MUHAMMAD KHURSHID KHAN (CHAIRMAN).--The facts giving rise to appeal may shortly be stated thus :-
2. The appellant Abdul Kabir, Assistant Sub-Inspector Police, while posted as Law Instructor, Police Training School, Hangu, was issued a charge-sheet on 9th August, 1978, by the Principal, Police Training School, Hangu, as being "authority" under the Police Rules, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules). He was charged for misconduct for his unautho--rised occupation of the house owned by one Haji Rahimullah of Village Nawa Killi, Tehsil Swabi. The charge was communicated to the appel--lant together with statement of the allegations explaining the charge and other relevant circumstances proposed to be taken into consideration.
3. The appellant submitted his reply controverting the allegation contained in the charge-sheet, claiming on the other hand that he was innocent. Feeling not satisfied with the reply so submitted, the "authority" decided to have the departmental inquiry conducted through an Inquiry Officer, Mr. Qayyum Jan, Prosecuting Sub-Inspector, was appointed as an Inquiry officer to hold an inquiry against the appellant in respect of the charge against him. Mr. Qayyum Jan, thereupon held a detailed inquiry in the matter and after examining all the necessary evidence came to the conclusion that the house in question had been given on monthly rent of Rs. 100 to the appellant by its owner Haji Rahimullah but the appellant was neither paying rent to the owner nor was he prepared to vacate the house. The inquiry report was submitted to, and placed before, the authority, who, while agreeing with the findings of the Inquiry Officer, ordered the reversion of the appellant from the officiating rank of an Assistant Sub-Inspector and his reduction to a lower stage in the time scale of pay as Head Constable for a period of three years without any cumu--lative effect, vide order dated 7th May, 1979. Aggrieved of the said order, the appellant, on the 6th of June, 1979, submitted an appeal to the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Peshawar Range, Peshawar.
4. Another inquiry against the appellant was also ordered by the Principal, Police Training School, Hangu, in pursuance to a complaint in writing submitted to him on 16th February, 1978, by a delegation of the elders of Kharsha-Band, a Village adjacent to Police Training School, Hangu, the allegations contained in the complaint being that the appellant was in the habit of loitering in the nearby fields and making indecent gestures towards the womenfolk of the village. The appellant, on the basis of these allegations, was charged for misconduct. He was served with a charge-sheet together with statement of allegations explaining the charge and the relevant circumstances proposed to be taken into consideration.
5. The appellant submitted his reply denying therein the allegations made against him. The reply having been found not satisfactory, the Principal as being "authority" under the Rules, appointed Abdul Mutlib, Sub-Inspector Police, as an Inquiry Officer to hold an inquiry against the appellant in respect of the charge against him. Mr. Abdul Mutlib, thereupon, held an inquiry in the matter. The inquiry report was submit--ted to, ' and placed before, the "authority" who, by an order dated 26th May, 1979 dismissed the appellant from service with immediate effect. The appellant challenged this order before the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Peshawar Range, Peshawar, by means of departmental appeal.
6. Both the departmental appeals submitted by the appellant, the one directed against the order dated 7th May, 1979, and the other challenging the order dated 26th May, 1979 of the Principal, Police Training School, Hangu, were disposed of in one order dated 12th September, 1979 by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police. The appeals were dismissed and the orders appealed against were maintained. Dissatisfied with the orders so passed by the departmental appellate authority, Mr. Abdul Kabir has preferred an appeal before this Tribunal which is being disposed of by this Order.
7. It has not been disputed before us that the Principal, Police Training School, Hangu, was exercising the powers of the "authority" under the Rules in respect of the category of Police Officials to which the appellant belonged at the relevant time. Rule 4 of the Rules lays down that "if the authority decides that it is necessary to have departmental in--quiry conducted through an inquiry officer, he shall appoint for this purpose an inquiry officer who is senior in rank to the accused. According to rule 5 of the Rules, the authority, on receipt of the findings of the inquiry officer or where no such officer is appointed, on receipt of the explanation of the accused, if any, shall determine whether the charge has been proved or trot and in case the charge is found to have been proved, the authority shall award one or more of major or minor punishments as deemed necessary. In the inquiries which have also to the appeal before us, this procedure has been duly observed. In other words, the inquiries in both the cases were conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Rules. With this background, we shall now proceed to deal with the matter agitated in the appeal before us.
8. In view of the legal position on the subject, we propose to deal with the orders of the "authority" dated 7th May, 1979 and 26th May, 1979, separately and will take them up one by one. While dealing with the first of these orders, reference shall first be made to the law bearing on the subject. By means of this order, the appellant was reduced to a lower post, and to a lower stage in the time scale of pay as Head Cons--table. It may be pointed out that proviso (b) (ii) to section 4 of the North-West Frontier Province Service Tribunals Act, 1974 (hereinafter called the Act), places a bar on the right of appeal of a civil servant in the event of his reduction to a lower post, grade or time scale, or to a lower stage in a time-scale by the departmental authority as a result of departmental inquiry. It is not difficult to understand section 4 of the Act which says that "Any civil servant aggrieved by any final order, whether original or appellate, made by a departmental authority in respect of any of the terms and conditions of his service may, within thirty days of the communication of such order to him, within six months of the establishment of the appropriate Tribunal, whichever is later, prefer an appeal to the Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter." There can thus be no doubt that by virtue of this proviso, all final orders made by departmental authorities in respect of any of the terms and conditions of service of Civil Servants were made appealable to the appropriate Service Tribunal. However, the Legislature in their own wisdom, decided to exclude certain matters from the purview of Service Tribunals and for that purpose added provisos (b) (i) and (ff) to section 4. By virtue of provisio (b) (ii) which is relevant for our present purposes, no appeal shall lie to a Tribunal against an order or decision of a departmental authority determining the quantum of departmental punishment or penalty imposed on a civil servant as a result of departmental inquiry except where the penalty imposed is dismissal from service, removal from service or compulsory retirement.
9. The word "quantum" has nowhere been defined in the Act. The dictionary meaning of the word, however, is amount, share, portion, required, desired, or allowed amount. Keeping this meaning of the word "quantum" in view, we would now proceed to determine the legal aspect of the matter. A careful examination of section 4 and proviso (b) (ii) leaves no room for doubt about the fact that a civil servant dismissed or removed from service or compulsorily retired by a departmental authority as a result of departmental inquiry can challenge such final order of the departmental authority before the appropriate Service Tribunal even on the ground of quantum of departmental punishment or penalty. Normally the position of a civil servant who suffers one of the minor penalties, or the penalty of reduction to a lower post, grade, time scale or lower stage in a time- scale which is one of the major penalties, would have been at par with a civil servant dismissed, removed, or compulsorily retired, from service in the matter of appeal to the Service Tribunal because the condi--tions of service of a civil servant include provisions, not only as to dismis--sal, removal or compulsory retirement but also provisions as to the imposition of all other penalties provided by the Rules. However proviso (b) (ii) to section 4 has taken away the right of a civil servant punished with a penalty other than that of dismissal, removal, or compulsory retirement, from service, to appeal to the Service Tribunal, against the quantum of punishment determined by the departmental authority. The said proviso is, however, no bar to the filing of an appeal before the Service Tribunal on a ground other than the one having reference to the quantum of punishment determined by the departmental authority. It follows, therefore, that such an order can be challenged before the Service Tribunal for being illegal or without jurisdiction. This view was taken by us in the case of Mr. Muhammad Zaman v. Conservator of Forests and another (Appeal No. 2 of 1980), and we see no reason to take a different view in the case now before us.
10. From the above somewhat lengthy survey, the legal position which emerges is that this Tribunal would not be in a position to interfere with the order of the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, maintaining the order of the authority, namely, the Principal, Police Training School, Hangu, dated 7th May, 1979, in so far as the quantum of punishment was conceived. As regards the legality of this order, it may at once be stated that the Superintendent of Police, being "authority" under the Rules was competent to issue charge-sheet and statement of allegation and to appoint an Inquiry Officer to hold into the chrage against the appellant. The Inquiry Officer held a detailed inquiry and examined all the evidence adduced before him, in accordance with the Rules. The appellant was also afforded opportunity to produce his defence. The Inquiry Officer, on consideration of all the evidence before him, came to the conclusion that the house in question was owned by Rahimullah who rented it out to the appellant on monthly rent of Rs. 100 but that the latter not only made default in the payment of rent but also refused to vacate the house even on his transfer from Mardan District to the Police Training School, Hangu. These findings - are based on the evidence collected during the course of inquiry and we feel that findings are well founded. The appel--lant, we regret to say, went to the extent of denying the very title of his landlord to the house. During the course of arguments before us, however, he conceded that the house was given on rent to him by Rahim. Ullah and that he (appellant) has refused to vacate it. The appellant undoubteldy misused his official position, firstly in not paying the rent to his landlord, and secondly in remaining in unlawful possession of the house even after his transfer to another district. This was unbecoming of an officer especially an officer belonging to Police Force who is expected always to set the machinery in motion against a wrong done to any of the citizens of the country. Be that as it may, the appellant was rightly found guilty of the charge framed against him in the inquiry under discus.
11. We now arrive at a point where it becomes necessary to deal with the second inquiry founded on the allegation of making indecent gestures by the appellant to the womenfolk of village Kharsha Band. In this inquiry also, evidence was recorded by the Inquiry Officer, and the "authority", on considering the evidence and on taking into consideration all the attending circumstances, formed the view that the allegations contained in the statement of allegations stood proved. Upon dispassionate consideration of the evidence and the circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that the conduct of the appellant justified an inference of guilt against him. The evidence collected in the enquiry has-been discussed in details by the authority in the impugned order dated 26th May, 1979 and we feel no hesitation in agreeing with the reasoning adopted by the "authority," therein. The appellant, while advancing arguments before us, was not in a position to contend that the evidence used against him was either interested or otherwise unreliable. We would, therefore hold that the evidence was sufficient to connect the appellant with the charge of misconduct framed against him. The punishment awarded to him was also not disproportionate to the charge against him.
12. For the reasons given above, there is no force in this appeal. The appeal, therefore, fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs.