MUSHIR ALAM, J.---The Petitioner has impugned the Order dated 14.09.2019, to the extent of para-13, whereby , the learned Bench seized of the matter examined the proprietary of the order passed by the learned Judicial Officer in a proceeding, which, according to learned Bench, the learned Judicial Officer has passed two orders conflicting each other and the manner in which such orders have been passed reflect adversery on the knowledge and efficiency of the Judicial Of ficer.
2. Mr. Rasheed A. Rizvi, learned counsel for the Petitioner by placing reliance in the case of Ms. Nusrat Yasmin v.
Registrar , Peshawar High Court Peshawar and others contended that the High Court should refrain from passing structure on judicial side, though he states that High Court misused supervisory jurisdiction in terms of Article 203 and he also does not dispute that MIT can always independently examine any proceedings, from independent information, and can conduct independent inquiry as to the proprietary of the orders and all administrative actions, after which it may conduct such action including counseling and/or otherwise.
3. Learned Additional Advocate General present in Court states that he has no objection at all instead of examining the matter at judicial side, same may be examined on administrative side by the MIT without being influenced with any observations made by the Bench.
4. The question requires whether the High Court can pass strictures against a Judicial Officer on the Judicial side or whether it is solely to be done at the administrative side by the MIT has most recently been addressed by this Court in the case of Miss Nusrat Yasmin v. Registrar , Peshawar High Court, Peshawar where this Court, sized of a matter that concerned the scope of judicial and administrative powers enjoyed by the High Court under the Constitution, 1973 vis--vis passing judicial strictures against judicial of ficers, came to a conclusion as follows: "The High Court enjoys original, appellate and revisional jurisdiction under various provisions of law and the Constitution and while exercising these jurisdictions, the High Court enjoys the power to modify , set aside or uphold1 the judgment of the courts below . As a matter of routine, the High Court comes across orders of the lower court, which are not justified either in law or in fact, and modifies them or sets them, aside. The concept of appeal and revision to a higher forum presumes that a judge in spite of discharging his or her duties to the best of his abilities and capacity may still or to make a mistake...
The High Court while adjudicating a lis is free to examine all aspects of the case that are necessary and integral for the determination of the case and this includes, in a particular case, bias or malice on the part of the judge of the District Judiciary , if the record of the case supports it. This, at best, will result in setting aside the impugned judgment on the ground of bias or mala fide."
5. When the High Court passes strictures in its judgments, this Court has stated that: "What is under examination on the judicial side is the legal reasoning behind the order or the judgment. Error , if any, in the legal reasoning, application of law or appraisal of evidence by the courts below , is rectified by the High Court, in accordance with the law, which may include the ground of bias or malice. Stricture recorded in a judgment, on the other hand, is "a severe" and a 'sharp criticism or a censorious remark" and is akin to a "piece of censure" and passes for a "critical remark" regarding the conduct, integrity, diligence, behavior, temperament, and competence of a judge. Stricture becomes accessible and remains in. the public domain (as part of the judgment) for posterity. Subsequent exoneration of the judge in departmental disciplinary proceeding cannot undo the damage already done, as the stricture continues to exist in the judgment and the mind of the public.
Strictures do not restrain the judge from continuing as a judge but at the same time, shatter his confidence and weaken his petformance. There is nothing reformative about a judicial stricture and is a stigma thrust upon a judge with no formal legal recourse to undo it. Public disgrace suffered at the hands of the judicial strictures remains in the public memory, as if, etched in stone.
6. The passing of adverse findings against the judicial officers of the subordinate courts has also previously been not approved as in the case of Muhammad Mansha v . The State where: "2. The subordinate Courts or the inferior Courts as they are sometimes called are an integral part of the judicial system of our country . The description "inferior Courts", or "inferior tribunal" is a categorising and not a derogatory description. Such Courts or tribunals "are not inferior in the doing of justice; nor in the judges who man them, nor in the advocates who plead in them . The rule of law depends upon public confidence and public acceptance of the judicial system; therefore, anything which tends to undermine that confidence in the judicial system must be strongly discountenanced. It is for these reasons that we feel that the observations in the order of the learned Judge in the High Court that there were some extraneous considerations which weighed with the learned Additional Sessions Judge for granting bail to Mansha and the direction in para. 9 of the judgment that "Mr. Ghulam Mustafa Shahzad, Additional Sessions Judge, Sheikhupura to appear in person before this Court on 14-11-1995" should not have been made. The sweeping condemning observation that the learned Additional Sessions Judge was moved, in making the impugned order, by "extraneous considerations" and the direction referred to above, must necessarily shake the public confidence' at least the confidence in that officer of the people of the district where he is for the time being serving; it is the more serious because the officer had had no opportunity of explaining his position before the observation was made."
7. The High Court must, when arriving at a contrary conclusion in a matter before it from the subordinate judiciary , tread with caution when commenting on the ability , competence, integrity , and behavior of the judge and, therefore, refs ain from passing strictures. The High Court, no matter how unhappy with the quality >of the judgment, should restrain itself from passing a personal remark against the judicial capabilities of a judge of the subordinate judiciary .
8. Instead, the High Court is to exercise supervisory control over the district judicia ry in accordance with Article 202 and Article 203 of the Constitution, 1973. The relevant service laws empower the competent authority to initiate appropriate disciplinary proceedings against a Judicial Officer. Therefore, the High Courts, under its judicial authority , should avoid passing strictures against a judicial officer of the District Judiciary , any action if at all warranted must be done in accordance with law, namely by exercising the supervisory control vested in the High Court.2 3 4 5 6 7
9. In this view of the matter , let the MIT examine the judicial record as mentioned in para-13 of the impugned order without being influenced by any such observation made in the impugned judgment. Instant Cr. Petition disposed of in terms noted above. PLD 2019 SC 719 at Paragraph 4 Chambers 21st Century Dictionary. P.1396 and New Webster's Dictionary of the English Language. . Deluxe Encyclopedic Edition p.969 . The Concise Oxford Dictionary- New Edition. p.1140 . See V.K Jain v. High Court of Delhi through Registrar General and others. [(2008)17 SCC 638], Awani Kumar Upadhyay v. The Honbie High Court of Judicature at Allahabad and others (AIR 2013 SC 2189) and Amat Pal Singh v. State of U.P. and another (AIR 2012 SC 995) . PLD 1996 SC 229 at paragraph 2. . (1 ord Denning in Attorney-General v. B.B.C. ((1981) A.C. 303, 313).