 12(2), C. P. C. Which I am sure, the Legislature never intended.
That being the legal position, I am convinced that the combined effect of sections 12 to 16, 18, 19 and 51 of the Electricity Act read with section 10 and XVI of Part HI of the Telegraph Act and the Government Notification No, SO-II(E) 2/5-60 dated 6-1-1961, cannot operate as a legal bar to the cognizance or the trial of the suit for permanent injunction filed by the petitioners herein against WAPDA because it has nowhere been laid down in theSe provisions that the suit for permanent injunction, as it was, is barred or does not lie. The mere fact that WAPDA could install the poles or could pass 50) K. W. Tower lines from the land of the petitioners without paying the compensation is not sufficient to hold that the suit is barred by any law and plaint liable to be rejected. Even, otherwise, the term "want of jurisdiction" and the "suit barred by any law" are not synonymous. The distinction between two provisions are very much obvious. To determine lack of jurisdiction, the material other than the plaint can be looked into whereas for determining whether the suit is barred by any law, the statement in the plaint has only to be considered. In case of lack of jurisdiction, the entire suit may be dismissed or the plaint be returned under Order VII, rule 10, C. P.
C. But in case the suit appears to be barred by any law, the plaint has to be rejected. In case, the suit is dismissed for want of jurisdiction, the subsequent suit may not lie but in case of rejection of plaint, a subsequent suit on the same cause of action would be maintainable provided it is filed within limitation. For these reasons, I am fully convinced that the term "want of jurisdiction" used in section 12(2), C. P. C. Does not include therein, the' term "suit bayed by any law", and as such the trial Court in application under section 12(2), C. P. C. And the DiStrict Judge while sitting in revision against order therefrom had no legal authority to reject 'the plaint. There is no doubt that under section 12(2), C. P. C., the trial Court and in case of an appeal or revision arising from the order passed therein, the Court of revision may set aside the decree challenged on the grounds given in section 12(2), C. P. C. But cannot reject the plaint under Order VII, rule 11, C. P. C. Consequently, on this score alone, it can be safely held that by rejecting the plaint straightaway in the circumstances of the case, the District Judge has crossed the limits and exceeded his authority and as such the impugned order to that extent has been passed without lawful authority.
8. As far contention No, 2 raised by the learned ,counsel for the petitioners, it is now well settled that for, the rejection of the plaint, the court has to see the statements made in the plaint itself and cannot go , beyond that. It is equally true as submitted by the learned counsel that if the law on the subject belies the averments of the plaint, the same may be applied for the rejection of the plaint under Order VII, rules 11, C. P. C. In K the instant case, however, I find that in para. No, 4 of the plaint it was averred that WAPDA had no right to pass 500 K. W. Tower line, etc. Through the land without payment of compensation and this averment has been denied in the written statement very clearly in these words :- {{URDU TEXT}} In situation like that I am of the view that the plaint should not have been rejected straightaway because it also involves factual investigation to some extent. The issue having not been framed and the petitioners having not been given any opportunity to substantiate their case, to my mind, they have been condemned in an unlawful manner. It is remarkable that WAPDA, respondent, in its written statement filed in the suit and in his petition under section 12(2), C. P. C. Challenging the compromise decree, has not raised the plea of the non-disclosure of the cause of action or that the suit was barred by law as envisaged by Order VII, rule 11, C. P. C. I have examined the plaint. If the statements in the plaint are accepted as true in the circumstances of the case, the same does not suffer from infirmity envisaged by Order VII, rule 11, C. P. C. For these reasons, I am also inclined to accept point No, 2 raised by the learned counsel and hold that on this point, too, the order appears to have been passed without lawful authority.
9. Coming to that part of the impugned judgment whereby th compromise decree dated 4-9-1979 has been set aside, I find, the same as arbitrary and illegal for the reasons that assertions of fraud, misrepresentation K and want of jurisdiction raised in grounds 'A to H' of amended application K under section 12(2), C. P. C. To challenge the validity of the compromise decree were specifically denied in the reply wherein 4 preliminary objections were also taken. Since in that application, the issues were not framed ; the evidence of the parties was not recorded ; WAPDA was not asked to prove allegations of fraud, etc. And the petitioners were not given opportunity to lead evidence to rebut the assertions of the WAPDA, the learned District Judge was not legally competent to set aside the compromise decree straightaway and thereby condemned the petitioners herein. The questions of fraud, misrepresentation, authority of the two Officers to appear in the case and compromise the same, did require factual enquiry and as such the District set aside, I am of the view that since the allegations of fraud, etc. We're not admitted in the written statement and some preliminary objections were also raised, the trial Court was not justified to dismiss the application without having framed issues and given opportunity to the parties to prove or rebut the issues and as such the impugned order to the extent of setting aside the order dated 17-12-1980 has to be sustained. I am of the considered opinion that the District Judge could in the circumstances of the case set aside the order dated 17-12-1980, whereby the application under section 12(2), C. P. C. Was dismissed but he could not accept the application under section 12(2), C. P. C. Moved by WAPDA. I am fully conscious that the relief under Article 9 of the Provisional Constitution Order, 1981 is Extraordinary one and the District Judge had jurisdiction to pass wrong or even erroneous order. To my mind, it is not a case of that type. It is a case in which the District Judge has flouted the relevant provisions of law and the principles laid down for the administration of justice and has also acted arbitrarily. Although neither the issues were framed nor the evidence was led in the suit or in application under section 12(2), C. P. C., yet the learned District Judge not only set aside the compromise decree but also rejected the plaint. In these circumstances, I am of the opinion that it is rather the duty of this Court while sitting in Constitutional jurisdiction to interfere and strike down such illegal, unwarranted and arbitrary orders.
11. As far the guiding principles explained by the learned counsel, I see no reason to differ with the same. Since the facts of the two cases seldom coincide, therefore, each case has to be examined and decided in the light of its own circumstances. To my mind the case law cited by the learned counsel and the arguments advanced by him do not rehabilitate the legal flaws and infirmities affecting the authority of the District Judge to the extent of the rejection of the plaint and setting aside the compromise decree. Resultantly, the impugned judgment and decree of the District Judge to the extent of the rejection of the plaint in the suit for permanent injunction filed by the petitioners herein, against the WAPDA and setting aside the compromise decree dated 4-9-1979, is declared to have been passed without lawful authority and of no legal effect. It is further declared that while accepting the revision, the learned District Judge could only set aside the order dated 17-12-1980 but could not accept the application made under section 12(2), C. P. C. Without issues and evidence. He could remand the case to the trial Court for framing issues in application under section 12(2), C. P. C. And recording evidence of the parties therein or could himself frame the issues and refer the same for trial to the trial Court, Since this Court while exercising the writ jurisdiction does not as a rule even not in a case where it does interfere, substitute its own decision for the decision of the courts below, therefore, I after having declared the impugned order to the extent of the rejection of the plaint and setting aside the compromise decree, to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect, send the case back to the learned District Judge for proceeding according to law, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.