MUHAMMAD SHAN GUL, J. Through this judgment, we intend to decide the titled Intra Court Appeal which has been filed against the judgment dated 11.07.2008 passed in Writ Petition No. 2051 of 2008 filed by respondent No.1, Saqib Mahmood against the appella nt and another . This writ petition was allowed by a learned Single Judge on 25.07.2008 whereby he ordered for re-instatement of the respondent in service. The present appeal challenges the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge.
2. Brief facts of the case necessary for the adjudication of this appeal are that the respondent was an employee of the Habib Bank Limited. Disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him under the provisions of Habib Bank Limited Staff Service Rules, 1981 (Rule s) on 10.02.2001. These proceedings resulted into imposition of major penalty of dismissal of service on the respondent on 26.06.2001. A departmental appeal was filed in terms of these Rules which was rejected by the appellate authority on 28.08.2001. The respondent then availed the then existing remedy provided by section 2-A of the Service Tribunals Act, 1990 and his appeal was allowed by the Tribunal, the dismissal order was set-aside, the respondent was re-instated in service and the Bank was allowed to hold a denovo inquiry within six months. It was specifically mentioned in the order passed by the Service Tribunal that the retention of the respondent in the service of the Bank was dependent on the findings of the fresh denovo inquiry .
3. Thereafter the respondent was served with a charge sheet on 07.04.200 4. The respondent denied all allegations. An inquiry was conducted, during which, the respondent was afforded adequate opportunity of establishing his case. Finally , an inquiry report dated 06.07.2004 was issued to the respondent. Since the time frame prescribed by the Service Tribunal (the Tribunal could not have provided a time frame without the backing of any law) could not be kept, the respondent rushe d to the Service Tribunal and filed a miscellaneous petition and obtained a stay order in his favour . As a result, no further proceedings could be held. In the meanwhile, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan passed judgment in the case of Muhammad Mobeen-us-Salam and others vs. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary , Ministry of Defence and others (PLD 2006 SC 602), hence the respondent was informed on 13.07.2006 by the Tribunal that his petition had abated. Since there was no restraint order in the matter any more, a show cause notice dated 31.10.2006 was issued by the appellant to the respondent so as to bring the disciplinary proceedings to their logical conclusion. The respondent rushed to the Civil Court and obtained stay against the disciplinary proceedings on 02.11.2006. This stay order was vacated on 04.01.2008 and the appellant issued an order dismissing the respondent from service of the Bank on 04.02.2008.
The respondent filed a departmental representation on 16.02.2008 and without waiting for its disposal, he rushed to this Court and filed a writ petition which has been allowed and against which, the present appeal has been filed.
4. Since the dismissal order dated 04.02.2008 did not convey the exact factual position, it was superseded by dismissal order dated 11.04.2008 and the reference to the earlier dismissal order was replaced with a reference to the report of denovo inquiry and the previous dismissal order was overtaken and superseded by the order dated 1 1.04.2008 Order dated 04.02.2008 "You were dismissed from the service of the Bank vide letter # SAS/TM/RNH/220662 dated 25.06.2001, on the following charges of serious misconduct.
1. Misappropriation of Rs. 450,000/- and Rs. 200,000/- total Rs. 650,000/-.
2. Borrowing Rs. 450,000/- in violation of Rule No. 34(1) of HBL Staff Servic e Rules 1981 from M/s. Royal Engineering, Lahore.
Being aggrieved of your dismissal you filed appeal No. 60(L) CE-2001 in the PST-Islamabad wherefrom it was ordered to conduct De-Novo inquiry in your case, which was conducted by Inquiry Committee. The Inquiry Committee found you guilty of above referred charges. Thereafter , you filed M.P.No. 1743/03 in appeal No. 601(L)
CE/2001.
However , consequent upon the order dated 27.06.2006 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan, you filed appeal in the Court of Sr. Civil Judge, Lahore whereby the bank was restraine d from taking any action against you vide order dated 02.1 1.2006.
The above restraining order of Sr. Civil Judge has been vacated vide order passed on 04.01.2008, and, consequently your dismissal letter has come into force.
You are, therefore, relieved from the service of the Bank with immediate ef fect."
5. The subsequent order which is being reproduced below rectifying the earlier order was never challenged.
Order dated 1 1.04.2008 "Mr. Saqib Mahmood Of ficer (P .No.200552) Habib Bank Limited RHQ Lahore.
House No.2-Fasih Road, New Islamia Park, Lahore.
REGD. A/D.
AHK/MAB/MS/200552 1 1.04.2008.
You were dismissed from the service of the Bank vide letter # SAS/TM/RNH/220552 dated 25.06.2001, on the following charges of serious misconduct.
1. Misappropriation of Rs.450,000/- and Rs.200,000/-total Rs.650,000/- Being aggrieved of your dismissal you filed appeal No.601(L) CE-2001 in the FST- Islamabad wherefrom it was ordered to conduct De-Novo inquiry in your case, which was conducted by Inquiry Committee. The Inquiry Committee found you guilty of above referred. Therefore, you filed M.P .No.1743/03 in appeal No. 601(L)CE/2001.
However , consequent upon the order dated 27.06.2006 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan, you filed suit in the Court of Civil Judge, Lahore whereby the bank was restrained from taking any action against you vide order dated 02.1 1.2006.
The above restraining order of Civil Judge has been vacated vide order passed on 04.01.2008.
The competent authority has, therefore, decided to dismiss you from the service of the Bank in terms of report of above referred De-Novo inquiry , and relieved from the service of the Bank with immediate effect.
By issuing of this letter , contents of previous letter # AHK/MAB/MS/200552 dated 04.02.2008 are hereby revoked and cancelled.
AMIN UL HUDA KHAN HEAD INDUSTRIAL RELA TION & DISCIPLINAR Y ACTION HR & OD GROUP ."
6. While allowing the writ petition, the learned Single Judge held that the order passed by the Service Tribunal dated 07.02.2004 mandating a time limit in which the denovo inquiry had to be finalized had attained finality inasmuchas the order had never been challenged. He further held that the petition was maintainable despite the fact that the relationship between the respondent and the appellant-Bank was not governed by any statutory rules of service and allowed the writ petition.
7. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the dismissal order based on denovo inquiry is an independent action and on which the order of the Service Tribunal has no bearing. Further subm its that Habib Bank Limited was privatized in 2004 and the Bank or its functionaries do not perform functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation and that its employees were governed under Habib Bank Limited Staff Service Rules, 1981, which were non statutory in nature . Also submits that the learned Single Judge has fallen into an error of fact inasmuchas the learned Single Judge has premised the rationale of his judgment on the belief that the respondent' s service had been terminated on account of the same order that had been set aside by the Service Tribunal. That the learned Single Judge did not pay any heed to the dismissal order dated 11.04.2008 which had removed the confusion, if any , in the matter .
8. Learned counsel for respondent No.1, on the other hand, vehemently supported the impugned judgment.
9. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant as well as respondent No.1 and have perused the record.
10. We have considered the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge and are of the firm view that it cannot be sustained on account of two conspicuous errors, one being an error of law and one being an error of fact. The learned Single Judge has based his decision on the dismissal order dated 04.02.2008. This is an error of fact that goes to the root of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge because the respondent was dismissed from service not on account of some previous order but on account of findings recorded through a denovo inquiry held subsequent to the order passed by the Federal Service Tribunal. The reference in the dismissal order dated 04.02.2008 to the dismissal letter having come into force was adequately rectified by means of a fresh dismissal order dated 11.04.2008 and there was no place for the learned Single Judge to have based his decision on an incorrect fact. The inadvertent error relied upon by the learned Single Judge stood cured on 11.04.2008 in any case even though no mileage or benefit could have been drawn from it, since both orders conveyed the same information through written expression, that are quite apart. The fact that the learned Single Judge fell into an error of fact is evident from the fact that the learned Single Judge set aside the order dated 04.02.2008 whereas this order was not in the field and had been superseded by order dated 11.4.2008. In this view of the matter , this error of fact is crucial and renders the judgment susceptible to appellate interference.
11. Furthermore, a six member Bench judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Abdul Wahab vs. HBL (2013 SCMR 1383 ) has categorically held that the Habib Bank Limited Staff Service Rules, 1981 were not statutory rules of service and contractual employees or even permanent employees governed by such statutory rules could not have resort to constitutional juris diction afforded by Article 199 of the Constitution. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has also ruled in the same judgment that such employees continued to be regulated by the rule of master and servant and hence such employees could not seek re- instatement in service .
12. The respondent was proceeded against under the Habib Bank Limited Staff Service Rules, 1981, in 2004, after the appellant Bank had been privatized and the Removal from Service Ordinanc e was no more applicable to it.
These are non statutory rules of service and therefore, do not qualify to be relied upon while seeking resort to constitutional jurisdiction. It may be added here that judicial review is the mechanism whereby the intent of legislature as manifested in a Statute is secured and upheld. What is sought to be remedied by resort to constitutional jurisdiction is the offence caused to a Statute. This is the overarching aim of judicial review . Naturally , therefore, rules of service can only be relied and invoked in constitutional jurisdiction if these are statutory and not otherwise. It is trite that unless there is a statutory intervention available to an employee of a government corporation, attached department, autonomous body nee next step agencies of the Government who wants to seek resort to constitutional jurisdiction can only to do so if he is able to show some dereliction of Statute. But for this element, the employees whose terms of service are governed by non statutory dispensation remain in an incessant master and servant relationship with the employer . Since the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan has declared the Habib Bank Limited Staff Service Rules, 1981 to be non statutory , these were not available to be invoked and relied upon by the respondent in constitutional jurisdiction. This objection was not only raised verbally before the learned Single Judge but also submitted in writing (paras 2 & 3 of the report and paraw ise comments submitted by the appellant may be referred), but the same has not been properly adverted to by the learned Single Judge.
13. Besides the judgment of a six member Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan referred above, the cases of Shafique Ahmed Khan and others vs. NESCOM through Chairman, Islamabad and others (PLD 2016 SC 377), Pakistan Defence Officers Housing Authority and others vs. Lt. Col. Syed Jawaid Ahmed (2013 SCMR 1707 ), Muhammad Tariq Badr and another vs. National Bank of Pakistan and others (2013 SCMR 314), Pakistan Telecommunication Co. Ltd. Through Chairman vs. Iqbal Nasir and others (PLD 2011 SC 132), Muhammad Nawaz vs. Civil Aviation Authority and others (2011 SCMR 523), Chief Manager , State Bank of Pakistan, Lahore vs. Muhammad Shafi (2010 SCMR 1994 ), Pakistan International Airlines Corporation and others vs. Tanweer-ur-Rehman and others (PLD 2010 SC 676) and Pakistan Red Crescent Society and another vs. Syed Nazir Gillani (PLD 2005 SC 806) are some of such cases that hold that the principle of master and servant shall only not apply if some Statute or statutory rules place fetters upon the terms of the contract between the parties. Where a Corporation is set up by a Statute but the government does not reserve to itself the power to regulate conditions of service and the Statute itself does not prescribe any conditions or if otherwise no statutory prescription is forthcoming and it is the Corporation or its management which is given the power to frame rules and regulations to govern the terms of service of its employees, the employee is left with no protection under the Statute itself and the Corporation has complete control over its employees since its regulatory power is not fettered by any statutory provision. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the famous case of Muhammad Mobeen-us-Salam supra (PLD 2006 SC 602) at page 689 has observed that the persons working in government controlled corporations (appellant is not even in contractual service any more), would not be deemed to have a warrant to a statutory remedy in the absence of a warrant of law i.e. a Statute that regulates his terms and condition of service.
14. The House of Lords in the case of R vs. Berkshire Health Authority (1984) 3 ALL ER 425 at page 430, has lucidly observed that "unless there are statutory provisions bearing directly on the right of public authority to dismiss the plaintiff, the Court will not intervene. It is the existence of these statutory provisions which injects the element of public law to attract the remedies of administrative law. The employment of a public authority does not per se inject any element of public law, unless there is statutory underpinning which injects the element of public law ."
15. In the case of Executive Committee of U.P. State Warehousing Corpn., Lucknow vs. Chandra Kiran Tyagi (1970 (2) SCR 250), the Indian Supreme Court has held at page 259 that normally and apart from the intervention of a Statute, there would never be a nullity in terminating an ordinary contract of master and servant.
16. Durga Das Basu, in his treatise on Administrative Law 2nd Edition at page 144, says that administrative instructions, Rules or Manual, which had no statutory force are not enforceable in Courts of law. The reason is that not having the force of law , these cannot confer any legal right and cannot be enforced in writ jurisdiction.
17. Insofar as the learned Single Judge has held that the inquiry proceedings went past the time-line prescribed by the Service Tribunal, suffice it is to state that the Federal Service Tribunal can only exercise such jurisdiction that is vested in it by the law. A combined reading of the erstwhile section 2-A with section 5 of the Federal Service Tribunal Act, 1990 reveals that there is no jurisdiction vested in the Federal Service Tribunal that authorizes it to give a time-line within which an inquiry has to be conducted and completed. While the Federal Service Tribunal has the power to set-aside, confirm, vary or modify the order appealed against, it does not have any jurisdiction to supervise, manage or control administrative inquiry proceedings by issuance of a continuous Mandamus since it does not possess any extra ordinary jurisdiction such as the one conferred by Article 199 and Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakist an, 1973. What it can do is to vary or modify the order imposing penalty but it cannot go behind the order and control or supervise inquiry proceedings at an administrative level.
18. It may be useful to mention here that never has this question ever been raised in a Court of Law. The question whether the Service Tribunal has the jurisdiction or authority to pass a time-line for the conduct and completion of inquiry proceedings has never been answ ered jurisprudentially . While the cases referred to by the learned Single Judge hold that "initiation of any inquiry beyond the time line cannot be countenanced, in none of such cases, has the question pertaining to the authority or jurisdiction of the Federal Service Tribunal to bind a respondent with a time-line within which to conduct an inquiry , has ever been raised or discussed or adjudicated.
18. It is trite that all Courts of Law constituted under the Constitution and the Law have only such jurisdiction that has been conferred upon them by the Constitution and the Law. S.M. Waseem Ashraf vs. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary , M/O Housing and Works, Islamabad and others (2013 SCMR 338) is one such judgment that supports what has been stated above. In the cases of Chief Post Master , Faisalabad, GPO and another vs. Muhammad Afzal (2020 SCMR 1029 ) and Divisional Superintendent, Postal Services, Faisalabad and others vs. Muhammad Zafarullah (2021 SCMR 400), it has been emphasized that "all Courts/T ribunals seized of matters before them were required to pass orders strictly in accordance with the parameters of the Constitution, the law and the rules and regulations framed under the law. No Court had any jurisdiction to grant arbitrary relief without the support of any power granted by the Constitution or the Law ."
19. Furthermore, of special import is the fact that the sequence of events in the denovo inquiry proceedings reveals that the inquiry was conducted and concluded within the six months time frame and therefore, in any case no benefit could be drawn from this incorrect assertion . Only the show cause notice was formally issued after the time- line and even then the respondent managed to drag the matter for more than three years in the garb of stay orders, first from the Tribunal and then from the Civil Court.
20. The Federal Service Tribunal passed the following order on 07.02.2004:- "We have observed that disciplinary proceedings conducted against the appellant were violative of legal requirements as laid down in the law. Accordingly , the impugned order dated 25.6.2001 and the appellate rejection order dated 23.8.2001 are set aside and the appellant is reinstated in service with effect from the date he was dismissed from service. It shall, however , be open to the respondents to initiate and complete denovo enquiry proceedings against the appellant in accordance with the relevant law within a period of six months, removing the legal and procedural infirmities as discuss ed in this order . Further retention or otherwise of the appellant in service and payment of back benefits to him shall depend upon the findings of the fresh enquiry against the appellant, if conducted within the timeframe as stipulated above."
The six months time period was to expire on 06.08.2004. On 01.07.2004, the competent authority ordered for statement of allegation/charge sheet to be issued. Consequently , an inquiry was initiated. Thereafter , the respondent appeared and the evidence of the prosecution was recorded and documents were placed on the file.
Upon being confronted with such docume nts, the respondent left the inquiry proceedings and submitted a request for re-constitution of the Inquiry Committee. This request was not warranted, so it was declined. On 06.07.2004, Inquiry Committee finalized and submitted its inquiry report and a Note based on the same was submitted to the competent authority on 29.07.2004 and the competent authority ordered for a show cause notice to be issued.
(Annex: C,D,E & F of the ICA under adjudication may be referred to in this respect). Therefore, the inquiry was concluded within the stipulated time period and nothing remained to be done in the inquiry . The assertion about the inquiry not being conducted within the stipulated time period is therefore, not correct. Upon the receipt of the show cause notice dated 18.09.2004 the respondent again went to the Federal Service Tribunal and obtained a stay from the said Tribunal. However , on account of the case of Muhammad Mobeen-us-Salam (supra) (PLD 2006 SC 602), the proceedings before the Tribunal abated but the respondent then rushed to the Civil Court and obtained a stay order from the Civil Court. This stay order was granted on 02.11.2006 and was recalled on 18.10.2007 whereafter the order of termination dated 04.02.2008, subsequently overtaken by the termination order dated 11.04.2008, was issued. Even here it may be noticed that for more than three years the final dismissal order could not be issued on account of the stay order secured by the respondent, from the Tribunal and the Civil Court.
21. Without prejudice to the fact that inquiry was conducted and completed within the stipulated period, even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that the time-line had been bypassed even then, since there was no penalty attached to the time lapse, the direction of the Federal Service Tribunal can only be considered to be directory and not mandatory . A five member Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Tallat Ishaq vs. National Accountability Bureau through Chairman and others (PLD 2019 SC 112) has held at page 130 that "the time line applicable in the context of conclusion of a trial by an Accountability Court is directory in nature and not mandatory because it does not provide for penalty in the case of non observan ce and non compliance. It does not provide that if the stipulated time line is not adhered to in the matter of completion of trial then the prosecution would stand terminated." In the same judgment at page 131, it has been held that "even in the cases where a direction is issued by a superior Court regarding the conclusion of trial within specified period fixed by the Court for the purpose of admission of the accused to bail, upon non-compliance of such direction bail is not always automatic. It goes without saying that direction issued by the superior Court to the trial Court to conclude a trial within the specified period is an administrative direction and non compliance of such a direction may not entitle the accused to claim bail as of right." In Aftab Ahmad Kolachi vs. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary , Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and 2 others (2009 PLC (C.S.) 258), a Division Bench of Sindh High Court has held that "directions for the performance of official duties within a particular time were generally construed as directory and not mandatory . Many Statutes, such as Family Courts Act, the Anti-T errorism Act etc. contain time frame for the completion of proceedings but that does not mean that non completion of the same would have the effect of vitiating the proceedings." In Shams-ud-Din vs. Muhammad Sharif (PLD 1996 Lahore 210), a Division Bench has held that "it should be noted that a direction by the superior courts for disposal of a case within a particular period of time is always directory in nature."
22. In the matter before us, the order of Federal Service Tribunal does not say that in the event of the non- completion of inquiry , the proceedings shall abate. It also does not say that inquiry cannot be conducted after six months. At this stage, we are tempted to refer to the proviso of section 10 of The Punjab Employees Efficiency , Discipline & Accountability Act, 2006. This proviso also reflects the above line of judgment and rules that the inquiry process shall not be vitiated if the time-line indicated therein is not kept!
23. As far as the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the respondent and taken into account by the learned Single Judge are concerned, the same are distinguishable on more than one count. The case reported as Zahooruddin Sheikh vs. Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, through Chairman, Islamabad (2007 PLC(C.S.) 959) relates to a matter before the Hon'ble Apex Court where the charge sheet, inquiry proceedings, show cause and removal order were all issued after the expiry of six months. Whereas in the case before us, the inquiry was completed well within the six months stipulated period and even the issuance of show cause notice which is the culmination of an inquiry was ordered on 29.07.2004 which is well within the time-line of 06.08.2004.
Moreover , the question of jurisdiction or authority of the Federal Service Tribunal to fix a time-line was never raised and thus not addressed.
24. In fact the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported as Tariq Akhtar vs. Plant Protection Advisor and Director , Department of Plant Protection, Karachi (1997 PLC (C.S.) 182) clearly reveals that if any time line is provided by the Federal Service Tribuna l the same is directory and not mandatory because in the words of the Hon'ble Apex Court, "if" the Service Tribunal has the power to fix period of three months it also has power to extend such period." On the face of it, it means that the power to issue a time-line is directory and permissive and not mandatory . Even in this case, no question was raised whether the Tribunal was vested with any jurisdiction to give a time line for the conduct of denovo proceedings. The word if clearly denotes that the question is yet to be settled.
24. National Bank of Pakistan and others vs. Shamoon Khan and others (2010 PLC (C.S.) 608) is a case decided by the Hon'ble Apex Court in which the respondent Bank simply did not do anything whatsoever during the time period mandated by the Service Tribunal and simply stayed put. This is again distinguishable from the case before us where the entire inquiry proceedings were conducted within the prescribed six months time-line and even the issuance of show cause notice had been ordered within the time frame provided by the Service Tribunal. Only the show cause notice was formally issued after 06.08.2004. There was, thus nothing left to be inquired after 29.07.2004. Another case on the subject is Zarai Taraqiati Bank Ltd., Islamabad and another vs. Aftab Ahmad Kolachi and another (2009 SCMR 129) in which the inquiry proceedings not even initiated within the four months stipulation and therefore, the said case is distinguishable as well.
25. On another more specific note, one that would perhaps dwarf all other issues, the appellant bank was privatized in 2004 and therefore, evers ince was not a "person" within the meaning of Article 199 of the Constitution and did not belong in the realm of public law any more. A constitutional petition against the appellant bank in the year 2008 was therefore, manifestly not competent. In the case of Abdul Wahab (supra) (2013 SCMR 1383 ), it has been held in para 7 as under:- "It is an admitted position that the Bank has been privatized and the majority shareholding thereof, has been acquired and is vested in Agha Khan Foundation, there also is no discord that the Board of Management of HBL is predominantly represented by the said foundation. However , in order to bring the Bank within the purview and the connotation(s) of a 'person' and 'authority' appearing in Articles 199, 199(5) and 199(1)(c) of the Constitution and also for the purposes of urging that appropriate order , in the nature of a writ can be issued independently by this Court under Article 184(3) (Constitution), to the Bank, the learned counsel for the petitioners has strenuously relied upon the 'function test'; and in this respect it is submitted that the State/Federation has a considerable, shareholding in the Bank and representation in the managing affairs thereto therefore it shall qualify having the status of a person/authority within the meaning of the law; besides, the Bank is being regulated by and under the authority of the SBP thus on this count as well it (Bank) has the status mentioned above, therefore this Court should exercise its jurisdiction in terms of the Article supra. In this context, it may be held that for the purposes of resorting to the 'function test', two important factors are the most relevant i.e. the extent of financial interest of the State/Federation in an institution and the dominance in the controlling affairs thereof. But when queried, it is not shown if the State/Federation has the majority of shareholding, or majority representation in the Board of Management of the Bank. As regards the authority and the role of the SBP (in the above context), SBP is only a regulatory body for all the banks operating in Pakistan in terms of Banking Compan ies Ordinance 1962 and suffice it to say that such regulatory role and control of SBP shall not clothe the Bank, with the status of a 'person' or the 'authority' performing the functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation. Rather it shall remain to be a private entity . In support of the above, reliance can be placed on two judgm ents of this Court reported as Salahuddin and 2 others v. Frontier Sugar Mills and Distillery Ltd. Takht Bhai and 10 others (PLD 1975 SC 244), which prescribes that "regulatory control does not make a person performing functions in relation to the federation or a province"; likewise in Pakistan Red Crescent Society and another v. Syed Nazir Gillani (PLD 2005 SC 806) it was held "such control must be particular to the body in question and must be persuasive...... on the other hand, when the control is merely regulatory whether under the statute or otherwise it would not serve to make the body a 'State', therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that the Bank is a private institution for all intents and purposes."
The learned Single Judge failed to appreciate this basic fact, a fact strenuously put forward by the appellant, both verbally and in writing. The learned Single Judge has not even noted or addressed this issue. How could a writ be issued against a private person?
26. After an analysis of the precedents in issue, it is crystal that the respondent whose terms and conditions were governed by Habib Bank Limited Staff Service Rules, 1981 and who had been dismissed from service under such rules could not invoke the remedy afforded by Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 since his relationship with the appellant was governed by the rule of master and servant. Since he could not have filed a constitutional petition, the order passed by the learned Single Judge allowing the petition cannot possibly be sustained. Moreover and even more importantly , appellant Bank not being a person within the contemplation of Article 199, no writ could have been issued to it.
27. In view of what has been discussed above, the errors of law and fact committed by the learned Single Judge are fatal and therefore, his judgment cannot be allowed to remain in the field. This appeal must be allowed. The impugned judgment is therefore, set-aside.