The present appeal arises out of the order dated 29th July, 1982 passed by the Presiding Officer, 1st Labour Court Baluchistan at Quetta whereby, he inter alia found the appellant's claim not maintainable for want of jurisdiction.
2. Detailed narration of the facts is , not necessary as the decision hinges on a law point. Suffice it to say that the appellant was employed as Accountant in respondent's organization since 1st January, 1972. He tendered resignation from service which was accepted on 24th September, 1980.
Subsequent to this, he submitted a monetary claim based on different counts such as arrears of pay, pay in lieu of earned leave, bonus and provident fund etc. To the respondent. The claim was not satisfied ; as such, the appellant first served a notice upon the respondent and then filed an application under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the "Ordinance") to recover the said dues.
3. The respondent not only repudiated the said claim on merits but also raised several legal objections as to the maintainability of the appellant's application ; viz. Misjoinder of respondent No. 2, non---availability of territorial jurisdiction with a court at Quetta, improper notice, bar of limitation : and finally non-maintainability of the application under section 25-A of the Ordinance.
Of all these objections which have been dealt with by the Labour Court ; the one going to the root of the case is the one mentioned last. The Presiding Officer,. Labour Court, heard the parties on the said preliminary issues and dismissed the appli--cation vide order dated 29th July, 1982 on the ground that as the appellant had seized to be a "worker" within the meaning of the Ordinance, after having tendered resignation from service, the application under section 25-A of the Ordinance was incompetent.
4. When the appeal came up for hearing, first serveral such points were raised by the learned counsel for the parties which called for a thorough probe into the scheme of the Ordinance and other allied laws specially the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 and the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. Consequently, I requested Mr. Basharatullah, Advocate and Mr. Munawar Ahmed Mirza, learned Advocate-General to assist me in this exercise. The arguments advanced by these learned counsel and the parties' counsel deal with ; (a) the scope and applicability of section 25-A of the Ordinance, and (b) the nature of the claims that can be entertained within the scope of this provision.
5. The crux of the lengthy arguments advanced in the case can be summed up in these words that Mr. Basharatullah was of the view that all kinds of monetary claims of an employee, in service or out of it by any kind of incident (whether as a result of resignation or by retirement) could be pressed before a Labour Court under this provision of law. He was further of the view that invocation of. Such jurisdiction was not by way of ancillary relief in cases of illegal dismissal, discharge etc. From service ; rather both kinds of causes were entertainable separately as well as combinedly. He also argued that since the appellant being a news--paper employee, deserved to be regarded a "worker" or "workman' within the scope of the Ordinance by dint of Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1.973, therefore, he could .Successfully maintain his monetary claim alone before the Labour Court and for doing so it was not necessary that termination of service etc. (which in this case was by his own unilateral act) should have also been challenged as a main grievance. Contrarily Mr. Munawar Ahmed, learned Advocate---General while agreeing with the contention of Mr. Basharatullah. With regard to the right of certain category of newspaper employees to invoke the jurisdiction of the Labour Court like any other "worker" or "work--man" covered by the Ordinances objected to his interpretation of section 25-A (1) of the Ordinance. He ,submitted that undoubtedly the phrase--logy used in this section was such that it indicated in the first sight that any and all kinds of claims, including an independent monetary claim of a worker could also be entertained by a Labour Court whether or not the question of dismissal, discharge or removal etc. From service was challenged before it, but when it was construed in the light of the preamble and the definition of the "worker" or "workman" to be found in section 2 (xxxviii).Of the Ordinance, it would become manifest that neither unquali--fied monetary claims were entertainable under this provision of law, nor every employee whose services stood terminated could invoke the Labour Court's jurisdiction under this provision. Further, with reference to the Standing Order 12 (3) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 and soul provisions of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, he canvassed that if the provisions of section 25-A of the Ordinance were to be considered all pervasive in the sense Mr. Basharatullah opined; then Standing Order 12- (3) which specified that the cases of termination of employment for reasons other than misconduct of permanent and temporary workmen, were challenge--able -under `section 25-A of the Ordinance provided such termination was in violation of the guarantees specified under the earlier part of this Standing Order shall seem to be redundant because when the doors of the Labour Court were to be kept were open to all kinds of employees (both past and present), then what was the necessity to specify as to which class of workers could challenge any particular action of their employer and in what patroller circumstances, and further that the Payment of Wages Act whereunder certain kind of dues could be recovered by an employee through a court created by it, shall also become meaningless. Prima facie the argument has force.
6. The question as to who was entitled to approach the Labour Court and what kind of claims were entertainable by it and with what conditions, if any, can in my humble opinion, be appreciated by the perusal of the Preamble, the definition of "worker" and "workman" in conjunction with the recital of section 25-A of the Ordinance. These provisions read as under :- Preamble.-An ordinance to amend and consolidate the law relating to the formation of the unions, the regulation of relations between employers and workmen and the avoidance and- settlement of any differences or disputes arising between them..
Whereas it is expedient to amend and consolidate the law relating to the formation of trade unions, the regulation of relations between employers and workmen and the avoidance and settlement of any differences or disputes arising between them or matters connected therewith and ancillary thereto ; and whereas the national interest of Pakistan in relation to the achievement of uniformity requires Central Legislation in the matter ; Now, therefore, in pursuance of the proclamation of the 25th day of March, 1969 read with the Provisional Constitution Order, 1969 and in. Exercise of all powers enabling him in that behalf the President is pleased to make and promulgate the following Ordinance : Section 2 (xxviii). Definition.-'-- Worker" and "workman" mean any person not falling within the definition of employer who is employed (including employment as a supervisor or as an apprentice), in an . Establishment or industry for hire or reward either directly or through contractor whether the term of employment be express or implied and for the purpose of any proceeding under this Ordinance, in relation to an industrial dispute includes a person who has been dismissed, discharged, retrenched, laid of or otherwise removed from employment in connection with or as a consequence of that dispute or whose dismissal, discharge, retrenchment, lay-of or remove had led to that dispute but does not include any person: Section 25-A. Redress of individual grievances.-(1) A worker may bring his grievance in respect of any right guaranteed or secured to him by or under any law or any award or settlement for the time being in force to the notice of his employer in writing, either himself or through his shop steward of Collective Bargaining Agent within three months of the day on which cause of such grievance arises." *[underlying is mine] Much need not be said with regard to the Preamble, for its language is crystal clear to indicate the intent and purpose of the Legislature. It would .Be sufficient to mention that this special enactment was introduced to ensure healthy relations between the employers and the workmen. Therefore, a method of easy and effective adjudication of these disputes (both of individual and collective nature) -was laid down. Adverting to its scope ; let us take note of the words occurring in the definition of "worker" and "workman" viz." . ... Whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purpose of any proceeding under this Ordinance in relation to an industrial dispute Pointed reference to the word "dispute" in relation to employment makes it evident that the fundamental concern of this law is to set at rest the disputes with regard to the terms and conditions of employment of a worker or workman meaning thereby that in cases where a dispute of this nature does not exist, yet there are actionable claims requiring adjudication the ordinary law courts or forums were open to. An aggrieved person like any other citizen and his case was an ordinary case. The special treatment under the Ordinance was open only to the special class of citizens namely the "'Workers" as defined by the Ordinance and West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. The women' he ceases to be a worker he is outside the ambit of these Courts' jurisdiction. However, this is also pertinent to see as to which kind of removal from service would disable a person from knocking at the door of a Labour Court and which category of them, though out of employment, shall still be regarded a "worker" for the purposes of the Ordinance ; and I shall presently advert to it. But before that I would like to dilate upon the scope and functioning of the Ordinance a little further. A reference is thus necessary with regard to the meaning of the word "dispute" when used in the context of the terms and -conditions of service. The question of settlement of terms and conditions of service generally crops up in two ways namely, (1) when an industrial dispute is raised by a C. B. A. Union etc. Of an organization to settle as to what should be the terms and conditions of service of various categories of workers (both with regard to continuity or otherwise of service as also with regard to emoluments and fringe benefit etc.) and (2) an industrial dispute raised when the terms and conditions of employment of worker 'or workman guaranteed under any law, award of settlement were violated in any fashion. In both kinds of .Cases, certain monetary claims may also. Form part of the dispute but such monetary claims being linked up directly with the terms of employment which forms basis of the dispute are ancillary in nature and not independent by themselves, and that is why, adjudication upon them is inseparable from the basic question. For instance, if a person has been dismissed, discharged or . Removed from service in violation of the terms of his service he can approach the Labour Court for an order to get a suitable declaration and besides such declaration he can also claim the restoration of such monetary benefits which would have accrued to him if he had not been illegally removed from service and the court while reinstating him in service would grant him the past wages etc. By way of ancillary or consequential relief. In such an event we have seen that the main claim was with regard to the restoration of the original terms and conditions of service in violation of which termination of employment had taken place while the monetary claim was by way of ancillary claim. But the cases in which there is absolutely no dispute with regard to the terms and conditions of service, the monetary claim can be pressed by an aggrieved employee against his employer under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 or through a regular civil suit if not barred by the" former. Generally speaking the scheme of the Ordinance is such that the monetary claims are to be picked up by a Labour Court only in those cases where a dispute exists with regard to the terms and conditions of service and not otherwise.
7. The other question is as to who can approach the Labour Court . Answer to this question is simple. 1n the definition of worker and "workman", the words : ".. And for the purpose of any proceeding under this Ordinance in relation to an industrial dispute includes a person who has been dismissed, discharged, retrenched, laid-of or otherwise removed from employment in connection with or as a consequence of that dispute or whose dismissal, discharge, retrenchment, lay-of, or removal has led to a dispute clinch the issue. It is clear that the Ordinance primarily deals with the cases of those workers who continued to be in employment but it also includes within its ambit those workers who were not in service but with regard to whose termination of service a dispute had arisen. It conspicuously emits such workers who bad resigned their jobs or had retired from service. The reason simply being that such termination of the employment is neither as a result of any dispute, nor any dispute is raised with regard to it ; say, undisputed termination of service. The appellant's case is thus clearly outside the scope of this provision of law, as he is a past worker and there is absolutely no dispute with regard .To the terms and conditions of his service. In this view of the matter, 1 am supported amongst other, by Mohabbat Khan v. International Forwarding Agency Limited, Karachi (1980 PLC 655).
I, therefore, find the impugned order of the Labour Court unexceptionable. Consequently the appeal is dismissed with no orders as to costs. The appellant shall be at liberty to approach the appropriate forum for the redress of his grievances.
Before I part with the case, I may express my appreciations for the valuable assistance provided to me by Messrs Basharatullah Advocate and Munawar Ahmad Mirza, Advocate-General.