1. MAZHARUL HAQ (CHAIRMAN. This is an application filed by Lal Khan under section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 against the respondent-Management for his re-instatement and consequential benefits.
2. A preliminary objection ha; been raised that in case where a workman has not complied with the procedure in making a complaint under S. O. le of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, he cannot agitate the matter regarding the violation of the Standing Orders in a general petition under section 34 of the amended Industrial Relations Ordinance XIX of 1970. The learned counsel for the respondent has argued that under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, section 34 as it stood then, did not give a right to an individual workman, to make an application to a Labour Court for the enforcement of any right guaranteed.
3. On the contrary, an application under section 34 laid before the Labour Court by any party to an Industrial Dispute only relating to a matter arising out of any right guaranteed and now after the amendment on 17-10-70, the amending Ordinance XIX of 1970 has 'substituted section 34 as follows: "34. Application to Labour Court- Any collective - bargain--ing agent or any employer or workman may apply to the Labour Court for the enforcement of any right guaranteed or secured to it or him by or under any law or- any award of settlement."
4. He further argued that even under the aforesaid amended section, an application to the Labour Court can only be made by a workman for the enforcement of any guaranteed right or secured to him by or under any law or any award or settlement. In the instant case, the workman is asking for the enforcement of a right guaranteed under the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. Therefore he must follow the entire procedure for the enforce--ment of his this right contemplated by S. O. 18 of the said Ordinance. He concluded that under the general law i.e., the industrial Relations Ordinance, in its section 34, a right has been given to a workman asking for the adjudication of his right under any law and in the present context, it would mean any law including the Standing Orders Ordinance. He further argued that section 34 widens the scope for a workman to come to the Labour Court but it does not repeal or override the provisions of the Standing Orders Ordinance in any manner and that since in the instant case, the petitioner was required -to give a grievance notice to the employer within 15 days of the occurrence of the grievance and since no such notice was given, the petitioner cannot straightaway rush to the Labour Court simply because the new section i.e. Section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance has given him a right to apply to the Labour Court.
5. The learned counsel for the petitioner replies that section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance does not prescribe any special mode or limitation period for making any application to the Labour Court for the enforcement of a legal right, there--fore, it would follow that this being a Central statute will override the provisions of Standing Orders Ordinance which is a provincial statute. He concluded that under Standing, Order 18 of the aforesaid Standing Orders Ordinance, a grievance notice within 15 days is to be given and a complaint to the Labour Court is to be made within 30 days of the reply and if .no reply is given by the employer, a workman is to apply to the Labour Court within 60 days from the date of the receipt of the grievance notice, but by the operation of section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1970, a workman is no longer required to fulfil these conditions before applying to the Labour Court.
6. I have considered the arguments of both sides.In my view, section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, as it 'stands today, no doubt, widens the scope for a workman to bring his grievance for redress before a Labour Court, provided there has been an infringement of any of his guaranteed right under any law, award or settlement. I find, it is the Standing Orders Ordinance, which guarantees certain rights to him. Therefore, any violation of these rights would be justifiable under the provisions of the same law. Section 34 o the Industrial Relations Ordinance does trot intend that the period of limitation and the mode of- serving a grievance notice have been repealed. Had this been the intention of the Legislature, it would have specifically repealed these provisions o the Standing Orders Ordinance or would have done so by implications. Both these intentions are not to be found in the t Industrial Relations Ordinance XIX of 1970. Therefore, I conclude that section 34 does not interfere with the operation' of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. It simply widens the scope for a workman to apply to a Labour Court. for the infringement of any of his right guaranteed under any law including the Standing Orders Ordinance, and since in the instant case, no grievance notice was served upon the employer under Standing Orders 18, this petition is, therefore, dismissed.