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1982 PLC 1069

WAPDA THROUGH CHAIRMAN AND 2 OTHERS vs Mian MAHMOOD HUSSAIN

Citation1982 PLC 1069
CourtLabour Appellate Tribunal
Case No.Petitions Nos. LHR-559/A. of 1978-pb
Date1982-07-10
Judge(s)Sardar Muhammad Abdul Ghafoor Khan Lodhi
ResultOrder accordingly

ORDER

ORDER

' In the two revisions the question involved is the same, therefore, both of them are being decided together through this single order. Revision No, 5.59/A-78/Punjab arises from the order dated 9th November, 1978, passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No, 2, Lahore. The grievance petition was brought against the withholding of pay and allowances, whereas Revision No, LHR-82/79-Punjab arises from the order dated 9th November, 1978, passed in the grievance petition brought for re-instatement in service. In both the cases an objection was raised before the lower Court, which was that the respondent was a civil servant and not a workman. The learned lower Court relying upon PLJ 1978 Lah. 134 held that the respondent was not a civil servant but a workman. The authority relied upon by the learned lower Court is not relevant to the case, inasmuch as the person involved in the' case from which the authority arose was employed in the power wing, but the respondent was employed in Building Department of WAPDA. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners that since the respondent is not employed in the power wing, clause (xix) of Schedule H of section 2(n) of the Workmen's Compensation Act is not applicable. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent has argued that, as stated by the respondent in his statement that he was dealing with electricity and Sui gas bills of the staff, therefore, clause (xix) of Schedule-II benefits him and he stands ousted from the definition of civil servant. I do not find any force in this argument. Even if the statement of the respondent is accepted as correct, he was dealing with the bills of the employees of the maintenance of building division and thus had no connection with the generation, transformation and transmission of electrical energy. The persons employed at the Dams where electrical energy is produced, the employees working at the transforming stations and the one employed in the distribution section stand excluded from the definition of civil servant, but since the respondent was not employed in the said wing, he cannot take benefit of clause (xix). The respondent was dealing with the electric bills of his own department and not of the power wing. However, clause (viii) of Schedule II needs consideration. It reads as under :- "employed in the construction, repair or demolition-(a) of any building or structure."

' Since the respondent was employed in the maintenance section of the buildings of WAPDA, he is said to be employed in the construction, repair and demolition. The department, in which he was employed, was maintaining WAPDA buildings. Maintenance means addition of buildings, if necessary, repair of the building in order to prolong their life and demolition of any portion, which is in dilapidated condition or demolition of which is meant to reconstruct it or remodel it. This is noteworthy that clerical staff employed in connection with construction; repair or demolition has not been excluded from the clause. Where the Legislature intends to exclude any class of employees, it specifically makes provision to that effect. For example in clause (xix) in the beginning the clerical staff had not been excluded, but by the amending Act XIV of 1973 the persons employed in clerical capacity were excluded by inserting the words otherwise than in a clerical capacity. Afterwards again they were included. If the intention the Legislature had been that the employees a capacity of maintenance of the buildings should not be benefited by clause

(viii) the words 'otherwise capacity' would have been inserted in the clause. The intention of Legislature is clear that at even persons employed in clerical capacity in connection with the construction, repair or demolition of buildings or structures are workmen as defined in section 264, Workmen's Compensation Act. Needless to say that the respondent being Accounts Clerk was doing clerical work in the maintenance of buildings division of WAPDA and thus he comes within the exceptions of the definition of civil servants.

2. Although it has not been argued that while deciding whether a particular person is a civil servant or not, the definition of civil servant is not to be looked into, but since such a point has been raised by WAPDA in other cases and I have repelled back the said argument, 1 want to add some lines in this respect. It will not be denied by any quarter that whenever we have to deal with any special term, we have to see how it has been defined. Without looking for its definition, we cannot correctly understand the term. The term 'civil servant' has been, no doubt, used in section 17 (1-B) of WAPDA Act, but it has not been defined in the said Act as is evident from the said section, therefore, we have to see what the definition is. Section 17(1-B) has only excluded the deputationists from the term 'civil servant' but beside the exclusion clause, there is nothing to define the term. So the term has not been defined in the said clause. Clause (1-B) of section 17 suggests that for the purposes of Service Tribunals Act, the employees of WAPDA would be deemed to be civil servants, therefore, we have to see how the term has been defined it the Service Tribunals at the said Act has not itself defined the term, but has borrowed the definition from the Civil Servants Act. When we look into the definition of civil servant in the Civil Servants Act, we find that there is an exception that the persons who are covered by the definition of workman given in section 2 (n) read with Schedule II of the Workmen's Compensation Act are not civil servants. Since the respondent stands excluded from the definition of civil servant given in the Civil Servants Act, the Labour Court has jurisdiction, if otherwise he is covered by the definition of workman given in the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 or the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968.

3. Although it has not been argued before me that the respondent is not a workman within the meaning of labour laws, yet since such an objection has been raised in the revisions, I proceed to decide it. From the very designation of the respondent, it is clear that he was a Clerk. His designation is Accounts Clerk. In his statement he stated that he used to make entries about the electrical and mechanical stores and that his pay was Rs, 570. The duties performed by him were not challenged in cross-examination. Mr. Abdul Haque, Divisional Accountant, appeared as RW 1 and stated that the duties of the respondent were not the maintenance of rent registers, issuing of rent bills, dealing with the inspections reports of the Chief Auditor's Office, including the drafts and summary etc. The duties of the respondents are given in Exh, R-1 which are as under "(1) Maintenance of Rent Register and issuing of Rent bills.

(2) Inspection reports of Chief Auditor's Office Draft Paras. And summaries.

(3) Checking of contractors/suppliers bills and maintenance of their proper record pertaining to WAPDA colony and WAPDA flats.

(4) Checking of pay bills of regular as well as work charged staff of WAPDA House.

(5) WAPDA Rest House.

(6) Maintenance of Value and Quantity Accounts of Stores and T & P received issued and balance of Maintenance Sub-Division."

It is clear from Exh. R-1 that the duties of the respondent were clerical and of routine nature. He had not to apply his brain and initiative. He had no supervisory powers and thus he is covered by the definition of workman given in section 2 (xxviii) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. His duties being clerical he is covered by the definition of workman given in section 2 (1) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 also. I, therefore, hold that the respondent is not a civil servant but a workman and that the Labour Court rightly decided the point. There is no force in the two revisions, which are dismissed. The record of the lower Court is sent back immediately, so that the cases are decided on merits without further loss of time. The other point which arises in this case is whether the building department of WAPDA comes within the definition of industrial or commercial establishment or any industry. But this point was not raised either in the revision, or in the written statement, nor the learned lower Court has touched it, therefore, I do no propose to express any opinion on the point. Before touching this point, the production of some evidence may also be necessary, about the functions of the building department.

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