1. SAEEDUZZAMAN SIDDIQUI, J.------The petitioner has challenged in this petition the order of eviction passed by the VI Senior Civil Judge and Rent Controller, Karachi, passed in Rent Case No. 2178 of 1981 under section 14(3) of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, in respect of the premises occupied by them. We have heard Mr. Inamul Haq and Mr. Ghareeb Nawaz, the learned counsel for the petitioner and respondents Nos. 2 and 3, respectively. Respondent No. 1 has not defended the petition. The facts relevant to the petition are as follows :---- Respondents 2 and 3 along with one Mst. Doulat B. Irani let out an area of 2007 sq. Ft. On the ground floor of Building No. S. B. 7/81, situated in Saddar, Karachi under a registered lease deed executed on 26-4-1973 on monthly rent of Rs. 8,000 commencing from 1-5-1973 for a period of five years, to Messrs, Commerce Bank Ltd. Karachi, the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner. Respondent No. 2 who is one of the landlords attained the age of 60 on 21-5-1981, and before attaining that age he served a notice upon the leasee on 13-1-1981 purporting to be under section 14(1) of Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, calling upon them to vacate and hand over the vacant and peaceful possession of the premises within two months of the receipt of notice. The receipt of this notice is not disputed and as the premises was not vacated only respondents 2 and 3 after expiry of the period mentioned in the notice filed Rent Case No. 2178/81 for eviction of Commerce Bank Ltd., under section 14(3) of the Ordinance. In para. 1 of the rent application filed before the Controller on behalf of respondents 2 and 3 as landlords of premises it is alleged that Mst. Doulat B. Irani, subsequent to the creation of the lease in favour of Commerce Bank gifted her share to respondents 2 and 3, who are now the only landlords of the premises. Notice of the ejectment case was duly served on Messrs Commerce Bank Ltd. And it is not disputed that in spite of service of notice no appearance 'was made before the Collector which resulted in ex parte proceedings and order of eviction dated 9-8-1981. The period of two months allowed by the Rent Controller to vacate the premises expired on 8-10-1981 and the time allowed under section 21 of the Ordinance to file appeal against the order of eviction, also expired on 8-9-1981. However, when execution application was filed by respondents 2 and 3 and notice of execution application was issued to the petitioner on or about 12-10-1981, they applied for certified copy of the order dated 9-8-1981 on 5-11-1981, which was granted to them on 15-11-1981 and thereafter the present petition was filed in this Court on 28-11-1981. The learned counsel for the petitioner has raised the following contentions before us :-----
(1) That since there were 3 lessees of the premises the ejectment case should have been filed by all the 3 lessees and the statutory notice under section 14(1) should also have been served by all the lessees.
(2) That the remedy under section 14 of the Ordinance could not be availed of by one of the joint owners of the property unless all the owners fulfil the condition prescribed under section 14 of the Ordinance.
(3) That the respondents 2 and 3 admittedly being the owners of several properties and themselves being in occupation of the first floor of the building the application was barred under subsection (2) of section 14 of the Ordinance.
(4) That during the proceedings of the rent case on 26-5-1981 the case was placed before a link Judge in the absence of the VI Senior Civil Judge and Rent Controller and the order passed on that date by the link Judge declaring the petitioner as ex parte was an order without jurisdiction and as such the final order passed by the VI Senior Civil Judge and Rent Controller was also a nullity in the eye of law.
2. It is not necessary to examine the above contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner as in the circumstances of the case we are satisfied that the present case is not a fit one in which we should exercise our discretion under Article 199 of the Constitution and interfere with the order of Rent Controller at the instance of the petitioner.
3. From the fats stated above it is obvious that the petitioner bas been guilty of gross negligence in the case. They deliberately failed to appear before the Rent Controller after service of notice of ejectment case. The A learned counsel for the petitioner was at pains to urge before us that their Branch Manager, acted negligently in the case, but this could hardly be ground to exercise the discretion under Article 199 of the Constitution. It is now well settled law that remedy by way of a petition under Article 199 of the Constitution cannot be a substitute for the statutory remedies available to a person under the normal law. The remedy by way of petition under Article 199 cannot be allowed to be availed by a person in order to defeat and circumvent the statutory remedies available to him under the normal law and which he failed to avail deliberately by act of negligence. In the case before us the learned counsel for the petitioner was unable to advance any cogent reason for non-appearance of the petitioner before the Rent Controller or their failure to avail of statutory remedy of appeal under section 21 of the Ordinance. All that was said by the learned counsel during the course of arguments was that their Branch Manager, acted negligently in the case. Could in these circumstances, the petitioner be allowed to challenge the order of eviction which has attained finality under the law on account of the default and neglect of the petitioner? The answer in our opinion is that in such circumstances the Court will decline to interfere with the order under Article 199 of the Constitution even if such an order is found to be suffering from legal infirmities. In the case reported as Mumtaz Hussain alias Bhutta v. Chief Administrator of Auqaf, Punjab (1976 SCMR 450), while refusing a petition for leave to appeal it was observed by the Supreme Court that the writ jurisdiction of the superior court cannot be invoked in aid of injustice and in order to defeat the express provisions of statutory law. Similarly in the case of Ch. Abdul Qadir v. Lahore Commercial Bank Limited (1980 SCMR 280), the petitioner who was defendant in the suit failed to appear before the Civil Judge and contest the proceedings.
4. However after attachment was made in the execution proceedings he filed a writ petition in the High Court of Lahore which was rejected on the ground that all the points sought to be taken on behalf of the petitioner in the writ proceedings should have been taken before the appropriate civil Court. In the petition for leave to appeal the Supreme Court maintained the order of the High Court and dismissed the petition with the following observations :---- "After hearing the learned counsel at some length we find there is no merit whatsoever in the submissions made by him. It is admitted that the petitioner had been cited as a defendant in the suit filed by the Bank for the recovery of the loan and interest accrued thereon ; and that the petitioner was properly served. However, for reasons best known to the petitioner, he did not contest his liability, nor did he file a written statement. Even after the decree had been passed and it had been stipulated that he would be responsible for the payment of the loan as a guarantor in case the decretal amount was not paid by the other defendants, he did not file any appeal against this judgment and decree He did not even raise any objection in the executing Court against the attachment of his property. It thus becomes clear that be voluntarily failed to avail himself of the remedies available to him under the civil law. In these circumstances, he had obviously no locus standi to maintain a writ petition in the High Court to challenge the legality and validity of the orders made by the Civil Court in the main suit as well as during the execution proceedings."