WIQAR AHMAD, J.----Through this judgment, we intend to dispose of W.P. No. 654-M/2020, W.P. No. 655-M/2020, W.P. No. 1098-M/2020, W.P. No. 1139-M/2020, W.P. No. 1244-M/2020, W.P. No. 423-M/2020, W.P. No. 443- M/2020, W.P. No. 524-M/2020, W.P. No. 793-M/2020, W.P. No. 887-M/2020, W.P. No. 948-M/2020, COC No. 72- M/2020, W.P. No. 1028-M/2020 and W.P. No. 1191-M/2020. Petitioners in all these connected petitions are aggrieved of a number of final determinations for imposing of anti-dumping duties after finding the imports of Cold Rolled Coils/Sheets originating in or exported from the People's Republic of China and Ukraine as dumped, under the Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") read with Anti-Dumping Duties Rules, 2001.
The resultant definitive anti-dumping duties had been imposed for a period of five years at ad val value by respondent No. 2 i.e. National Tariff Commission. Details of the five final determinations impugned through the respective constitutional petitions may be briefly stated by reproducing a Para from one of the similar petitions in the case of "M/s. T ameer Steel Zone ", for ready reference; "That this petition is caused because the petitioner is aggrieved, firstly by the unlawful imposition of the Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties at ad val- value by Respondent-2 through the Notice of Final Determination A.D.O No. 35/2015 / NTC/CRC dated 19.01.2017 (the "Impugned Determination") on alleged dumped imports of "Cold Rolled Coils/Sheets" into Pakistan originating in and/or exported from the People's Republic of China and Ukraine (the "Exporting Countries") under the Anti-Dumping Duties Act,2015 (the "Anti-Dumping Act") read with the Anti-Dumping Duties, 2001 (the "Rules") , secondly by the unlawful imposition of the Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties for a period of five years at ad val value by Respondent-2 through the Notice of Final Determination A.D.O No. 37/2015 NTC/GC dated 08.02.2017 (the "Impugned Determination") on alleged dumped imports of "Galvan ized Steel Coils/Sheets" into Pakistan originating in and/or exported from the People's Republic of China (the "Exporting Country!') under the Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015 (the "Anti-Dumping Act") read with the Anti-Dumping Duties Rules, 2001 (the "Rules") and thirdly the petitioner is also aggrieved of Notice of Final Determination ADC No. 51/2017/NTC/CCCS dated 13.06.2018 (the "Impugned Determination") whereby Anti-Dumping Duties on alleged dumped imports of "Color Coated Steel Coils/Sheets" into Pakistan originating in and/or exported from the People's Republic of China and Republic of South Africa" (the "Exporting Countries') under the aforesaid provision of law, this petition."
2. Learned counsel appearing on behal f of National Tariff Commission raised a preliminary objection that the petitioners had an alternate remedy available to them under section 70 of the Act and thus their constitutional petitions have not been maintainable before this Court. In response, learned coun sel for petitioners submitted that a sub-constitutional legislation could not oust constitutional jurisdiction of this Court. They have also stated that the remedy of appeal provided under section 70 of the Act had been time-bound and that by now their appeals had got time barred, therefore the alternate reme dy may not prove efficacious and adequate for them. Mr. Isaac Ali Qazi one of the counsel for petitioners has also relied upon judgment of Hon'ble Suprem e Court of Pakistan rendered in the case of "Khalil Mehmood v. Collector of Custom, Custom House Lahore " reported as 1999 SCMR 1881 and contended that in said judgment Hon' ble Supreme Court had held that wher e the .very order is found to be patently illegal, void or wanting in jurisdiction, the fact that an alternate remedy had been available should not prevent the High Court from exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction. In rebuttal, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of National Tariff Commission submitted that due to the peculiar facts and circumstances that most of the petitioners have been belonging to the newly merged areas of erstwhile FATA and PATA, National Tariff Commission would not raise any objection over appeals of the petitioners being time barred. He added that though he would be opposing their petitions on merits but would not raise the plea of limitation before the appellate tribunal.
3. We have heard arguments on the question of maintainability of the instant writ petitions before this Court and perused the record.
4. There is no dispute regarding the fact that an alternate remedy is now availab le to petitioners. We have been informed that the appellate tribunal stood fully constituted according to the composition provided in section 64 of the Act. The appellate tribunal is by now fully functional, having lawful authority to consider pleas of the petitioners and grant the appropriate relief, if the petitioners were found entitled thereto. The petitioners can therefore have recourse to the remedy provided by section 70 of the Act. A remedy of further appeal before High Court has also been provided under subsection (13) of section 70 of the Act. Thus a robust and full-fledged mechanism for dispute resolution has been provided under the Act. In the case of "Commissioner of Income Tax, Companies-II and another v. Hamdard Dawakhana (Wad), Karachi" reported as PLD 1992 Supreme Court 847, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan has held in this regard; Before parting with the judgment we may observe that in cases where any party resorts to a statutory remedy against an order he cannot abandon or bypass it without any valid and reasonable cause and file Constitution petition challenging the same order . Such practice, in cases where statute provides alternate and efficacious remedy up to High Court, cannot be approved or encouraged . In a recent judgment of this Court in C.A. No.79-K of 1991, one of us (Ajmal Mian, J.) in similar situation observed as follows: "We may now revert to the question, whether the appellant was justified to file above Constitution petition against the order of the Tribunal instead of invoking section 136 of the Ordinance for making a reference to the High Court. According to Mr. Rehan Naqvi, a reference under the above provision would not have been adequate and efficacious remedy as it would have taken years before it could have been heard. The same could be true for a Constitution Petition. The tendency to bypass the remedy provided under the relevant statute and to press into service Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court has developed lately , which is to be discouraged. However , in certa in cases invoking of Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court instead of availing of remedy provided for under the relevant statute may be justified, for example when the impugned order/action is palpably without jurisdiction and/or mala fide. To force an aggrieved person in such a case to approach the forum provided under the relevant statute may not be just and proper ."
Similarly in the case of "Collector of Customs, Lahore and others v. University Gateway Trading Corporation and another " reported as 2005 SCMR 37 the Hon'ble apex Court has also observed; "A bare perusal of the said order woul d reveal that search was conducted in view of strong apprehension of removal of the suspected smuggled goods. Notices under section .171 of the Customs Act, 1969, were also served upon the respondents. In our view , all the legal formalities were completed by the Customs.
Authorities before searching the godown and registration of case against the respondents, which hardly warrants interference by the High Court in its Constitutional jurisdiction because "Superior Courts should not involve themselves into a thorough probe or in-depth investigation of disputed questions of fact which necessitate taking of evidence. In depth investigation can conveniently and appropriately be done by the forums available in the hierarchy -- Constitutional jurisdiction is primarily meant to provide expeditious and efficacious remedy in a case where illegality , impropriety and flagrant violation of law regarding action of the authority is apparent and can be established without any comprehensive inquiry into complicated, ticklish, controversial and disputed facts -- controversial questions cannot be decided by High Court in exercise of powers as conferred upon it under Art.199 of the Constitution."
Further ahead in the said judgment it was also observed; "It hardly needs any elaboration that "where a particular statute provides a self-contained machinery for the determination of questions arising under the statute where law prov ides a remedy by appeal or revision to another Tribunal fully competent to give any relief, any indulgence to the contrary by the High Court is bound to produce a sense of distrust in-statutory Tribunals Petitioner without exhausting his remedy provided by the statute filed Constitutional petition . Constitutional petition, in circumstances, was not maintainable." Resolution of dispute in the cases in hand also, requires a thorough probe and in-depth investigations of disputed questions of fact, as the impugned orders had been passed after investigations under Part-VIII of the Act wherein it had been found that the subject goods had been dumped by the countries of their origins. The appellate tribunal established in the case would be in a better position to call for record of the investigations and see whether same had been carried out according to law and whether the Investigating Authorities had reached a correct conclusion on the basis of evidence before it or not. Further reliance in this respect may also be placed on judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of "Jawed Malik v. The State " reported as 2005 SCMR 49 and the case of "Chief Administrator of Auaaf v. Muham mad Ramzan and others " reported PLD 1991 Supreme Court 102.
5. Regarding reliance of learned counsel for petitioners on judgment of Hon'ble apex Court in the case of "Khalid Mehmood v. Collector of Custom, Custom House Lahore" reported as 1999 SCMR 1881 , it is not disputed that existence of an alternate remedy do not totally oust jurisdiction of the High Court in a case where the impugned order is patently illegal, void or wanting In Jurisdiction and further recourse to an alternate remedy is found counterproductive, inadequate or in-efficacious, the High Court may itself intervene in the matter and nip the evil in the bud, but it has parallely been explained in said judgment that adequacy of an alternate remedy should always attract the attention of the High Court. Further ahead it had also been observed by august Supreme Court in said judgment; There are other matters, however , where the Constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 cannot be so readily resorted to. One such, falling in this category , would be matters amenable to the jurisdiction of an exclusive Tribunal, mandated by the Constitution itself. Another , which readily comes to the mind, would be disputes under a statute, postulating the appellate or revisional jurisdiction to reside either in the High Court itself or directly in the Supreme Court. An example, essentially relevant to the first, would be the Service Tribunal where the Tribunal is mandated by the Constitution of Pakistan namely , Article 212, thereof and where an appeal lies directly from the Tribunal's decision to the Supreme Court. Obviously , the High Court should be very slow in entertaining disputes covered by the jurisdiction of such a Tribunal even in matters where the High Court's jurisdiction cannot be taken away e.g. acts which are void, without jurisdiction or coram non judice. In such cases of ouster , the High Court would consider it a better- exercise of its discretion not to interfere. More or less a similar principle applies where an exclusive Tribunal or a regular Court has jurisdiction in a matter but the legislation, creating such Court or forum or conferring jurisdiction on the same, also ends up by providing appellate or revisional jurisdiction to the High Court itself.
In the cases in hand also not only the remedy of appeal before the appellate tribunal has been provided under subsection (1) of section 70 of the Act but a further appeal before High Court also lies under subsection (13) of section 70 of the Act. We have no reason to dub the said mechanism for resolution of alternate dispute as Ineffective or in-efficacious. Moreso, when learned counsel for respondents has also undertaken before this Court on behalf of his client that objection to the instant petitions being time barred would not be raised before the appropriate tribunal.
6. In light of what has been discussed above, all these connected writ petition s are therefore converted into appeals and shall be deemed to have been filed before the appropriate tribunal under subsection (1) of section 70 of the Act on the dates of filing of constitu tional petitions before this Court. Office is directed to transmit record of all these petitions before the tribunal, in original and shall retain copy of the same for the purpose of record of this Court. Respective petitioners are directed to appear before the Worthy tribunal on 20.12.2020. The consignments already cleared on receipt of post-dated cheques or bank guarantees, without payment of anti-dumping duties at import stage, in pursuance to interim orders of this Court passed in the writ petitions, shall be subject to final determinations of the appellate tribunal in the respective converted appeals. Till then neither the post-dated cheques nor bank guarantees shall be enchased by the relevant authorities.
7. Since main writ petitions have been disposed of, C.Ms Nos.806-M, 948-M, 988-M, 1396-M, 1397-M and 1534-M of 2020 as well as C.O.C. No. 72-M of 2020 have therefore become infructuous and same are disposed of accordingly .