SALAHUDDIN PANHWAR, J.---Through instant Cr. Acquittal Appeal Prosecutor General Sindh has challenged the order dated 05.06.2017 whereby application under section 249-A, Cr.P.C. was allowed in a case emanating from FIR No. 191/2015, under sections 353/ 146/147/186, P.P.C. of Police Station Aram Bagh.
2. Precisely relevant facts are that with reference to report number 49 of Roznamcha Police Station Aram complainant/SHO Muhammad Alam Bagh Dahri stated that on 08.05.2015 he was on administrative duty along with ASI Nazeer Ahmed, PC-Muhammad Ibrahim, PC-Shoukat Ali, Driver PC Fateh Muhammad as per DIGP/South/Z.1B/898; at Court Road at 1345 hours Dr. Zulfiqar Mirza along with his 10 to 15 companions came out from ATC court and he when came out from there near main gate of old Secretariat he misbehaved with police officials who were on duty on mobile number APC # SP-9794 and came into raid having pushed such police officials forcibly climbed on such vehicles bonnet and used its speech thereby gathered public and media and this has been witnessed by other police officials who were deployed there for security purpose thus alleged offence of accused persons falls under sections 353/186/147/146, P.P.C.
On above narrated story, the learned trial court after hearing the parties has passed impugned order relevant paragraph is that: "Heard both sides and perused the material available on record which reveals that no any specific role has been assigned to accused person and surprisingly no any persons specifically has been shown to whom accused person pushed and climbed over the bonnet of the vehicle moreover it is admitted fact that people of media and general public has gathered there and no any witness has been assigned in this regard guide line has been given in case of law of Muhammad Pervaiz v. The State (2005 SCMR 1038) wherein august Supreme Court of Pakistan has been pleased to acquit the accused only on the ground of violation of the provision of section 103, Cr.P.C.'
3. Learned APG contends that impugned order is not in accordance with law as the learned trial court without examining the witnesses acquitted the respondents whereas, in this case there was ample evidence against the respondents hence this is a fit case to be remanded for trial on merits.
4. In contra learned counsel for the respondent contends that there was no iota of evidence to convict the respondents and this is a case wherein there was no probability of conviction hence learned trial court has rightly passed impugned order.
5. Needless to mention that the trial court(s) are competent to exercise their power under sections 249-A and 265-K, Cr.P.C. where, taking available material as true, yet there is no probability of conviction; or where charge appears to be groundless and further process would be nothing but an abuse to process of law. Reference may well be made to the case of Ghulam Farooq Tarar v. Rizwan Ahmed and others (2008 SCMR 383) where such principle reiterated as:- "5. There is no cavil to the proposition that a Court can acquit the accused under section 249-A, Cr.P.C. if after hearing the Public Prosecutor it 'considers that the charge is groundless or that there is no probability of the accused being convicted of any offence......".
Though, there are vague allegations of pushing and climbing on bonnet of vehicle yet complainant did not speak a single word that how such acts resulted in deterring him from discharging his duty. To constitute an offence within meaning of section 353 or 186, P.P.C., it is sine qua non that such alleged obstruction or deterrence must be with intention to prevent one from discharge of official duty. In absence thereof, such charge would qualify to be groundless least would make it quite obvious that proceedings, if continued, would not result in conviction.
Further the allegations, as narrated and discussed by the learned trial court while acquitting the respondents, are not shown to be shocking, perverse and illegal and even there is no claim that as to how, if such evidence comes on record as same are, would be sufficient to convict the respondents. In absence of such grounds, an interference in acquittal under sections 249-A/266-K, Cr.P.C. would not be justified. Accordingly, instant Cr.
Acquittal Appeal is hereby dismissed.