By the present writ petition Mr. Tariq. Masood, Advocate of this Court, impugns the validity of the decision of the Supreme Court Enrolment Committee of this Court, respondent, dated tile 4th February, 1981, deferring his case for enrolment as an Advocate of the Supreme Court for a year.
2. The petitioner was admitted as an Advocate of the Lahore High Court on the 12th December, 1975.
He applied for grant of certificate of fitness for enrolment as an Advocate of the Supreme Court.
The respondent Committee called thirty-six Advocates who bad made similar applications for interview. Only twenty-four appeared before the Committee. Twelve were given the requisite certificates while the cases of other twelve, including that, of the petitioner, were deferred for a year.
3. The petitioner maintains that having practised as an Advocate of this Court for five years he was entitled to be enrolled as an Advocate of the Supreme Court vide Order IV, rule 4 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980, and that by deferring his case for a year the respondent Committee exercised legislative function by enlarging the period of five years prescribed in the aforementioned Order IV, rule 4, which it was not competent to do. To appreciate the petitioner's contention Order IV, rule 4 is reproduced for facility of reference below :- "4. A person shall not be qualified for being enrolled as, an Advocate unless he-
(a) has been for not less than 5 years enrolled as an Advocate in a High Court ;
(b) has been certified in a duly authenticated form by the Chief Justice and Judges of the High Court that he is fit and proper person to appear and plead as an Advocate before the Supreme Court Provided that Chief Justice and Judges may grant the enrolment of a person not qualified as aforementioned, if in their judgment, he is qualified by knowledge, ability and experience to be enrolled as an Advocate."
A plain reading of rule 4 would show that enrolment for a minimum period of five years as an Advocate of the High Court is required of a person to become eligible for being considered to be enrolled as an Advocate of the Supreme Court and not, as the petitioner thinks, that after five years of enrolment as an Advocate of the High Court he becomes entitled, as a matter of right to be enrolled as an Advocate of the Supreme Court. Unless his fitness for enrolment as an Advocate of the Supreme Court, irrespective of his length of practice as an Advocate beyond five years, is determined and accepted by the Chief Justice and Judges of the High Court be cannot be said to be qualified for being enrolled as an Advocate of the Supreme Court unless the Chief Justice and Judges of the Supreme Court grant the enrollment if in their judgment he is qualified by knowledge, ability and experience. Therefore, by just completing five years' enrolment as an Advocate of this Court the petitioner cannot claim to be qualified for enrolment as an Advocate of the Supreme Court and ask fur issuance of fitness certificate in that behalf by the respondent Committee as a matter of course. The very language of rule 4 indicates that the Chief Justice and Judges of this Court can refuse to certify an Advocate of this Court to be fit for enrolment as an Advocate of the Supreme Court if they do not consider him to be fit and proper person for that purpose. By deferring the petitioner's case for a year the respondent Committee was in fact expressing its view the for at least a year the petitioner cannot be considered to be a. Fit and proper person to appear and plead as au Advocate of the Supreme Court. It cannot be said to have in any way enlarge the time of five years set. By rule 4 because the period of five years, as already remarked, is the minimum for which an Advocate is required to be enrolled in a High Court before he could aspire to become an Advocate of the Supreme Court. The rule in down in Ghulam Zamin v. A. B. Khondkar (PLD 1965 Dacca 156) that the executive possess no powers to legislate law is not relevant to the facts of the present case.
4. The fact that only half of the number of Advocates interviewed by the Committee were granted fitness certificates and the cases of the other] half were deferred for a year indicates absence of any discrimination on the part of the Committee. The petitioner's grievance that he has been discrimi--nated against is without any basis.
5. The petitioner---s argument that since under section 26(2) of the Legal Practitioners and Bar Council Act, 1973 (XXXV of 1973), he did not suffer from any disqualification from being admitted as an Advocate he ought to have been selected for enrolment as an Advocate of the Supreme Court is based on fallacious process of reasoning. Section 26(2) deals with disquali--fications of persons seeking admission as Advocates of the High Court, Enrolment to the roll of Advocates of the Supreme Court is regulated, as laid down by section 28 of the Act, by the Supreme Court Rules.
6. Referring to the observations of this Court in Zahur Illahi's case (PLD 1975 Lah. 499) that whenever an executive action is taken, against the property, interest or reputation of a person he has a right to know what the reasons for which that action is taken are, the petitioner attacked the legality of the respondent's decision for not informing him of the reasons for deferring his case. The Committee had interviewed him and the reason for deferment of his case was obvious enough as he was not considered fit for issuance of certificate enabling him .For applying for enrolment as an Advocate of the Supreme Court. The authority Rex v. Hyde Justices ((1912) 1 K B 645), cited by the petitioner does not in anyway advance his case. In the first place the provisions of the Licensing (Consolidation) Act, 1910, which came up for interpretation before the Court were different from the rules being considered in the instant petition. Even in. The reported case the Justices bad the jurisdiction to decide Whether an applicant was "a fit and proper person to be holder of the licence". Such a determination presupposed that one can very well be declared to be not "a fit and proper person". There--fore, no one can claim as a matter of right that he should be given certificate of fitness in every case. Hence the petitioner cannot require the issuance of fitness certificate under Order 1V, rule 4 of the Supreme Court Rules just for asking the same after five years' practice as an Advocate of the High Court. His fitness or unfitness can very well be determined by the respondent Committee before his case for issuance of certificate is decided.
7. The determination of fit acid proper person according to regu--lation 13(2) under the New South Wales Motor Traffic Act, 1909-1955, by Commissioner for Motor Transport, referred to in Collier Garland Limited v. Hotchkiss (97 C L R 475), cited by the petitioner was to be made under different set of conditions and circumstances distinguishable from those required for determining fitness of an Advocate for enrolment in the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, the Commissioner had no doubt the power to reject the fitness of a person. This authority hardly helps the petitioner to improve his case.
8. In view of what has been said above this petition is found to be without any substance and is consequently dismissed in limine.