RASAAL HASAN SYED, J.---- Petitioner filed a suit claiming declaration to the effect that he was allottee, owner-in- possession of the phatta (platform); the respondent has no concern whatsoever with the same; the cancellation of Order No. 759/MCP/JP dated 16.1.2018, letter No. 834/MCP/JP dated 06.4.2018 were illegal, ineffective and void ab initio and that based on the same the respondent No. 1 shall be restrained from making interference in the possession of the petitioner . It is claimed that in compliance of the order of his Court vide letter No. 759/MCP/JP dated 16.1.2018 phatta was allotted to the petitioner; the petitioner was a license holder in terms of letter dated 07.3.2018; and that being a lawful allottee he was owner in possession of the phatta and further that the respondent intended to illegally dispossess the petitioner for which no notice was ever served and further that the letter issued for the purported cancellation was kept secret, which was illegal and that the respondent had acted beyond jurisdiction and intended to make illegal interference in the rights of the petitioner . The respondent No.2 resisted the suit by filing written statement and claimed that phatta (platform) in dispute was located between the courtyard of petitioner's shop and the Fruit Market and that it was owned by the respondent and was reserved for the cultivators and dealers of the Fruit Market Committed. It was added that the phatta (platform) in issue remained in possession of respondent No.2 but few years before, it was illegally -occupied by the petitioner who thereafter started frivolous litigation and that he had no right in the disputed place where the phatta existed. Respondent No. 1/Market Committee also filed its written statement claiming that the petitioner has no cause of action, the civil court was not the proper forum for the relief, the petitioner had illegally sold the phatta (platform) and transferred the possession for which he had no right or moral justification and that the suit was not maintainable and further that the appeal lies under Rule 76 of Punjab Agricultural Produce Rules, 1979 and that the petitioner was guilty of violating the provisions of Punjab Agricultural Produce (Market) Ordinance, 1978 as also the rules framed thereunder and was thus not entitled to any relief.
2. Vide order dated 24.6.2019 the learned Civil Judge observed that the petitioner was claiming to be allottee of phatta and challenged the order of cancellation of respondent No.1 and the matter pertains to the Agricultural Produce Markets which was governed by Punjab Agricultural Produce (Market) Ordinance, 1979; appeal was permissible under the Act. The petitioner has not availed the remedy before the District Officer Revenue hence the plaint was liable to be returned. Accordingly , the plaint was ordered to be returned to the petitioner under Order VII, Rule 10, C.P .C. for presentation before proper forum.
3. In appeal filed' by the petitioner , the learned Addl. District Judge observed that the Administrator passed a cancellation order , the relevant law provides for an appeal against the order of the Market Committee; DOR was entitled to hear the appeal which was the proper forum and that the plaint was liable to be returned for presentation before the proper forum. It was observed that the trial court rightly directed the return of plaint which order did not call for any interference. Appeal as also the cross objections were therefore, dismissed. In the instant revision petition the orders of the courts below are now under challenge.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner questioned the legality of the orders by pleadin g that the civil courts are legally competent to examine the acts and orders of the Public Authorities with a view to find out if they suffer from lack of jurisdiction or were against law and that the order was not appealable and further that the institution of the suit in civil court was incorrectly questioned and the courts below wrongly returned the plaint. Contrarily , learned counsel representing the respondents defended the impugned order and maintained that the suit could not have been instituted, the petitioner should have approached the competent forum which in their view was the appellate authority under the statute.
5. On due consideration of the reasons which prevailed with the courts below to order return of plaint and also the, relevant rules which have been relied for this purpose, it is observed that the view taken by the courts below is based on misinterpretation of law. In this case, the stance taken by the petitioner was that he was lawful allottee in terms of the Order passed by this Court and that the order of allotment was issued in compliance to the directive issued in those proceedings and further that he had been lawfully possessing the phatta (platform) while the respondent No.1 did not have any justification to make any illegal interference in the possession and title and that the letter under challenge for the purported cancellation of the allotment was illegal, ab initio void and inoperative in law. The suit was for declaration with consequential relief. Section 9 of C.P.C. contemplates that civil court shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature except of which the cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. The scope of jurisdiction has remained subject-matter of consideration in various cases and the consistent rule is that in the first instance there should be an express or implied provision to bar the jurisdiction of the civil court so as to oust interference of the civil court and that notwithstanding the bar the civil court retains ultimate jurisdiction to examine if the acts of such forums were in accordance with law or illegal or mala fide. Reference can be made to the case "Hamid Hussain v. Government of West Pakistan and others" (1974 SCMR 356) where it was observed by the august Supreme Court to the effect that the civil court being the courts of plenary jurisdiction, under section 9 of C.P.C. can make an inquiry as to the existence or otherwise of facts which gave exclusive jurisdiction to a Tribunal of special jurisdiction and that the well- established principle is that even where the jurisdiction of civil court is barred and conferred upon the special tribunal, civil court being the courts of ultimate jurisdiction will have the jurisdiction to examine the acts of such forum to see whether their acts are in accordance with law or illegal or mala fide. Similarly, in the case of "Muhammad Tufail v. Abdul Ghafoor and others" [PLD 1958 SC (Pak) 2013 it was observed that if the jurisdiction of civil court is expressly barred in a case, the bar will be applicable to the orders passed in strict conformity with the provisions of statute and where this is not so, the civil court cannot be denuded of its power of interference. It was further observed that the protection does not cover an Order capriciously made or in flagrant breach of the statute given the protection and that it was well-settled, that even if the jurisdiction is excluded the civil court has jurisdiction to examine into case where the provisions of the act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal had not acted in conformity with the fundamental principle of judicial procedure. In the instant case, the petitioner has challenged the validity of the cancellation order on the ground that it was illegal without jurisdiction and against the provisions of Statute and that the respondent No.2 was unnecessarily extending cooperation to deprive the petitioner of his alleged lawful title and possession of the phatta (platform). This being so prima facie the jurisdiction of civil court could not be deemed to be barred and it retains the jurisdiction to 'examine the acts and orders of respondent No.1 with a view to satisfy if the same are in conformity with the statute under which it was passed and if the authority had acted in accordance with the provisions of the statute or beyond its scope. The alleged provision providing a remedy of appeal which prima facie did not apply to the situation or the order as agitated in the suit, could not debar the civil court from taking cognizance and examine the matter as a court of plenary jurisdiction to determine if the orders under challenge were without jurisdiction or in accordance or in-conformity with the statute and if the authority has not acted without lawful authority. The jurisdiction of the court was therefore, neither barred nor the plaint could be returned on such unwarranted assumptions.
6. The impugned orders, therefore, suffer from serious error of law and jurisdiction and otherwise based on misunderstanding and misinterpretation of the provisions of the Market Committee Ordinance, 1978 as also the Rules framed there under and therefore, the same cannot be af firmed.
7. Resultantly , the revision petition is allowed, the impugned orders are set aside, in result, the suit shall be deemed to be pending which will now be decided by the learned Civil Judge in accordance with law on its own merits and after framing proper issues, giving the opportunity of evidence to the parties. Being somewhat old matter , it is directed that the proceedings shall be held expeditiously so as to conclude the suit and decided it within four months .