MUHAMMAD SHAN GUL, J.- By filing the instant civil revision, the petitioner has challenged an order dated 18.02.2016 passed by a learned Civil Judge, whereby an application for restoration of an application for restoration of a suit for declaration filed by petitioner was dismissed as also an order dated 26.02.2018 passed by a learned Addl. District Judge by virtue of which the appeal filed by the petitioner against the said order was also dismissed.
2. The facts in brief, necessary for the adjudication of the instant Civil Revision are, that the petitioner 's mother Mst.
Maryam Bibi filed a suit for declaration with permanent injunction praying that suit land measuring 9-Marlas 4- sarsai situated in Chak No.168/10-R Tehsil and District Khanewal is under her possession and that order dated 16.04.1995 passed by Member , Board of Revenue and order dated 23.01.1992 passed by Assistant Commissioner (Consolidation) and orders dated 27.08.1993 & 09.03.1994 passed by Colony Assistant are against law and facts, thus, are liable to be set aside. W ritten statement was submitted in the matter by the Province of Punjab.
3. Mst. Maryam Bibi, the mother of the petitioner died on 22.12.1998. On 05.01.1999, the counsel for late Mst.
Maryam Bibi informed the court about her death. He was asked to file amended plaint after contacting the legal heirs of Mst. Maryam Bibi by the trial court. Since the counsel for the petitioner Mst. Maryam Bibi was not contacted by the legal heirs even after, according to him, he had informed them and apprised them, the suit filed by Mst.
Maryam Bibi was dismissed for non-prosecution on 30.06.1999.
4. On 15.07.1999, the petitioner Badar Din jumped into the foray and while stepping into his mother 's shoes as the legal heir of his mother , filed an application for restoration of the suit. This application for restoration of the suit was dismissed for non-prosecution on 14.12.1999. Therefore, the position that emerged was that a suit for declaration was dismissed on 30.06.1999. The suit was sought to be revived by an application dated 19.07.1999 but the said application was dismissed for non-prosecution as well on 14.12.1999. Thereafter , the petitioner remained in a state of deep slumber and after more than 3/2 years on 23.04.2003, the petitioner moved an application for restoration of the application for restoration of the suit. Not surprisingly and going by the lame conduct of the petitioner , even this application was dismissed for non-pro secution on 09.04.2009. However , the same was restored after six years on 07.09.2015. During the proceedings for restoration of application filed for restoration of the earlier application filed for restoration of the suit, the petitioner Badar Din appeared as AW.1 and produced the plaint, interim orders, application for restoration by way of documentary evidence and closed his case. The trial court vide order dated 18.02.2016 dismissed the application filed for restoration of the application for the restoration of the suit after noting the negligent and wanton conduct of the petitioner . The trial court dismissed the application by relying on Article 163 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (this is wrong because it is Article 181 of the Limitation Act that has a bearing on, and which governed, the present matter and which shall be alluded to in the following discourse).
5. Thereafter , an appeal was filed by the petitioner and which appeal also met the same fate on 26.02.2018. Both, the trial court as also the appellate court noted with concern the fact that the petitioner had not advocated any sufficient cause which kept him from agitating the matter in accordance with the time line provided in the Limitation Act, 1908. In fact the petitioner took the plea about ignorance of law of limitation which is not only naive but also unrecognized in law. The petitioner also took the plea of filing a fresh suit and banked on the time consumed in the process but he did not bring any documen tary evidence on record which would even remotely advance and support the plea that he himself took.
6. What is of interest to note is the fact that the petitioner by way of application dated 23.04.2003 prayed for setting aside both orders i.e. one dated 30.06.1999 and the other dated 14.12.1999. While the suit of the petitioner 's mother was dismissed by way of order dated 30.06.1999, the application filed for restoration of the suit was dismissed on 14.12.1999.
7. The petitioner thereafter filed the present civil revision in 2018 and the same is still at limine stage despite having been fixed for hearing on atleast four occasions. This court has undertaken a lot of effort in bringing the petitioner's counsel to the court so as to argue the matter.
8. The counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was not in the know of the law of limitation and that in any case his case was governed by Article 181 of the Limitation Act and not Article 163. The counsel for the petitioner was confronted immediately by the Court that even if his argument about Article 181 of Limitation Act governing the instant matter is accepted , his application was still barred by four months having been filed after three years and four months of the order of dismissal for non-prosecution and that therefore, he could not make much headway with the said argument. The counsel for the petitioner , very fairly and candidly , admitted this fact and assured the court that he had only half-heartedly taken up this plea. The counsel for the petitioner also argued that the petitioner had consumed time in having filed another suit for declaration and which suit was eventually returned and therefore, the time consumed in the said exercise should have been taken into account.
Again, he was confronted with the question whether any documentary evidence had been brought on record in this respect to which he, candidly and fairly, replied that no such exercise had been undertaken and that he appreciated the fact that such plea could only have been driven home if it was backed by cogent and reliable documentary evidence. In the end, the counsel for the petitioner quite sheepishly took up the plea of ignorance of law but then he himself suggested that this was a half-hearted argument only meant to appease the petitioner.
9. On the other hand, learned Additional Advocate General Punjab appeared on behalf of the Province of Punjab in the matter , defended both orders passed by the courts below and submitted that concurrent findings of fact cannot be interfered with in revisional jurisdiction, unless there is illegality or jurisdictional infirmity and that since none of these accepted grounds were even remotely present in the matter before this Court, there was no need to interfere with the well reasoned orders passed by the Courts below . He argued that if the plea of the petitioner of Article 181 being applicable in the matter is accepted without demur even then the application of the petitioner was barred by four months (if the application is considered to have been filed for the restoration of an application for restoration of the suit) and by 10 months in case the time is counted from the application filed for restoration of the suit and that in either instance the application so filed by the petitioner was barred by time. He added that while the application1 was also barred by 10 months with respe ct to seeking restoration of the suit, the application was also barred by 4 months if considered in the context of laying a challenge to the order dated 14.12 .1999 whereby initial application for the restoration of the suit was dismis sed. The learned law officer has relied upon the case of Ghulam Qadir and others vs. Sh. Abdul Wadood and others (PLD 2016 SC 712) to submit that Article 181 of the Limitation Act is attracted to the matter , however , since the petitioner had not even remotely alluded to a 'sufficient cause', there was no way that delay in the matter could be condoned.
10. I have heard the arguments and have perused the record.
11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in Ghulam Qadir 's case (supra) PLD 2016 SC 712 at page 726 has held as follows:- "Article 181 of the Limitation Act applies in respect of an application filed for the restoration of an application for restoration of a civil revision."
The Hon'ble apex Court has held that in allowing or refusing both such application s the rule of 'sufficient cause' as envisaged in section 5 of the Limitation Act and its principles shall be attracted, regardless whether such section is applicable or not.
12. Seen in the light of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan discussed above and by acknowledging the plea of the petitioner that Article 181 was applicable to the matter in hand, the same result as arrived at by the courts below can be achieved. This is so because both orders under challenge i.e. 30.06.1999(whereby the suit was dismissed for non-prosecution) and 14.12.1999 (whereby the application for restoration of the suit was dismissed) had both gained protection in terms of section 181 of the Limitation Act when the petitioner woke up from his deep sleep and came to the Court and filed the second application on 23.04.2003 and from a dismissal of which the present civil revision emanates. Furthermore, ignorance of law of limitation is not even remotely a 'sufficient cause' since ignorance of law is not excusable or pardonable and if we were to add the part of non production of any documentary evidence by the petitioner to establish 'sufficient cause', the matter becomes crystal and warrants no interference whatsoever.
13. In a celebrated judgment passed by a Division Bench of the Sindh High Court reported as Ahmed Ali vs. Registrar , Cooperative Societies (PLD 1971 Karachi 182), it has been held at page 187 that "a second application for restoration of previously dismissed application filed for restoration of a lis/suit would lie and in the absence of an express provision in the Limitation Act for dealing with such an even tuality , in all such cases, Article 181 of the Limitation Act would be properly applicable as this Article is a residuary Article which governs all applications for which no express provision is made in the Limitation Act."
14. Similarly , in the case of Premier Insurance Company of Pakistan Ltd, Lahore vs. Mian Sheikh Ahmad (1981 CLC 1326 ), the Hon'ble Lahore High Court at page 1327 has lucidly ruled that "the Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908 covers the case of restoration of an application dismissed in default seeking restoration of the suit dismissed for non-prosecution."
15. Having considered the precedent cases on the subject and after perusing the available record, it can be safely observed that the application dated 23.04.2003 filed by the petitioner seeking restoration of an application dismissed on 14.12.1999 as also seeking restoration of suit dismissed for non-prosecution on 30.06.1999, even if considered in the context of Article 181 of the Limitation Act was massively barred by time and therefore, the orders passed by the courts below do not call for any interference in revisional jurisdiction. The part about Article 181 and not Article 163 governing the matter in issue having been taken care of in the present judgment, there is no need for any interference in the concurrent findings recorded. In view of what has been discussed above, this Civil Revision fails and is hereby dismissed. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.