' UMAR ATA BANDIAL, J.---While attacking the judgment dated 20.10.2015 rendered by the learned High Court in Civil Revision No, 464 of 2000, learned counsel for the petitioner has forcefully contended that the learned High Court has failed to consider the law laid down by this Court in Rehmat Ali v. Muhammad Younis (PLD 2014 SC 680) and thereby ignored the saving effect of section 35(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991. Instead the learned High Court has placed reliance on another judgment given by this Court in Muhammad Ali v. Humera Fatima (2013 SCM R 178) to hold that the disclosure of date, time and place of Talb-i-Muwathibat in the plaint is a mandatory requirement of law-which had not been complied by the petitioner in the plaint of his pre-emption suit filed in 1990 during the interregnum when no pre-emption legislation was in field.
2. The chronology of events is that the petitioner filed a suit for possession through pre-emption on 25.01.1990 but for lack of legislation after the annulment of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 by the judgment of the learned Shariat Appellate Bench in Government of N.W.F.P v. Said Kamal Shah (PLD 1986 SC 360), the said suit was dismissed on 10.06.1990 as being not maintainable. Upon the promulgation of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 the petitioner's suit was revived on 24.09.1991; it was heard and dismissed on 23.01.1996. That result was affirmed in appeal on 06.03.2000 but the learned High Court allowed the petitioner's civil revision petition and decreed his suit on 10.02.2005.
On 11.02.2008 this Court allowed. The respondents' appeal and remanded the matter back to the learned High Court to consider and decide the same afresh in the light of Section 35 of the Act 1991, the requirement of Zarar and Zaroorat and the effect of the judgment of a five Members Bench of this Court in Haji Rana Muhammad Shabbir Ahmed Khan v. Government of Punjab Province, Lahore (PLD 1994 SC 1). In the remand proceedings learned High Court has by the impugned judgment dated 20.10.2015 followed Muhammad Ali v. Humera Fatima (2013 SCM R 178) to dismiss the petitioner's suit. It is held that the disclosure of above mentioned particulars of Talb-iMuwathibat are essential under the classic Islamic law which were lacking in the petitioner's suit.
3. It is not disputed by the learned counsel that the plaint in the petitioner's pre-emption suit lacks the requisite details of date, time and venue for the pronouncement of the Talb-i-Muwathibat. In that background, the judgment of this Court given in Rehmat Ali's case (PLD 2014 SC 680) pronounces that the saving clause in section 35 of the Act 1991 does not apply to save the suit filed by the plaintiff in that case on 08.03.1987 from the requirements of section 6(2) of the Act 1991, namely, the obligation of the pre-emptor to prove Zaroorat or the avoidance of Zarar. The facts of Rehmat Ali's case (PLD 2014 SC 680) and the question arising for determination therein are entirely different from the facts of the present case. Consequently it may be observed at the outset that the said judgment relied emphatically by the learned counsel for the petitioner is distinguishable and therefore not germane for resolution of the controversy in the present case.
4. Having said that, it may be noted that the declaration made by the Shariat Appellate Bench of this Court in Government of N.W.F.P v. Said Kamal Shah (PLD 1986 SC 360) that the Punjab Pre- emption Act, 1913 is repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam came into effect from 31.07.1986. Article 203D(3) of the Constitution provides as follows: "203D(3). If any law or provision of law is held by the Court to be repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam, (a)...
(b) such law or provision shall, to the extent to which it is held to be so repugnant, cease to have effect on the day on which the decision of the Court takes effect," (emphasis supplied)
' Accordingly, under a Constitutional directive the Punjab Preemption Act, 1913 ceased to have effect from 31.07.1986 i.e,, the date fixed for effectiveness of the above said judgment by the learned Shariat Appellate Bench. The meaning of the expression "cease to have effect" in the context of the Article 203D is different from the meaning of the expression "repeal" under Article 264 of the Constitution. This view was expressed as follows in Jannat-ul-Haq v. Abbas Khan (2001 SCM R 1073): ' "Similarly operation of a law declared to be repugnant to the Injunctions of Quran and Sunnah or anything done or suffered there-under before a specified date or institution of a suit pending on the specified date also does not amount to the repeal law. There is a fine distinction between both the eventualities in so far as their respective implications are concerned. The implications of the expression "cease to have effect" occurring in Article 203D regarding Islamization of laws would be that special methodology in its post declaration juncture to be repugnant to the Injunctions of the Quran and Sunnah is provided therein. It is, therefore, concluded that Article 264 of the Constitution which governs the implication of repeal of law would not be attracted to the laws which are declared to be void on the ground of their being violative of fundaniental rights enshrined in the Constitution as in the case in hand."
5. The upshot of the foregoing judicial view is that with effect from the date fixed by the Shariat Appellate Bench for a repugnant law to cease to have effect, the ordinary incidents following from the repeal of a law are neither attracted nor followed. Accordingly, from the date of effectiveness of such a declaration, no accrued right nor incurred liability under the repugnant law can survive past the date of effectiveness of the declaration made under Article 203D of the Constitution.
6. In the foregoing background, any rights or liabilities created under the. Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913 cannot survive past the date fixed in Said Kamal Shah's case, namely 31.07.1986. It has been held in Safia Begum v. Ibrahim (PLD 1989 SC 314) that a suit filed during the interregnum, commencing 01.08.1986 until 28.03.1990 (whereafter ' Ordinance V of 1990 dated 29.03.1990 was enforced) the classic Islamic law governs the right of pre-emption of claimants. It follows that the rule of specification of particulars of Talb-i-Muwathibat under the classic Islamic law applies to the petitioner's suit filed during the said period. Specifically with reference to the provision of section 35(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 the judgment of the learned Shariat Appellate Bench reported as Haji Rana Muhammad Shabbir. Ahmed Khan v. Government of Punjab Province, Lahore (PLD 1994 SC 1) has held the said provision is repugnant to the Injunction of Islam "in so far it exempts the cases pending or instituted during the period from 01.08.1986 to 28.03.1990 from the requirement of Talb-i-Muwathibat and extends the right of limitation to them upto one year." The date of effectiveness of the declaration given in the said judgment was fixed as 31.12.1993. On that date the revived pre-emption suit filed by the petitioner was already pending adjudication before the learned civil Court which dismissed the same on 23.01.1996. The declaration of law made in Haji Rana Muhammad Shabbir Ahmed Khan v. Government of Punjab Province, Lahore (PLD 1994 SC 1) came into, force on 31.12.1993; accordingly before the petitioner's suit was decreed on 23.01.1996 the exemption given by section 35(2) of the Punjab Preemption Act, 1991 in respect of the pronouncement of Talb-i-Muwathibat ceased to have force.
7. As a result the judgment and decree passed id the petitioner's pre-emption suit on 23.01.1996 rightly applied the classic Islamic law as enshrined in the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991.
Consequently, the impugned judgment of the learned High Court dated 20.10.2015 has also applied the correct law. As such, we do not find any force in the objections raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The petition is dismissed and leave to appeal is refused.
' These are the reasons of our short order dated 10.03.2016.