1. ' JUSTICE MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, CHAIRMAN.-This leave to appeal petition from judgment of the Federal Shariat Court dated 11-5-1982, under Article 203-F of the Constitution, as reported by the office, is barred by time. Learned counsel has made the following submissions in this behalf:-
(a) that the computation by the office, of the time is incorrect;
(b) that no period for filing a petition for leave to appeal under Article 203-F, (2-B) having been provided therein, limitiedon as provided in the Supreme Court Rules, 1980, would not be attracted; and (c)that in any case, the delay is condonable on a general ground mentioned in the application submitted in this behalf; namely, that "the petitioner was held in custody and his father was an old man, the delay if any in submission of the petition for grant of leave to appeal, has occurred nor due to negligence but for reasons beyond the control of the petitioner".
2. ' This first submission is based on the fact that the copy of the impugned judgment was delivered to the petitioner's counsel in an incomplete form. It was resubmitted to the office of the Federal Shariat Court for completion and the same was received back on behalf of the petitioner on 27-8- 1982. Therefore, the period between the date of the application for copy i,e, 23-5-1982 to 27-8-1982 (when completed copy was delivered) should have been excluded. And that being so, the petition would be in time. Our inquiry, however, has revealed that the copy was originally delivered on 17-6- 1982. The petitioner's side kept it till 21-8-1982, when it was resubmitted for completion. The missing part related to the entry of the date of the application for copy, in the endorsemefit to be made by the copy officer regarding various particulars. The contents of the judgment, however, were complete even when the copy was delivered in the first instance on 17-6-1982. No explanation has been offered regarding a long period of retention of the copy, on behalf of the petitioner from 17-6- 1982 to 21-8-1982. This period, therefore, would have to be counted against him when computing the period of limitation. If that is done, it is not denied, the petitioner would be time barred under the rules of the Supreme Court. The last submission, regarding the petitioner being in custody and his father being old, hardly furnishes a cause for condo nation of delay, therefore, there is no force in the first and last contentions of the learned counsel.
3. ' We have examined the second contention of the learned counsel, with reference to the relevant provisions contained in Article 203-F of the Constitution which as amended reads as follows:- "203-F. Appeal to Supreme Court.-(1) Any party to any proceedings before the Court under Article 203-0 aggrieved by the final decision of the Court in such proceedings may, within sixty days of such decision, prefer an appeal to the Supreme Court.
(2) The provisions of clauses (2) and (3) of Article 203-D and clauses (4) to (8) of Article 203-E shall apply to and in relation to the Supreme Court as if reference in those provisions to Court were a reference to the Supreme Court.
4. (2-A) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, final order or sentence of the Federal Shariat Court-
(a) if the Federal Shariat Court has on appeal reversed an order of acquittal of an accused person and sentenced him to death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term exceeding fourteen years; or, on revision, has enhanced a sentence as aforesaid; or
(b) if the Federal Shariat Court has imposed any punishment on any person for contempt of the Court."
5. (2-B) An appeal to the Supreme Court from a judgment, decision, order or sentence of the Federal Shariat Court in a case to which the preceding clauses do not apply shall lie only if the Supreme Court grants leave to appeal.
(3) For the purpose of the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by this Article, there shall be constituted in the Supreme Court a Bench to be called the Shariat Appellate Bench and consisting of
(a) three Muslim Judges of the Supreme Court; and
(b) not more than two Ulema to be appointed by the President to attend sitting of the Bench as ad hoc members thereof from amongst the Judges of the Federal Shariat Court or from out of a panel of Ulema to be drawn up by the President in consultation with the Chief Justice.
(4) A person appointed under paragraph (b) of clause (3) shall hold office for such period as the President may determine.
(5) Reference in clauses (1) and (2) to Supreme Court shall be construed as a reference to the Shariat Appellate Bench.
(6) While attending sittings of the Shariat Appellate Bench, a person appointed under paragraph'(b) of clause (3) shall have the same power and jurisdiction, and be entitled to the same privileges, as a Judge of the Supreme Court, and be paid such allowances as the President may determine."
6. ' The precise argument of the learned counsel is that when hearing a petition for leave to appeal under sub-Article (2-B). Of Article 203-F, the Shariat Appellate Bench i,e, this Bench, assumes, an independent status as an appellate forum, different from the Supreme Court. Therefore, the rules framed by the Supreme Court, under Article 191 of the Constitution which, inter alia, provided for limitation for filing a petition for leave to appeal in criminal matter, would not be attracted.
7. ' We do not agree with him. Article 203-F deals with three types of appeals. All these appeals as are apparent from clear language used in the relevant Sub-Articles lie to "the Supreme Court". The first type of appeal lies "to the Supreme Court" when the decision by the Federal Shariat Court is in respect of a matter provided in Article 203-D of the Constitution. The appeal of the second cartegory as provided in Sub-Article (2-A) of Article 203-F "lies to the Supreme Court" from any judgment, final order, or sentence of the Federal Shariat Court as apecifidd in. Sub-clauses (a) and
(b) of Sub-Article (2-A) of Article 203-F. The third category of appeal which is visualized in Sub- Article (2-B) of Article 203-F, would cover the present case. In this category "an appeal to the Supreme Court" would lie "only if the Supreme Court grants leave to appeal".
8. The foregoing analysis makes it clear that the appeal, in any case, whether direct by way of .Right or, though, special leave to appeal, lies to "the Supreme Court." This is not all. The appeal, in the third category of .c cases lies to the Supreme Court only when "the Supreme Court grants leave to appeal". Therefore, there is no doubt, in or mind that notwithstanding the provisions contained in Article 203-F (3)(05)(6) for constituting a Special (Shariat) Bench of the Supreme Court, this appellate forum i,e, the Shariat Appellate Bench, is and remains, a Bench of the Supreme Court.
9. Therefore, the Rules applicable to the proceedings of the Supreme Court would be applicable to the proceedings before and functioning of the Shariat Appellate Bench. It is an appellate forum but not different from the Supreme Court. Thus the rules applicable to the leave to appeal petition, filed under Sub-Article (3) of Article 185 of the Constitution, would also apply mutatis mutandis, to the petition for leave to appeal under sub-Article (2-B) of Article 203-F of the Constitution, till new rules if any are made or added in this behalf to Supreme Court Rules, 1980. The argument of the learned counsel has no force and is accordingly repelled.
10. ' In view of the foregoing discussion, this petition is dismissed as time barred.