MUHAMMAD JAWED ZAKARIA, JUDICIAL MEMBER .----The appeal has been filed by the taxpayer/appellant assailing the appellate order passed by learned CIR(A) vide Order No.19 of 2018 dated 14.12.2018 wherein _amended order passed under section 122(5A) by ADCIR has been confirmed.
2. The learned A.R of the appellant Mr. Arshad Siraj, Advocate has raised following grounds while assailing aforesaid orders.
GROUND OF APPEAL 1) That the Order of the learned Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals-IV), Karachi/Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue. Audit Range-B, Zone-I, Large T axpayers Unit-II, Karachi, is bad in law and on facts.
2) That the . Order of learned Commis sioner Inland Revenue, (Appeals-IV), Karachi/Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue, Audit Range-B, Zone-I, Large Taxpayers Unit-II, Karachi is illegal, ultra vires, void and without any justification.
3) That the learned Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals-IV) has erred in law and on facts in confirming the order passed under subsection (5A) of Section 122 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 wizen Order made under section 122(1) was neither erroneous nor prejudicial to the interest of revenue.
4) That the learned Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals-IV) has seriously erred in law and on facts in confirming the order passed under section 122(5A) when the said order was based on misinterpretation of provision of section 1 13 of the Income T ax Ordinance, 2001.
5) That the learned Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals-IV) has erred in law and on facts in confirming the order passed under section 122(5A) when the said appellate order is based on misinterpretation of section 1 13.
6) That the computation of income and tax is not in accordance with law .
7) That the appellant, therefore, prays that the order passed under section 122 (SA) and the appellate order be declared illegal and said orders may kindly be annulled and appeal may kindly be allowed.
8) That the appellant, further prays that it may be allowed to vary, amend or add to the above grounds before or at the time of the hearing of the appeal.
BRIEF F ACTS
3. Brief facts of the case as gleaned from the impugned orders are that appellant is engaged in the business of manufacturing items of stationery . The deemed assessment order under section 120 was amended under section 122(1) by DCIR on 17.08.2015. In such assessment under section 122(1), the DCIR computed the taxable income and tax payable under the normal and final tax regime in the following manner .
Declared Income Rs. 12,021,479/- Less: WWF Rs. 565,189/- Normal/Declared Taxable IncomeRs. 1 1,456,290/- Add: Additions as per amended orderRs.496,300/- Amended Taxable Income Rs. 1 1,952,590/- Tax Payable @ 35% Rs.4,183,407/- Add: WWF Rs.565,189/- Total Tax Payable Rs.4,748,596/- Tax liability on the basis of turnover under section 1 13Rs.3,326,825/- Tax Liability on Amended Taxable Income Payments and Adjustments:Rs.4,748,596/- Less: Tax Paid WWF Rs.565,189/- Available un-Adjusted Tax under section 1 13(2)(c)
For Tax year 2010 Rs.1,960,136/- For Tax year 201 1 Rs. 2,540,824/- Total Unadjusted Tax under section 1 13(2)(c)Rs. 4,500,960/- Total Tax (including WWF) Rs. 5,066,149/- Balance Tax under section 113(2)(c) to be carried forward Computation of FTR Income TaxRs. 317,554/- Receipt V alue of FTR Rs.125,442,127/- Tax Payable on FTR receipts Rs.1,254,421/- Less: Tax Collected/Deducted as Final TaxRs. 1,245,173/- Tax Short Collected/Deducted as Final TaxRs.9,248/- Balance Tax under section 113(2)(c) to be carried ForwardedRs. 317,553/- Less: Tax Short Collected/Deducted as FinalRs. 9,248/- Tax Net Balance Tax under section 113(2)(c) to be carried forwardedRs.308,305/- Tax paid as per Annexure-C-1 Rs.7,451,170/- Tax Collected/Deducted as Final TaxRs .1,245,173/- Total Tax paid during the year Rs. 8,696,343/- Balance Tax Refundable Rs.7,451,170/- Net Balance Tax under section 113(2)(c) to be carried forward for TY 2011Rs.308,305/-
4. The ADCIR, Range-B, Zone-I, Large Taxpayers Unit-II, Karachi issued a show-cause notice under section 122(5A) dated 20.11.2017 in which he opined that computation of taxable income and tax payable thereon reproduced above is erroneous in so far as it was prejudicial to the interest of revenue. The proceedings were culminated by passing the order under section 122(5A) ibid. Being aggrieved from the order passed by the ADCIR, the taxpayer filed appeal before the learned CIR (A), who vide order mentioned supra, confirmed the order of the ADCIR, hence the instant appeal before this Tribunal.
AN OVER VIEW
5. It will be beneficial to have a look to the reasoning and_ the findings in order to decide the appeal in hand. In the show-cause notice in paragraph (1), the ADCIR gave following reasons for treating the order passed by DCIR under section 122(1) as erroneous in so far as prejudicial to the interest of revenue.
"01 Adjustment of tax under section 113(2) (c) of the Ordinance Provision of Section 113(2)(c) are reproduced as under: "where tax paid under subsection (1) exceeds the actual tax payable under Part-I, Division II of the First Schedule, the excess amount of tax paid shall be carried forward for adjustment against tax liability under the aforesaid Part of the subsequent tax year: Provided that the amount under this clause shall be carried forward and adjusted against tax liability for five tax years immediately succeeding the tax year which the amount was paid."
8. The aforesaid provision of law clearly stipulates that excess amount of tax paid under section 113 is adjustable only against the "tax payable under Part 1, Division II of the First Schedule", wher eas, as per said computation of tax; assessing officer has adjusted excess amount of tax under section 113(2) (c) against the minimum tax payable on declared under subsection (1) of Section 113 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, besides, amount of Workers'
Welfare Fund was also adjusted against the excess tax under section 13(2)(c). Thus, adjustment of tax under section 113(2)(c) against the minimum tax under section 113(1) and WWF has resulted in undue refund on account of WHT claimed as per return for the Tax Year 2013".
6. After receiving the reply from the appe llant which has been reproduced in the body of the order under section 122 (5A), the ADCIR gave the following finding which is also reproduced for the sake of easy reference.
"The explanation and relevant provisions of law were carefully examined. The undersigned does not agree with the learned A.R on first issue. The working of erroneous amended order has already been given in the show-cause notice. The proper working of tax for the tax year under discussion should be as under; Amended normal taxable income Rs. 1 1,952,590/- Tax chargeable @ 35% Rs. 4,183,407/- Minimum tax chargeable under section 1 13 Rs. 3,326,825/- Amount available for adjustment of Minimum tax for T ax Year 2010 under section 1 13(2)(c)Rs. 856,582/- The net tax payable for T ax year 2013 Rs. 3,326,825/- Add: WWF Rs. 565,189/- Rs.3,892,014/- The FTR liability and tax have not been considered here. As the taxpayer has alrea dy adjusted and obtained refund of taxes pad at source, so ef fect is not given here.
The second issue of tax deduction under section 148 as adjustable for the taxpayer being manufacturer has been accepted. However , the ef fect is not given here because the taxpayer has already obtained refund of it.
As present, the amount of Rs. 3,892,014/- is payable by the taxpayer for Tax Year 2013."
7. Perusal of the record further shows that the appellant throughout in the proceedings under section 122(5A) as well as well in appeal before the learned CIR(A) contested the issue by stating that the action is without justification and is based upon misinterpretation of the provisions of clause (c) of subsection (2) of section 1 13.
ARGUMENTS OF THE LEARNED A.R.
8. The learned AR for the appellant Mr. Arshad Siraj Advocate re-iterated the contentions and submitted that the scheme of law in question has been misin terpreted by the ADCIR and has been wrongly confirmed by CIR (A) as in the impugned order the ADCIR has perversely and by misinterpreting the provisions of clause (c) of subsection (2) of section 113, has denied the adjustment of the excess amount paid by the appellant under subsection (1) of section 113, for Tax years 2010 and 2011 by taking the difference of tax chargeable for the year under consideration i.e. Tax year 2013 under Part-I of Division-II, of the First Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 and tax computed under Section 1 13 for the year under consideration.
9. The learned A.R. invited our attention to the scheme of law and submitted that through the provisions of clause
(c) of subsection (2) of the section 113 it was provided that where tax paid under subsection (1) of section 113 (minimum tax on turnover) exceeds the actual tax payable under Part-I, Division-II of the First Schedule the excess amount of tax paid shall be carried forwa rd for adjustment against tax liability under Part-I, Division-II, of the First Schedule of the subsequent tax years. He also referred to the proviso which provides that the amount under clause
(c) of subsection (2) referred above shall be carried forward and adjusted against the tax liability for Five (5) Tax years immediately succeeding the tax under for which the amount i.e. (minimum turnover tax under subsection (1) of section 113) was paid. He therefore, vehemently argued that the action of ADCIR is not inconsonance with sprit of clause (c) of subsection (2) of section 1 13.
10. The learned counsel further contende d that principles of interpretation of fiscal statute that words in the statute have to be read in their plain meaning and nothing can be added, subtracted or implied to arrive at desired interpretation while relying upon judgments of Hon'ble High Court of Sindh in case reported in 2001 PTD 2169 and 2010 PTD 592 he submitted that any interpretation arriving at without any statutory basis is not permissible he therefore, submitted that action is without jurisdiction and order under section 122(A) and Appellate Order confirming the same may be vacated.
ARGUMENTS OF THE LEARNED D.R
11. On the other hand, the learned D.R has strongly supported the orders of the officers below . He submitted that the action of the learned ADCIR duly confirmed by CIR (A) is within the jurisdiction and that the order under section
(1) passed by DCIR was erroneous in so far as prejudicial to the interest of revenue as much as that the DCIR adjusted Rs.65,189/- which pertain to levy of W orkers W elfare Fund.
OPINION / FINDINGS OF THE COURT
12. We have examined the issue in hand and have found that the provisions of clause (c) of subsection (2) of Section 113 have been misunderstood and misinterpreted which makes the action without jurisdiction with the exception that the DCIR wrongly adjusted levy of Workers Welfare Fund from the excess amount available to the appellant.
13. In arriving at such conclusion firstly it has to be seen i.e. what is the scope of clause (c) of subsection (2) of section 113 and Section 113. Section 113 applies to a resident company , and individual (having turnover of fifty million rupees or above in the Tax year 2009 or in any subsequent Tax year) and an association of person (having turnover of fifty million rupees or above in the tax year 2007 or any subsequent tax year) where for any reason allowed under Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 including any other law for time being in force. a) loss for the year; b) the setting of f of a loss of an early year; c) exemption from tax; d) the application credit/rebates; or e) the claiming of allowances or deductions (including depreciation and amortization deduction.
14. 14o tax is payable or paid by the person for a tax Year is less than one-half per cent of the amount representing the person's turnover from all sources for that year .
15. A proviso incorporated in subsection (1) is not being commented upon as same is not relevant to the issue in hand. Subsection (2) gives the application of entire section 113. Clause (a) of subsection (2) 'provides that the aggregate of the person's turnover as defined in subsection (3) for the Tax year shall be treated as the income of the person per year chargeable to tax. Clause (b) of subsection (2) provides that the person shall pay as income tax for the tax year (instead of the actual tax payable under Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 an amount equal to one- half per cent of the person's turnover for the year. Clause (c) of the subsection (2) is the clause which is relevant which speaks that where tax paid under subsection (1) exceeds the actual tax payable under Part-I, Division-II of the First Schedule, the excess amount of tax paid shall be carried forward or adjustment against tax liability under the aforesaid Part i.e. Part-I, Division-II of the First Schedule of the subsequent tax year. Proviso to clause (c) of subsection (2) provides that the amount under the clause (c) shall be carried forward and adjusted against tax liability for Five (5) tax years immediately succeeding the tax year for which the amount was paid.
16. After examining the above statutory provisions and the record we found that the appellant had unadjusted tax under the clause (c) of subsection (2) of section 1 13 for two tax years namely 2010 and 201 1 respectively .
17. The DCIR adjusted such carried forward excess amount from the tax liability arrived at by making amended assessment under section 122(1) and made adjustment of tax paid under subsection (1) of section 113 to the tax liability worked out for the year under consideration computed under Part-I, Division-II of the First Schedule. In course of such adjustment he also adjusted levy of W orkers W elfare Fund of Rs.565,189/-.
18. The ADCIR treated such adjustment as erroneous in so far as prejudicial to the interest of revenue in tctal disregard of the spirit of provision of clause (2) of subsection (2) of section 113. In entirely disregard, the ADCIR made the adjustment of tax chargeable under Part-I, Division-II of the First Schedule and reduced the same from the minimum tax chargeable under section 113 for the year under consideration and held that the difference between two is available for adjustment of minimum tax for tax year 2010 under clause (c) of subsection (2) of section 1 13.
19. As observed above, the entire action is based upon misreading and misinterpretation of the statutory provision in hand. At this stage the judgment cited by the learned AR becomes very relevant and we respectfully following the same state that it is cardinal principle of the interpretation of statute that the courts are merely supposed to interpret the law as it is and have no authority to add, delete or subtract any word in or from the language used by the legislature and in a taxing statute a tax on any person is to be levied by clear and unambiguous word and the expression used in the charging sections are not to be stretched by any process of interpretation, as to bring a person within the tax net not falling under the clear and plain language of the statute. Reliance is placed on in the case of Messrs Indus Benson & Co. v. Commissioner Income Tax reported as 2002 PTD 2169 , in the case of Collector of Sales Tax v. Abbot Laboratories Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. reported in 2010 PTD 592 (as referred by the learned AR) and to the cited decision of CIT Karachi v. W.J. Towel Agencies reported as 2006 PTD 1709 in the case of Pakistan Petroleum Ltd. v. CIT 2009 PTD 662 and judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Federation of Pakistan v. Zeal Pak Cement Factory Limited reported as 1985 SCMR 1968 and the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Mess rs Hirjina & Co. Pakistan Ltd. Karachi v . Commissioner Sales T ax reported as 1971 SCMR 128 .
20. In view of above discussion both the order of lower fora are vacated to the extent of adjustment of carried forward of excess amount available to the appellant Under clause (c) of subsection (2) of section 113, as very fairly conceded by the learned A.R for the appe llant that adjustment of levy of WWF from such available excess amount was not correct. The appeal is decided accordingly .
21. After surveying long chain of the judgments available on the subject following principles of interpretation are emerged: It is a settled principle that law is to be interpreted and applied rationally , justly , fairly and not arbitrarily . Plain reading of provision if unambiguous is to be adopted in its true sense without importing any extraneous provision or consideration.
Reasonable definiteness and certainty is required in statutes and reasonable certainty is sufficient. Reasonable precision and not absolute precision or meticulous or mathematical exactitude is required in the drafting of statutes, particularly as regards those dealing with social and economic problems.
Best rule of interpretation of a statute is to look into the purpose of law for which it is enacted/made, which was called "purposive approach".
Provision of a statute ought to be construed in the first instance according to their plain grammatical meaning.
When more than one meaning can be attributed to a word in a statute, the mean ing which is in consonance with the scheme of the statute is to be assigned to it and not the meanings which runs counter to it.
No superfluity or redundancy is to be attributed to the Legislature or to any provision of law rather the wisdom of the legislature.
In case of any conflict of two provisions, the rule of harmonious interpretation is followed unless there are compelling circumstances cqr necessity for doing so.
Redundancy cannot ordinarily be read in to the statutory provision but such presumption can differ from case to case. No redundancy can be attributed to the use of any word or phrase incorpora te in any particular provision of law by the legislature. Each word of statute is entitled to be given meaning and no part of it is to be treated as redundant. Redundancy to a letter of law cannot be readily presumed particularly when the words do not lead to an absurdity or confusion. Law of interpretation of statute loathes inferring redundancy of an existing statute or a statutory provision. If no meaning is given to an word in relevant law, then such a word is to be given ordinary dictionary meaning. Redundancy in legislation is to be avoided and only such interpretation is to be made as would be calculated to suppress the mischief and to advance the remedy . Courts must make every effort not to make redundant any part of the statute and must if necessary , stretch language so as to give it some meaning justified by context and object before Legislature.
Each word used in statute is to be read as integral part thereof, carrying meaning, if in the circumstances not impracticable, which is assigned to it in Ordinance parlance. Such sense is to be made on whole as that no clause, sentence or word shall prove superfluous , void or insignificant, if by any construction they may all be made useful and pertinent. Reasonable construction to be adopted instead of treating any clause as if it did not exist at all.
While interpreting a provision of statute, Court has to read the provision as it exists and to deduce or infer the meaning in accordance with the existing test of the word or particular provision.
It is well established that the intention of the Legislature must be found by reading the statute as a whole. The rule is referred to as an "elementary rule" by Viscount Simonds, a "complete rule" by Lord Somervell and a "settled rule" by Mukherjee, J. agreeing, Lord Haisbury , said, "that you must look at the whole instrument in as much as there may be in accuracy and inconsistency; you must, if you can, ascertain what is the meaning of the instrument taken as a whole in order to give effect, if it be possible to do so, the intention of the framer of it [(1888) 13 AC 294]. As added by Lord Davey , "every clause of a statute should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses of the Act so as, as far as possibl e to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute or series of statute relating to the subject matter".
The Court must ascertain the attention of the Legislature by directing-its attention not merely to the clauses to be construed but to the entire statutes; it must compare the clause with the other parts of the law, and the setting in which the clause to be interpreted occurs.
Statute is to be read as a whole in its context and a provision is not to be read in isolation until and unless provided to be otherwise. An attempt has to be made by the Court to first reconcile where clauses for a rational meaning while avoiding redundancy to any part thereof. In order to ascertain the true intent of Legislature and the purpose and purport of legislation, the entire statute is to be considered in its totality . Unless and until there is clear cut conflict which is irreconcilable, the Court should lean in favour of a harmonious interpretation so as to avoid any conflict and keep the laws operating in their occupied field in order to avoid any provision becoming redundant or surplus.
While interpreting a provision of a statute, Court will not read into it something which has not been provided for and the words are to be construed in their ordinary meanings unless the words and phrases are of technical legislation which are to be construed in their techn ical meanings, if they have acquired one, otherwise they are also to be construed in their ordinary meaning.
The words and phrases should be assigned ordinary dictionary meanings unless they are defined in the relevant statute with the presumption that the Legislature has used every word in the statute with full consciousness and knowing the connotation of each word and more particularly when a word has been defined by Legislature itself in the interpretation clause. Extraneous considerations cannot be employed to make it redundant or to detract it from meaning which it conveys. The Court should presume that no part of it was intended to be meaningless and that the provisions of statute could not have been intended to operate against each other .
Statute to be interpreted so as to prevent a provision from being unintelligible, absurd or totally unreasonable, unworkable or totally irreconcilable with rest of statute. Pre-existing law to be kept in view to ascertain real import of statute.
Where a specific procedure provided for exercising jurisdiction for imposing pena lty under statute, such provision considered mandatory and compliance with such provisions is essential to validity of order or proceedings. In case of plain language of statute, there is no alternative but to give ef fect to the same.
While interpreting certain provision of law, the Court cannot insert which Legislature never intended to nor the Court can sit in judgment over the authority of Legislature by interpreting such provision in a way which Legislature never intended to. Court has no authority to supply deficiency . in the language of law. It is an established principle of interpretation of statute that plain/literal and grammatical construction is applied subject to the qualification that the language is to be subordinate or is given a restricted meaning when it is opposed 'to the object or scheme of the statute or may lead to illogical, absurd or unconstitutional result. Where the Legislature has taken notice of a particular situation and has enacted a law to provide relief, then the legislative intent must be given effect to and cannot be ignored. For determining the intention of the Legislature, one has to look to the preamble and if necessary to the history of the Legislature.
Where law prescribed something to be done in a particular manner , it has to be done in that manner and not another . Provision of law cannot be interpreted in isolation, ignoring the progressive trend of time. While discovering the true meanings one must have regard to the enactment as a whole, to its object and to the scope and effect of the provisions. Even if two laws needed equal consideration, the law more specific to the issue, is to be preferred. Provisions of every part/section of statute are to be construed in their true perspective.
While interpreting any provision of statute, plain meanings of the expression and the words used in statute, shall be adhered to and no other meaning shall be deduced therefrom which is not available from a plain reading of the expression and the words used in the statute.
Interpreting any provision of law, all the provision of act or rules should be taken in to consideration in order to avoid any conflict in interpretation of its provisions because provision of law as a whole are to be applied in a harmonious manner . Court has to interp ret the law and rules as they are, but not as they should be. It must construe the statute in a manner which helps to attain the positive result which the Legislature intended to achieve by enacting the statute. Ordinarily a word or phrase used in one section of a statute is not construed disjunctively from the same word or phrase used in another section as by doing so it can lead to an erroneous conclusion resulting in defeat of Legislature intent. Expression used in next paragraphs or section is not be to detached for purpose of interpretation, but is to be considered together more so, when the same is found mutually dependent.
Court should lean in favour of finding possible explanation to uphold rather than destroy legislation.
Consistency is the cornerstone of the administration of justice. It is consistency which creates confidence in the system and this consistency can never be achieved without respect for the rule of finality . It is with a view to achieve consistency in judicial pronouncements, the course have evolved the rule of precedents, principle of stare decisis etc. The rules and principles are based on public policy and if there are not followed by courts there will be chaos in the administration of justice.
22. Further , following principles of interpretation can be evolved for the interpretation of statute, keeping in view the various pronouncement of superior courts:
(i) A statute may not be extended for interpretation in the manner , for which, it is never intended.
(ii) When a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular form, it necessarily includes in itself in negative viz. that thing should not be done otherwise.
(iii) Statute should be so interpreted to advance remedy and suppress mischief.
(iv) When a statute provides than for an act that something shall be deem to have been done which infact and in truth is not done, the Court is entitled and bound to ascertain for what purpose and between what persons the statutory fiction is to be resorted to.
(v) Where a statute provides for exception to general rules and allows impairment of rights of parties through executive action, then all conditions for its ef fectiveness must be established.
(vi) Where a statute is capable of two interpretations, the one that favours the subject is to be preferred, reasoning being that the statute is framed by the State having dominating and commanding position as against the subject.
(vii) Where section admits of only one reasonable meaning, Court is not authorized to give any other meaning except which flows from the section.
(viii) While construing a statutory provis ion, each word is to be given meaning and is not to be twisted into a meaning which it cannot bear or results in irrationality or absurdity . Irrationality or absurdity cannot be attributed to the legislature.
(ix) While enacting a law , legislature is presumed to know the existing state of law .
(x) Courts can interpret the provisions of law but cannot change or substitute such provisions and also cannot go beyond the wisdom of law .
(xi) Court while applying a particular law should take in to consideration the object for which it has been enacted.
Law should be interpreted in a manner which may advance the object and suppres s the mischief for which it might have been enacted and not in the manner which may defeat its object.
(xii) General terms following particular ones apply only to such persons or things as are ejusdem generic with those comprehended in the language of the Legislature.
(xiii) Whole purpose of the legislation is' also to be kept in the view to determine whether the duty cast is of absolute nature or of directory nature.
(xiv) If there is some doubt in respect of a state of the law, Parliament may decide to pass a declaratory Act, setting out what the law is.
(xv) When a statute directs things to be done by a private person within spec ified time and makes his rights dependent on proper performance thereof, unless the failure to perform in time may injure the public or individuals, the statute is mandatory .
(xvi) Law should be interpreted in such a manner that same should have been saved rather than destroyed. It is to be interpreted and applied in the spirit which has led to the enactment of the said law .
(xvii) In the absence of clear intention of legislature to apply provision of a statute with retrospective effect,, same would be deemed applicable prospectively .
(xviii) Working paper prepared by the Federal Minister of Law can be taken in to consideration while making interpretation of statute.
(xix) Neither the Court nor any other quasi judicial authority can extend or reduce the application of a provision of law under the garb of interpretation. Intendments expressed by law makers as a result of natural meaning of a provision can never be ignored and one is not allowed to enter into the legislation through interpretation.
(xx) Court can interpret the provisions of law but cannot change or substitute such provisions and also cannot go beyond the wisdom of law .
(xxi) While extending a law it is required to specifically refer to the amendments already made or at least some language to that ef fect is to be used.
(xxii) Court is bound to interpret a statutory provision as it is, and not as it should be.
(xxiii) Court while interpreting a law has to find intention of law makers from words used in the statute.
(xxiv) Statute must be read as an organ ic whole and should be interpreted in a manner so as to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy . The language of law is to be read in its natural meanings and not to add anything beyond intendment.
(xxv) Best method of interpretation would be to remain within the language of law and not to extend its meaning by way of interpretation.
(xxvi) Where ordinary meanings can be gathered to the clear and plain unambiguous language of an enactment, the same are to be followed without any addition.
(xxvii) While construing a law or its provisions, the legislative history and progression of law assumes significant importance.
(xxviii) While framing a new enactment, Legislature is well aware of the law in field.
(xxix) W ords used by Legislature would be read and understood in plain and ordinary meanings.
(xxx) Where a statute is ex facie discriminatory but is also capable of being administered in a discriminatory manner and it appears that it is actually being administered to the detriments of a particular class in particular , unjust and oppressive manner then it has been void ab initio since its inception.
(xxxi) In a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Famous dictum of Rowlatt J. in Cape Brandy Syndicate v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue . The interpretational rule is if a person sought to be taxed, can only be taxed, when he comes within the letter of the law. The Honorable Supreme Court of Pakistan, in case of Sohail Jute Mills Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1991 SC 329 at 341, has approved the dictum of Rowlatt J.
In this regard, V. refer to 2008 PTD 1420 CIR v. Idrees Cloth Home @ Para 27, wherein the same principle was adopted and followed by the Honorable Supreme Court of Pakistan, in the case of Eli Lilly Pakistan [Pvt.] Limited 2009 SCMR 1279 = 2009 PTD 1392 .
(xxxii) While interpreting the statute, the words in the statute have to be read in plain meaning and no words should be added or deleted. The law has to be interpreted, as it is and the Courts have no authority to add, delete, subtract any word, in or from language used in the statute. While interpreting a provision of statute, Court has to read the provision as it exits and to deduce or infer the meaning in accordance with the existing test or the words or particular provision. Court is not suppose d to add or to subscript any words from any provision of statute while interpreting a provision so as to give same meaning other than the one which obviously and plainly follows or can be inferred from it. A taxing statute shou ld be interpreted in such a manner so that taxes should be recovered without any complication and while charging tax, there should not be any doubt concerning method adopted. to achieve such object. A subject will be taxed only if he falls within the strict letter of charging section (xxxiii) The first and the foremost principle of interpretation is that words are to be taken in their literal meaning. The plain ordinary meaning of the word is to be adopted in construing a document, There have to be special circumstances where this principle is to be deviated.
(xxxiv) There is no reason to depart from the general rule that words used in a statute must first be given their ordinary and natural meaning.
(xxxv) Interpreting the taxing statute, the Courts must look to the words of the statute and interpret it in the light of what is clearly expressed. It cannot import provisions in the statute so as to support assumed deficiency .
(xxxvi) Where the statute's meaning is clear and explicit, words cannot be interpolated. In the first place, in such a case, they are not needed. If they shoul d be interpolated, the statute would more than likely fail to express the legislative intent.
(xxxvii) When a statute imposes a tax or professes to levy a charge, such statute is to be given a narrow construction.
(xxxviii) Ambiguity in such statute to be resolved in favour of citizen or subject. Two interpretations, if possible, interpretation which was favourable to citizen or subject to be adopted.
(xxxix) Clear and unambiguous language to be employed by Legislature or law-making authority .
(xl) No loom for any intendment, no equity about tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied
(xli) Provisions of such statutes to be strictly construed and should be interpreted in manner which is more favourable to the subject. No equity about, or presumption as to tax, to be read in taxing statute and nothing is to be implied but one can only look fairly at language used in the statute.
(xlii) Imposition, levy of recovery of tax a kinds of penalty , therefore, in case of any ambiguity in a taxing provision which is open to two constructions, one favouring the Revenue Department and the other favouring the taxpayers the one which favour the latter shall be acted upon.
23. In view of above discussion and on the basis of principles enumerated in the above cited cases , both the order of lower fora are vacated to the extent of adjustment of carried forward of excess amount available to the appellant under clause (c) of subsection (2) of section 113 for the reason that the said clause (c) provides for carry forward of excess amount of tax paid in terms of section 113(1) for adjustment against tax liability under Part I of First Schedule for the subsequent tax year. The said adjustment is not restricted to the difference between minimum tax liability and normal tax liability for the subsequent tax year. As far as the adjustment of levy of WWF from such available excess amount of minimum tax, we agree that the said treatment was not correct as very frankly conceded by the learned A.R for the appellant.
24. Resultantly , the appeal of the taxpayer stands disposed of f in the manner indicated above.