MUHAMMAD IRSHAD KHAN (MEMBER).-The appellant, a Senior Accountant (Grade-16) in the Department of Pakistan Post Offices, was appointed, without formal promotion, to act as Junior Accounts Officer, a Grade-17 post. He worked as such during the period from 9-7-1974 to 24-6-1977, for which he was allowed to draw pay in N. P. S-17 as would have been admissible to him, on his promotion to the said post. But his pay was restricted to the minimum meaning thereby that he would not be entitled to annual increments in N. P. S.-17 during the said period. When the appellant was informed of this decision vide Department's letter, dated the 1601 June, 1980, he submitted 4 representation to the President of Pakistan, on 5-7-1980 through proper channel but by Department's Memo--randum dated 25-10-1980, it was intimated to him that his said petition to the President bad been withheld under para. 7 (11) of the petitions instruc--tions. He then-filed the present appeal in this Tribunal.
2. It was mainly contended on behalf of the appellant that on his admission to N. P. S.-17 he became entitled to periodical increments unless they were withheld by an order of competent authority as a punishment. Reliance has been placed amongst others on section 17 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) which provides that a civil servant appointed to a post or grade shall be entitled, in accordance with the rules, to the pay sanctioned for such post or grade, which expression, according to the learned counsel for the appellant, shall always mean the pay as raised from time to time with the periodical increments. It was, therefore, submitted that the appellant was entitled to annual increments also for the period from 9-7-1974 to 24-6-1977.
3. On the other hand, reliance has been first placed on behalf of the respondent-department on the following observation made by the honour--able Supreme Court in the case of-Qazi Abdul Karim :- "After all if an employee is promoted to officiate in a higher post, involving higher responsibility, he must be held to be entitled to the minimum pay of the said grade of the said higher office."
4. It has, with respect, to be pointed out that the above observation was made by the honourable Supreme Court in its judgment whereby the petition of the Government for leave to appeal in the said case was rejected. I would venture to state that the observations made by the honourable Supreme Court in an order refusing leave to appeal, though are entitled to very highest respect, are neither a decision on a question of law nor an enunciation of a principle of law. Such incidental observations, not being the law enunciated, have no binding effect in other cases. Indeed, it is a cardinal principle of interpretation of judicial decisions that a judgment of/ a Court is meant to apply to the facts of a particular case in which it was given and can have but little weight in a case of which the facts are differrent. And let me add that the Supreme Court in the case of Hamida Bano v. Ashiq Hussain (PLD 1963 S. C 109) have pointedly warned that everything said by the Supreme Court in a judgment must be understood with great particularity as having been said with reference to the facts of that particular case. It thus seems to us to be clear that indiscriminate use of a general observation from of judgment isolated from the facts of the case may well-result in mis--carriage of justice. The said observation is, therefore, of not much help to the respondents and their reliance thereon is misconceived and untenable.
5. It has then to be seen that section 17 of the Act declares a' civil servant to .Be entitled to the sanctioned pay of the post or grade to which he is appointed. And we agree that the expression "pay" has been used in section 17 of the Act in its generally known sense i.e. Raising by periodical increments from a minimum to a maximum. In fact "Time---Scale Pay" has been so defined by F. R.
9 (31) (a). Faced with-this sound and clear proposition, the respondents took a stand that section 17 of the Act itself mentions that in such cases entitlement to the pay shall be `in accordance with the rules' and, therefore, the Government, in exercise of the powers conferred on it by F. R. 35, can fix the pay at the minimum of the grade and `thereby deny the annual increments. The fallacy of this argument is well brought out by the plain language of section 17 which clearly directs the payments of the sanctioned pay of the post in accor--dance with the rules" and does not at all make it subject to any rules, simply because the words used therein are "in accordance with the rules" and not "subject to rules". We are quite clear in our mind that now remuneration attaching to a post is one of the terms of Service guarantee by section 17 of the Act. This is thus a guaranteed right which cannot be varied to a civil servant's disadvantage. Even otherwise, doctrine of bounty no longer holds the field. The irresistible conclusion would therefore, be that F. R. 35 had no application to the instant case an could not be invoked to curtail the due remuneration of the appellant.
6. Without prejudice to our above conclusion it may be quite interest--ing to add that a Government decision incorporated just below F. R. 35 in the Compilation of the Fundamental Rules reads as under :- "Government decision.-In a case in which a local Government issued orders of a general nature under F. R. 35, restricting the officiating pay of Government servants to an increase equal only to a certain percentage of the minimum pay of the higher post, it was pointed out that reading this rule with the- rules substan--tively regulating the rate of officiating pay and in particular with F. R. 31 it is clear that the power conferred by F. R. X35 is not exercisable save by a special order passed in an individual case and on a consideration of the facts of that case. A general order purporting to oust universally the operation of F. R. 31 would be ultra vires of F. R.
35. It was also held that although the practice of passing ostensibly special orders on every individual case would not be ultra vires of F.
R. 35, It would constitute the grossest pos--sible fraud thereon."
A bare reading of the above Government's own decision makes it quite clear that F. R. 35 was not intended to deprive a person of guaranteed remuneration of the post of which he. Assumed the duties and responsibilities. Thus, the departmental interpretation does not also support the contention of the respondents in the present case. It is a well-settled rule of interpretation of statutes that if the Rules are capable of bearing a reasonable interpretation favourable to the employee then that interpretation should be preferred in the interest of justice. Viewing the matter from this angle, we are of the opinion that denial of the annual increments is the case in hand was unwarranted and violative of the Government policy laid down in the above decision.
7. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the appellant was entitled to the annual increments also for the period from 9-7-1974 to 24-6-1977 and the decision contained in para. 2 of the sanction letter, dated 16-6-1980 that during the aforesaid period the appellant will not be entitled to annual increments in N. P. S.-17, was incompetent, unjustifiable and bad in law which is accordingly set aside. In the result the appeal is allowed and it is directed that the amounts of the aforesaid annual increments should be paid to the appellant.
8. No order as to costs.